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Abstract 
This thesis looks at the differences in economic growth between Sub-Saharan Africa and East 
Asia in the time period from 1960 until today. Three major causes are assessed which all are 
attempted linked to the government’s role; i) Structural causes; ii) Economic policy; and iii) 
Institutional causes. The main results indicate that Sub-Saharan Africa suffered from worse 
structural effects than East Asia; and that East Asia had a more favourable institutional 
environment. The role of economic policies remains controversial and partly unresolved, 
which goes especially for the role of industrial and trade policies. My main findings confirm 
those by a number of scholars; i) A high state capacity promoted economic growth through 
economic policies and institutional innovations in East Asia; and ii) Sub-Saharan Africa had a 
low state capacity which hampered economic growth and the state capacity was weakened 
even further due to increased donor involvement. 
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Preference 
The work with this thesis has been, up until now, been the most challenging, fascinating and 
rewarding piece of paper I have written. At times it has been daunting to attempt to cope with 
such an open and large topic with so many potential pitfalls. Early in my work I had to assess 
which factors were more important and worth emphasising. It goes without saying that certain 
aspects were fascinating, but had to be dropped either due to the lack of time or due to the 
lack of literature. Two such factors were regional trade and cultural aspects. Apart from some 
factors that have been dropped, I believe so many relevant factors were assessed that a 
meaningful assessment could be made.  
 
Economic growth is such a wide topic and comparing it becomes difficult not least due to the 
fact that scholars opinions differ so much regarding the causes of economic growth. I 
attempted to have a more neutral view on the debate and attempted to the best of my abilities 
to assess the evidence I was faced with. Of course, not everyone will agree with my 
conclusions. I believe that my reliance on secondary sources, and not conducting research on 
more primary data, is the main weaknesses of this thesis. It is more an assessment of the wide 
literature available rather than a field research. Thereby I become dependent on the judgement 
of scholars who have written the books and articles I assess. Another weakness of the thesis is 
its generalising nature, the countries analysed within each region are so different that it at 
times not gives a balanced picture. I would defend the generalising on the basis that it is the 
regional wide differences that are most interesting when conducting a regional comparison. 
 
Personally, I believe that the strength of this thesis for those reading it would be the multitude 
of causes covered and the complexity of assessing their joint effects. Some aspects are more 
traditional in an economic analysis, for instance assessing the role of trade policies; others are 
more uncommon like assessing the role of social embeddedness. Taken all together I think the 
thesis gives a overview of the complexities of assessing economic growth and how 
controversial the role of the state continues to be in economic debates. The common 
perception has been that the state promoted economic growth in East Asia and retarded 
growth in Africa. I found that the picture is far more nuanced on both sides. 
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Introduction 
One of the most daunting questions in economic history is why some countries are rich and 
others poor. There are a number of reasons for why a comparison of East Asia and Sub-
Saharan Africa (henceforth Africa) is a good basis for a discussion of this question.1 Firstly, 
and most obviously, for the time period from 1960 to today it’s the group of countries with 
the “best” economic performance compared with the group of countries with the “worst” 
economic performance, see graph 1 for an illustration. Secondly, as shown in table 1, 
measured by GDP per capita (PPP) the income levels were virtually the same in 1960; as a 
Table 1 - GDP per capita (PPP 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars)
 1950 1960 1973 1980 1990 1995 2001
Sub-Saharan Africa in total 836 1067 1310 1289 1150 1077 1118
     Botswana 349 403 1119 1783 3187 3359 4552
     Congo DR 570 755 836 617 525 290 202
     Ethiopia* 390 439 626 642 581 550 660
     Kenya 651 726 961 1028 1090 1029 1016
     Nigeria 753 854 1497 1402 1161 1068 1157
     South Africa 2535 3041 4175 4390 3966 3824 4208
     Sudan 821 1024 780 931 743 787 1015
     Tanzania 424 459 590 1048 757 664 575
East Asia in total 664 1081 1968 2253 3313 4346 5043
     China 439 673 839 1067 1858 2653 3583
     Indonesia 840 1019 1504 1870 2516 3348 3256
     Japan 1921 3986 11434 13428 18789 19849 20683
     Philippines 1070 1476 1964 2376 2224 2221 2412
     South Korea 770 1105 2841 4114 8704 11818 14673
     Thailand 817 1078 1874 2554 4629 6573 6383
     Vietnam 658 799 836 758 1035 1397 1850
World Average 2111 2777 4091 4520 5157 5385 6049
USA 9561 11328 16689 18557 23201 24484 27948
 
Relative to the world average GDP per capita 
Sub-Saharan Africa 39,6 % 38,4 % 32,0 % 28,5 % 22,3 % 20,0 % 18,5 %
East Asia 31,5 % 38,9 % 48,1 % 49,8 % 64,2 % 80,7 % 83,4 %
 
Relative to the US per capita 
Sub-Saharan Africa 8,7 % 9,4 % 7,8 % 6,9 % 5,0 % 4,4 % 4,0 %
East Asia 6,9 % 9,5 % 11,8 % 12,1 % 14,3 % 17,8 % 18,0 %
 
*Including Eritrea 
Source: Maddison (2001), for a definition of the regions, see appendix 1. 
                                                 
1 When I say East Asia I also include Southeast Asia, see appendix 1 for an overview of the countries in the 
regions. 
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Graph 1: GDP per capita 1950-2001
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matter of fact East Asia had a lower GDP per capita than Africa in 1950. However, a more 
revealing comparison would be the period after 1960 since many African countries got their 
independence around this time and were therefore more able to conduct their own policies. 
The third reason is that both regions had a high degree of state intervention. There have been 
some heated debates around the effectiveness of state intervention, especially industrial 
policy, and this debate is central to understand the growth divergence between the two 
regions. 
 
A central theme is the increased standard of living that follows with economic growth. 
Economic growth is assumed to be highly correlated with economic development. While 
economic growth measures the growth in economic activity; economic development measures 
the growth in the standard of living. The most important aspect is not the growth of 
production, but the increasing living standard of the general population. If people’s lives do 
not improve with the presence of economic growth then what is the point? Given all this, it is 
imperative to understand some of the weaknesses of the GDP per capita indicator as a 
measure of standard of living, since it only measures the value of average production per 
person in a country. Some factors that are known to affect the standard of living such as life 
expectancy and literacy are not taken into consideration with the standard GDP per capita 
indicator. Another measure of standard of living is the Human Development Index (HDI) 
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which is an index comprised of income, life expectancy, school enrolment and literacy rates. 
In table 2 the HDI values and their development over time are shown. The development 
patterns using the HDI values are reinforced using this indicator as compared with the GDP 
per capita. I want to point out three trends. Firstly, the standard of living, even in the richest 
African countries, is lower than in East Asia. Two of the richest countries in Africa, Botswana 
and South Africa, have suffered from the effects AIDS recently and have had a sharp decline 
in life expectancy. Secondly, some African countries have according to this index had greater 
economic development than economic growth, for instance Nigeria and Sudan. Lastly, and 
most importantly for my assertion, is that it gives a comparable development pattern as when 
using the GDP per capita indicator, namely that the increases in the standard of living were far 
greater and sustainable in East Asia than in Africa. The HDI index is also not a perfect 
indicator. Other elements that also are important for the standard of living such as income 
inequality, political rights and a clean environment are not taken into consideration. Most 
likely there will never be an index that will objectively show how to measure standard of 
living. Since the HDI index gives a more or less similar picture as the GDP per capita 
indicator I will take a simplified assumption and say that economic growth and development 
both are measured by GDP per capita. 
 
Table 2 – Development in the HDI index values 
HDI ranking 2003 Country 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2003 
  
East Asia 
85 China 0,525 0,558 0,594 0,627 0,683 0,755
110 Indonesia 0,468 0,530 0,583 0,625 0,663 0,697
11 Japan 0,857 0,882 0,895 0,911 0,925 0,943
84 Philippines 0,654 0,687 0,693 0,720 0,736 0,758
28 South Korea 0,707 0,741 0,780 0,818 0,855 0,901
73 Thailand 0,614 0,652 0,678 0,714 0,749 0,778
108 Vietnam n.a. n.a. n.a. 0,617 0,660 0,704
  
Sub-Saharan Africa 
131 Botswana 0,503 0,577 0,638 0,681 0,659 0,565
167 Congo, DR 0,414 0,423 0,431 0,422 0,393 0,385
170 Ethiopia n.a. n.a. 0,291 0,311 0,323 0,367
148 Kenya 0,461 0,509 0,530 0,546 0,524 0,474
158 Nigeria 0,318 0,376 0,386 0,406 0,418 0,453
120 South Africa 0,655 0,674 0,702 0,735 0,742 0,658
141 Sudan 0,349 0,376 0,396 0,428 0,465 0,512
164 Tanzania n.a. n.a. n.a. 0,435 0,422 0,418
N.a. stands for not available 
Source: Human Development Report 2005 Table 2 p.223-226. 
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From 1960 until today East Asia has grown faster, measured by GDP per capita, than any 
other region in the world. Likewise, Africa has been the region in the world that has the 
weakest growth measured by GDP per capita. Another interesting feature is that both regions 
have had strong government interference in their economies. This gives fertile ground to 
attempt to answer two questions regarding the growth divergence between East Asia and 
Africa: 
 
I. Which factors can explain the divergence in terms of economic performance between 
East Asia and Africa? 
 
II. How can differences in the role of the government with regard to economic policies 
and institutions explain the growth divergence between East Asia and Africa? 
 
In general, two major set of explanations have been fronted in the literature regarding the poor 
growth performance of Africa. The first is external and attempts to see the African growth 
performance as a function of factors that are beyond the African countries’ control. Such 
causes can be geography, history and partly demography. Implicitly, if the conditions were 
unfavourable for Africa, they must have been far more favourable in East Asia. I will call the 
external causes for structural causes since they can limit or enhance the government’s ability 
to promote economic growth. The second major explanation is internal and states that the 
major impediment to economic growth has been the African countries’ own policies and 
institutions. In East Asia the debate around economic policies and institutions has been fierce. 
There are especially large debates regarding the industrial and trade policies of the East Asian 
governments and whether they promoted or retarded economic growth. Given my focus on 
the government’s role within the two regions it’s natural that I will focus most on the internal 
causes as opposed to the structural causes for economic growth. 
 
There are a lot of disagreements regarding the causes of the growth in East Asia. This is made 
more difficult by interregional differences in the terms of population size, natural resources, 
timing of their take-off, and ethnically composition. Even though there are a lot of differences 
within East Asia there seem to be some so-called “stylised facts”: 
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I. There was high government intervention in almost all countries with the exception of 
Hong Kong and the state intervention was especially high in Japan, South Korea and 
Taiwan. 
 
II. There was a high degree of capital accumulation which most likely was related to the 
high savings rates in these economies. 
 
III. There was a rapid accumulation of labour in both quantity and quality and the fertility 
rate declined rapidly. 
 
IV. There was a strong focus on exports, especially of industrial goods. 
 
V. There was a high degree of macroeconomic stability, with the East Asian financial 
crisis being the only true exception. 
 
VI. The successful countries had a reasonable degree of political stability within their 
growth periods. 
 
Just like for East Asia, there is a lot of disagreements regarding the causes for the poor growth 
performance in Africa. The causes are hotly debated and made more complex with vast 
interregional differences where countries like Botswana and Mauritius did exhibit sustained 
economic growth. In addition some countries have grown for shorter periods, but the overall 
picture is far bleaker. Just as in East Asia there are a number of “stylised facts” regarding 
Africa: 
 
I. There was high government intervention, however this was qualitative different from 
East Asia. For instance, there was a far higher degree of public investments relative to 
GDP in Africa than in East Asia. 
 
II. There was a weak capital accumulation process and savings rates were low. 
 
III. There was s large population growth, but the educational standards were low and the 
quality of education declined towards the end of the period even though enrolment 
overall increased. In addition, the fertility rates remained high for a long period. 
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 IV. African economies have had spells with import substitution and the export, which was 
often heavily taxed, was often in primary goods. 
 
V. There was a high degree of macroeconomic instability, for instance there were adverse 
effects of having high debts levels such as a high fiscal burden for repayment and a 
loss of creditworthiness to obtain short term credit in international credit markets. 
 
VI. The African region has become known for its political and social upheavals which 
have made economic growth virtually impossible. 
 
This provides a general picture. Both macroeconomic and political stability seemed to be 
necessary, but by itself insufficient reasons for economic growth. To understand the economic 
divergence one must explain the different experiences in capital accumulation, labour force 
accumulation and technological upgrading. This assertion is relatively agreed upon. The role 
of industrial and trade policy in this process seems, however, to be far more controversial. 
 
The thesis structure 
I will divide my thesis in three parts. A greater weight will be put on the internal explanations 
(policies and institutions) relative to the external (structural) due to my focus on the 
government’s role. Firstly, in chapter 1, I will look at the structural causes that have been 
mentioned in the literature, how they can be related to explaining the growth divergence and 
how they link to policies and institutions. Secondly, in chapter 2, I will look at economic 
policies and how the formulation and implementation of these affected economic growth. 
Chapter 2 will also look at some of the institutional explanations that are related to the 
economic policies to complement these. In the final part, chapter 3, I will look at institutional 
explanations for the growth divergence between the two regions. Finally, I will summarise 
and conclude my findings. Before I proceed I will briefly review some of the causes I’m 
going to touch upon. 
 
Structural causes 
The popularity of more deterministic causes of economic growth has been high. These are 
however nothing new. Landes (1999) gave an elegant summary of the old geography school 
and how it attempted to connect geographic conditions to economic outcomes. One of the 
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most famous deterministic explanations has been Nobel Prize winner Gunnar Myrdal’s (1968) 
“Asian Drama”. The arguments in his book was that Asia had a number of characteristics 
such as high population density and few natural resources which locked them in an “Asian 
poverty trap”. Africa, however, was given a more bright future since the population density 
was low and natural resources were high. It reflected the time’s spirit of African opportunism 
just after independence. History shows a different picture with East Asia becoming the most 
dynamic region in the world and Africa suffering from a growth tragedy; it was like putting 
Myrdal’s wisdom on its head. Today, there is talk of “Asian capitalism” and an “African 
poverty trap”. Many have cited Barro’s (1991) so-called “African Dummy” which was a 
variable that was negative and significant that remained after accounting for other growth 
variables. Something that was specific for Africa kept them in a low development state. The 
lesson, for me, is that ideas around deterministic outcomes change over time and “Asian 
Drama” has come to stand as an ironic symbol of such an assertion. Chapter 1 looks at 
various structural causes that have been mentioned in the literature to highlight differences 
between Africa and East Asia. 
 
The first of these is geography and demography. One geographic feature that has often been 
highlighted is the adverse effects of climate, especially tropics, on economic growth. Other 
geographic features include population density and access to waterways. Population density 
increases the potential for increased economics-of-scale and scope and might lead to a more 
advanced division of labour which would increase productivity. Access to waterways 
decreases transportation costs and might thus potentially increase trade which might facilitate 
increased division of labour and availability of technology. A last feature that will be dealt 
with is the demographic transition. I will comment on the effects of geography and 
demography in section 1.1. 
 
Other structural causes mentioned in the literature will also be highlighted. One of these is the 
colonial legacies in the two regions. Another structural effect, partly linked to the colonial 
heritage, is ethnic fragmentation which was far higher in Africa than in East Asia. The last 
structural effect I will mention, primary goods dependence, is also partly linked to the 
colonial regime. I will comment on the effects of these other structural aspects in section 1.2. 
 
What is important is how these structural causes affect the political environment and hence 
the government’s ability to affect economic growth. Geography and demography are difficult 
 11
to relate to the political climate per se and I will attempt to assess how it might dominate the 
ability of policies and institutions to promote economic growth. The political environment is 
also affected by some of the structural aspects I mentioned. One of these is the colonial legacy 
which created imbalances in the ethnic composition and the political and economic power 
structure. Another structural aspect that is important is the link between ethnical groups and 
primary goods dependence which can raise the potential for political and social conflicts. 
Finally, the political life in Africa is far more dominated by ethnic issues than ethnically 
heterogeneous countries in East Asia. I will look how structural factors might have affected 
the political climate in the two regions in section 1.3. 
 
Economic policies 
The debates around the divergent growth paths have mostly focused on the issue of economic 
policies. The period in question saw, what could be described, as a paradigm shift within 
developmental economics. From 1950 to around the beginning of the 1970s import 
substitution industrialisation (ISI) was widely regarded as the appropriate strategy for 
developing countries to foster their economies from a low stage of development. This 
approach had three main aspects; i) A scepticism against markets; ii) A focus on capital 
accumulation; and iii) A desire to industrialise and produce what the rich did. The results 
from import substitution were disappointing in both the East Asian countries that adopted it 
and in Africa. Two sets of problems were especially paramount; i) Macroeconomic instability; 
and ii) Inefficient use of resources. The exception within the two regions during the 1960s 
was Japan and four other East Asian countries, the so-called Tiger economies, which pursued 
a strategy of export promotion and grew far faster than other developing countries. From the 
end of the 1970s until today the neo-liberals have dominated the mainstream. There were 
three main aspects according to their approach; i) Macroeconomic stability; ii) The ideal of 
free markets and no government intervention; and iii) Open economies. The growth in the 
Tiger economies was put into this framework. The Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI) started 
to practice these policies in Africa through the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP).2 The 
results were in general disappointing and the neo-liberals were quick not to blame their own 
policy “recommendations”, but the “lack of commitment” of African governments. A final 
group of academics I will look at are the so-called revisionists, who criticise the neo-liberal 
paradigm and in general argue for a developmental state. A developmental state would; i) 
                                                 
2 The BWIs are the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD), also known as the World Bank. 
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Coordinate structural change; ii) Make growth visions; iii) Manage conflicts that arise from 
economic growth; and iv) Build institutions that secure economic growth. The revisionists 
heavily criticised the neo-liberal assertion of the growth in East Asia and claimed that the 
market and state were more complementary in the growth process. Most East Asian countries 
did have heavy state intervention and used protectionist measures, although the neo-liberals 
question their effect. In Africa the neo-liberal policies did not work as indented and critics say 
the SAP failed first and foremost since they did not take the specific historical and 
institutional conditions of Africa into consideration. I will look at the differences in policies 
and academic views regarding the effectiveness of the economic policy in chapter 2. The 
chapter will be divided into three main parts; i) Macroeconomic policies; ii) Industrial policy; 
and iii) Trade policy. 
 
In the first part I will look at macroeconomic policies. There is a near consensus regarding the 
need for macroeconomic stability in the process of economic growth and hence the 
macroeconomic policies will only be briefly touched upon. Three variables will be 
considered, the inflation rate, debts and exchange rates. I will comment on the 
macroeconomic policies in section 2.1 
 
In the second part, in section 2.2, I will look at the industrial policies and will adapt a broad 
definition were I will take a comparative assessment of three major areas of industrial policy; 
i) Financial systems; ii) Learning and technology; and iii) Coordinating policies. The first part 
of the industrial policy debate covers financial systems. Financial systems have gone through 
two major periods; one with Keynesian inspired policies with restrictions on the movement of 
capital until 1980; and a period after 1980 with a higher degree of capital mobility. In the pre-
1980 period both regions in general pursued a strategy of so-called “financial restraint” with 
repressed interest rates to make capital cheaper so it would increase investments. In the post-
1980 era financial liberalisation to increase the effectiveness of investment went far smoother 
in East Asia than in Africa. I will comment on the financial systems in the two regions in 
subsection 2.2.1. 
 
The second part of the industrial policy debate is centred on the need for learning and 
technology. A former supporter of import substitution, Bruton (1998), admitted that one of the 
key failings of the import substitution policies was its inability to facilitate a learning process 
and technological upgrading. As some neo-liberals now admit, for instance Crafts (1998), the 
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neoclassical assumption of universal availability of technology is quite probably false. The 
evolutionary approach has to a larger extent focused on the channels of technology transfer 
and have provided useful insight in the nature of technology transfer. I will cover the learning 
and technology issues in subsection 2.2.2 by looking at the role of human skills, the channels 
of technology transfer and especially the role of firms and state support and finally the 
availability of technology. 
 
The final part of the industrial policy debate looks at the importance of coordinating policies. 
One argument that I found fundamentally important regarding industrial policy is that the 
coordination between the various policies was far greater in East Asia than in Africa. To 
overcome the structural hindrances associated with low development and reach a “threshold” 
level complementary investments and institutions are needed to obtain a growth take-off. 
Also, the coordination of policy becomes vital to maintain the momentum of economic 
growth once the economy as taken-off. I will comment on the coordination of policies in 
subsection 2.2.3 
 
The final part of discussing economic policies I will look at trade policies. Trade policies have 
been almost as controversial as industrial policies and will be covered by two parts. In the first 
part the IS policies and the home-market led development will be assessed which had three 
major effects; i) The substitution of imports; ii) Overvalued exchange rates; and iii) Increased 
trade barriers. In the second part, the export-led development will be assessed by looking at 
the advantages stemming from increased exports and open economies and the debates this has 
produced. Trade policies will be covered in section 2.3. 
 
Institutions 
Institutions were taken back into the mainstream at the start of the 90s and have gained in 
popularity as a cause. But different authors seem to mean different concepts when discussing 
institutions. There seems to be two main institutional streams of research. The first is the new 
institutional explanation which is based on the rational man; sees the market as natural and 
hence not an institution; and sees it as the main goal of institutions to minimise transaction 
costs for market exchange by setting “the rules of the game” or institutions as “agents of 
restraint”. The second is the old institutional theory which is based on the social man; does 
not see market as natural and just another institution; and sees the overall goal of institutions 
to influence human behaviour. Institutions using this approach might be better summarised as 
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“social codes”. A major disadvantage of the new institutional approach is that the analysis of 
institutions often is conducted in isolation from its social context as they are only seen as 
mechanisms. Institutions, however, operate with each other and can enhance or retard the 
function of one and other. I believe that institutional changes and how it interacts with local 
institutions is of vital importance for understanding the growth divergence. Especially the 
concept of legitimacy is a key element to understand why some institutional innovations are 
more successful than others. That’s why I will follow the definition of institutions as “social 
codes” since I believe it gives more analytical explanatory power and flexibility in 
understanding the growth divergence. There are three main institutional explanations I will 
focus on; i) Technology; ii) State capacity; and iii) Social embeddedness. I will look at the 
role of institutions in chapter 3. 
 
The first explanation regards technological learning and might be adequately summed up by 
the national system of innovation (NSI) approach. There are two main levels of definitions; 
the narrow and the broad NSI concept. In the narrow concept the NSI comprises of; i) Private 
enterprises and the research institutes that they finance; ii) Governments that set the policy 
agenda; iii) Bridging institutions which include research councils and research institutions 
which act as the intermediate between governments and the users of knowledge; iv) 
Universities and related institutions that provide key knowledge and skills; and v) Other 
public and private organisations that play a role in the national innovations systems. In the 
broader concept of the NSI the focus is on those institutions and policies that can support the 
technology institutions and learning process. Such institutions and policies could include a 
macroeconomic stable environment, well functioning financial systems, trade policies and 
supporting institutions such as property rights. I will elaborate on the NSI approach in chapter 
3; with an attempt to tie many of the discussions in chapter 2 together in an institutional 
framework. 
 
The second institutional explanation is a focus on state capacity and how the state’s capacity 
is linked to other political elements and its own inner structure. The political process 
comprises of three elements; i) Agenda setting; ii) Policy formulation; and iii) 
Implementation. Under the ISI era there was no real theory around the political process which 
meant that many of the potential pitfalls with state intervention were underestimated. With the 
neo-liberal paradigm the “public choice” models dominated the view of politics as a part of a 
political market, where the outcome, unlike that in goods markets, was not optimal. The 
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“public choice” argues that the state should withdraw from markets since policies can be used 
for opportunistic “rent-seeking”. Not everyone agrees with this assertion, for instance Evans 
(1995) claims that the state should be not be completely autonomous or else it will not be able 
to implement its policy after intention. Evans (1995) fronted the concept of “embedded 
autonomy”. I will look at three levels of political influences and politics. The first level is the 
international level. The second level is the internal capacity. The third level is at the national 
level and how domestic political powers affect the decision making process. I would look at 
the state capacity in section 3.1. 
 
The final institutional explanation I will look at will look at, what I termed social 
embeddedness. The state is expected to fill many non-economic tasks in addition to their 
economic tasks. All the tasks are part of the governments overall perception even though there 
is no denying that economic growth and an increased living standard is one of the most 
important tasks the government has. I will look at two elements of the social embeddedness 
which are interlinked with economic growth; i) Conflict management; and ii) Legitimacy. In 
section 3.2 I will return to the role of social embeddedness. 
 
The thesis 
A number of studies have focused on a small set of causes and attempted to explain growth 
differences between countries using the variables of focus. Easterly & Levine (1997) is one 
example on how econometric techniques were used to estimate that differences in ethnic 
composition causes 28 % of the growth difference between East Asia and Africa. Also Bloom 
& Sachs (1998), focusing on geographical variables, attempt to find numerical values. The 
examples are numerous. One of the most influential has been the IBRD (1993) which has 
been a hotly debated contribution to the East Asian growth study by assessing the effect of 
industrial policies. The problem with econometric techniques as a tool for analysis is that 
effects are often interrelated and that another variable affects the independent variable in 
question. Numerical values coming from such studies, therefore, must be interpreted with 
caution. 
 
With institutions, these problems are even made more difficult. Institutions are interlinked and 
complex mental representations which are very difficult to quantify. Sindzingre (2004) 
criticised the neo-liberal attempts of reducing institutions to simple variables in econometric 
equations. The main problem is that institutions are taken out of their social context. To be 
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able to analyse institutions across countries one must therefore assume that institutions 
function the same way in different countries. But, democracy in the US seems to work 
somewhat different than democracy in Zimbabwe even though both are formally democracies. 
Another difficulty when analysing institutions is that they have synergy effects. Private 
property rights as an institution might function better when there a well functioning judicial 
systems and democracies, where each institution reinforcing the functioning of the other. 
 
My study uses different methods as complementary. I attempt to assess the working of 
structural factors, economic policy and institutions by themselves and in relationship to one 
and other. The sources are mainly secondary, which means that the policy implications should 
be somewhat nuanced. When looking at the various causes in isolation one only gets a part of 
a bigger picture. There are also a host of factors that might have been relevant that are not 
covered in this thesis. One of them is the role of regional trade patterns and how the intra-East 
Asian trade which has expanded greatly after 1980 compares to various failed attempts of 
promoting regional trade in Africa. Another theme could be cultural influence and how the 
presence of a Confucian heritage might have influenced the East Asian growth pattern. Not 
including such elements does not make them irrelevant. Still, I believe that enough different 
causes have been mentioned to be able to make a meaningful assessment of the growth 
divergence which attempts to complement traditional explanations to make a more complete 
assessment of the causes of growth in the regions. 
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Chapter 1 – Structural effects 
Before turning to the main focus of the authorities it is important not to disregard many of the 
potent effects of the structural factors. These factors can in part limit or enhance the 
government’s ability to promote economic growth. Thereby so-called structural features are in 
part interlinked to policies and institutions. This chapter looks at some of the most common 
structural causes mentioned in the literature and analyse how they relate to the government. In 
the first part I will look at geography and demography. In the second part I will look at other 
structural aspects such as ethnicity, history and primary goods dependence. Finally I will 
attempt to asses the implications for the government from the effects that are discussed. 
 
1.1 Geography and demography 
Geography is most likely the most deterministic aspect of the structural causes since it 
changes very slowly. To highlight the literature on geography and economic growth I will 
focus on three aspects; i) Climatic effects; ii) Transportation and urbanisation; and iii) 
Demography. A fourth aspect, which is very important, primary goods dependence, will be 
discussed in the second part of the chapter since it’s linked to the colonial heritage.3 I will 
also look at demography in this section since it in part influences the extent of potential 
economic growth. 
 
1.1.1 Climatic effects 
Landes (1999) emphasised the burden of climate due to for instance high temperatures, 
diseases and variable rainfall in the tropics.4 The agricultural productivity in Africa has 
historically been weak. The agricultural productivity has often been high in East Asia, but has 
historically been “eaten” up by the increased population growth which followed agricultural 
innovations. Geography is thus not the entire story. But, the evidence is too strong to ignore 
the fact that climate has put more strains on Africa than it has on East Asia. 
 
There are a number of effects of climate on an economy. Jeffrey Sachs is one of the most 
acclaimed authors that have stressed the burden of a tropical climate (see for instance Bloom 
                                                 
3 Both access to water ways and population density in the African countries are also in part linked to historical 
aspects such as slavery and colonisation, but I will focus on them here since they are more an effect of 
geography per se than of history. 
4 Another important factor mentioned by Landes (1999) was the presence of catastrophes such as for instance 
droughts, tropical storms and flooding which have devastating economic and social costs. 
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& Sachs, 1998). I believe that the literature on the adverse effects of a tropical climate on 
economic growth can be summarised into five effects: 
 
I. Direct effects of the tropics on people: The tropics often have more diseases than 
temperate regions such as the worm disease and malaria, this facilitates at least four 
effects; i) Increased costs for individuals for obtaining medicine; ii) Increased public 
costs for providing a public health system thereby potentially increasing the fiscal 
burden for countries with a large tropical zone; iii) Lost labour hours due to sickness; 
and iv) Direct deaths that reduce the labour stock and has adverse social effects.5 
 
II. Indirect effects of diseases on people: There are also adverse indirect effects of a heavy 
disease burden, I would like to stress two effects: i) Effective labour hours is reduced by 
the decreased health of the working population leading to decreased labour 
productivity;6 and ii) Reduced incentives to invest in education and health due to the 
lower life expectancy which reduces the perceived social pay-off.7 
 
III. Effects on animals: The tamed animals available to tropical regions have usually not 
contributed to a higher agricultural productivity relative to temperate regions due to: i) 
The disease burden on cattle which made it implausible that the already tamed animals 
of the more temperate regions could prosper in the tropics; and ii) Animals in the tropics 
were more difficult to tame than animals in temperate regions.8 
 
IV. Effects on soil: Plants are in general not as productive in the tropics as in the temperate 
regions and this is additionally complicated by the fact that agricultural innovations such 
                                                 
5 There is a link between health and income. The usual arguments claim that increased income leads to i) Greater 
access to medication due to higher purchasing power; and ii) Higher cognitive and physical capacity stems from 
better nourishment. Bloom & Sachs (1998), however, mention that there is a two way relationship between 
health and income and mentions that there were major health improvements in East Asia prior to take-off. Also, 
Bloom & Sachs claim that the health standards in Africa are lower than predicted given their income levels. 
6 This also goes for higher temperatures which reduces effective man hours. But people and cultures in warmer 
regions are in part adaptable to the higher temperatures even though there are natural limits (Landes, 1999). 
7 It needs to be stressed that this argument refers to the social pay-off for society and not the pay-off on the 
amount invested. For instance in Africa a dollar invested in health is very likely to give a greater relative benefit 
to an individual than investing a dollar extra in health in the US since the initial investment is lower and thus the 
“returns” greater. 
8 This effect might not be a burden of the tropics per se, but more of a “fortunate” distribution of animal species 
and that the northern more temperate regions were fortunate with the animal species they had around them. This 
is of course interlinked with population size since the higher agricultural productivity in the north allowed a 
higher population which meant that the natural wild life was reduced and many animal species were extinct 
which mainly left the animals that “benefited” the people (Diamond, 1997). 
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as the cultivations of plants do not cross well beyond climatic zones (see for instance 
Diamond, 1997; and Masters, 2002). To understand the effects of the tropics on soil 
Masters & Wiebe (2000) used frost as indicator since frost had three major effects on 
soil quality: i) Organic material decomposes five times faster in the tropics due to micro 
organisms at the top level; in temperate regions these organisms are mostly killed by the 
seasonal frost; ii) Frost breaks up compact soil since water expands when frost melts 
during the spring; and iii) Frost leads to the accumulation of “good” quality soil which 
means that there are greater possibilities for increases in agricultural productivity 
without the use of fertilisers and other stimulants.9 
 
V.  Variable rainfall: Landes (1999) stressed the adverse effects of variable rainfalls, which 
has adverse effects that are more “disguised” by some aggregate figures.10 Barrios et al. 
(2003) summarised the adverse effects of variable rainfall in four arguments: i) Less 
investments in weather specific sectors such as agriculture; ii) Less power production 
from hydro-electrical power production; iii) Rainfall affects the pace and extent of the 
phenomenon of desertification; and iv) Direct deaths due to droughts, reducing the size 
of the labour force. 
 
 To see how these effects influenced the growth divergence between Africa and East Asia, the 
extent of these effects has to be assessed. According to Bloom & Sachs (1998) 91 % of the 
African land area lies in the tropics, while only 30 % of East Asia does (see table 3). This 
shows, on the backdrop of the previous arguments, that Africa had higher burdens of climate 
by having a higher degree of its area in the tropics than East Asia. Sachs puts much emphasis 
Table 3: Area in the tropics 
Region Land area in the tropics 1000km coastline/ land area 
Sub-Saharan Africa 91 % 1.15 
East Asia 30 % 11.54 
Source: Bloom & Sachs (1998) Table 2. 
                                                 
9 Masters & Wiebe (2000) cited a estimate from Oldeman et al. (1991) that showed that the soil in Africa 
annually lost  660 kg/ha nitrogen (N), 450kg/ha kalium (K) and 75 kg/ha phosphor (P) from the 1960s to the 80s. 
During the same period the soils in temperate regions gained 2000 kg/ha N, 1000 kg/ha K and 700 kg/ha P. 
10 As the cliché goes: “If you have your head in the oven and your feet in the freezer your average temperature 
may be alright, but this does not mean your doing fine”. 
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on the burden of malaria which he means is the main impediment for the African growth 
performance.11 In Africa, of a yearly death of around 9 million people, around 1-2 million 
people die from malaria alone (Bloom & Sachs, 1998). In the 1960s and 70s there was a 
massive malaria campaign that was successful in eradicating malaria in isolated islands such 
as Hong Kong, Singapore and Mauritius. But in many parts of Africa the malaria campaign 
did not eradicate malaria, partly because the disease was harder to fight in these areas 
(Hammoudi & Sachs, 1999).12 But there are also qualitative differences between the tropical 
areas between Africa and East Asia that can explain some of the differences with regard to 
economic performance: 
 
I. Rainfall and access to sea modify some of the adverse effects caused by temperature. 
The tropics in East Asia both have the monsoon rain and a large part borders to the sea, 
especially relative to Africa (see table 3).13 Africa on the other hand has most of its area 
in the interior, more than any other continent; and only small parts of West Africa 
experience monsoon rainfalls. In addition, there has been a decline in rainfall since the 
1960s. Barrios et al. (2003) attempted to quantify the effect of the decreasing rainfall 
from the 60s in Africa and found that the reduced rainfall had adverse effects for Africa 
since it reduced agricultural productivity, reduced power production due to hydro-
electric power production, increased the desertification process and caused a number of 
deaths. In addition Barrios et al. (2003) found that, while rainfall was a significant 
variable for African agricultural productivity this did not hold for any other region. 
 
II. Much of Africa’s agricultural production is not conducted in the tropics due to the 
adverse effects of diseases, rather, it is concentrated in half dry areas that have poor 
quality soil and variable rainfall, which leads to a low productivity agriculture. 
 
III. The most fertile soil in the tropics is usually around volcanoes, which have been 
important for instance for the island of Java (Indonesia). In Africa these are rare, an 
                                                 
11 A disease that might have more adverse effects than malaria is HIV/AIDS that also has direct and indirect 
effects for Africa similar to other diseases. But HIV/AIDS is a more recent phenomenon in the African countries 
and cannot explain the growth in the most of this period, but is likely to render future economic growth prospects 
more difficult. 
12 Malaria is transmitted through mosquitoes which first carry and transmit the disease when they reach a certain 
age. In more temperate regions mosquitoes die before they reach this age. In the tropics, however, the 
mosquitoes survive due to the high temperature. 
13 According to Leinbuck & Ulack (2000) the sea area in Southeast Asia was about four times the landmass. 
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exception is the fertile volcanic soil in the highlands of Ethiopia, but these highlands are 
isolated, which lowers the potential for market-based production. 
 
1.1.2 Transportation and urbanisation 
There are a number of geographic determinants other than climate. I will concentrate on two 
that partly could be connected to policies: 
 
I. Access to transportation: Easy access to waterways, especially to sea or ocean going 
rivers gives increased possibilities for increased trade that potentially gives; i) Improved 
possibilities for division of labour which theoretically could raise productivity and 
economic production; and ii) Due to the increased interaction with other actors this 
could lead to the increased availability of technology. 
 
II. Population density: An increased population density could potentially raise the level of 
specialisation by increasing the division of labour and producers could theoretically take 
advantage of increased economics of scale and scope. 
 
In Africa the access to water way transportation through the access to the sea and ocean going 
rivers is weak. No continent has a smaller land area relative to the sea and there is a lack of 
ocean connecting rivers.14 The picture is markedly different for East Asia where both the 
accessibility through the sea and ocean penetrating rivers are high. So East Asia did not have 
the problem of landlocked countries. Landlocked countries are not only a geographic 
phenomenon, but also have a historic and political dimension as pointed out by for instance 
Collier (1998a) and Hagen (2002). For East Asia this gave a big advantage with lower 
transportation costs which could facilitate increased trade. Africa had larger difficulties with 
regard to water transport, but there are other factors at play as well in the African case. There 
are three other ways transportation is hindered in Africa; i) A large distance from key markets 
with the historical hindrance of the Sahara desert; ii) African topography and disease climate 
made non-waterway land transportation very costly and dangerous, and this can explain the 
low exchanges between African villages and the lack of a more sophisticated division of 
                                                 
14 Bloom & Sachs (1998) mentioned that there are few natural harbours that function as junctures for 
international trade. 
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labour in Africa historically;15 and iii) The economies of Africa are not complementary in 
their production structure which is also a historical rooted problem partly due to colonisation 
and this problem is increased by the poorly developed infrastructure and other transaction 
costs in crossing borders in Africa such as the payment of border inspectors. 
 
East Asia has a far higher population density than Africa (see table 4). This could be 
described as a potential historic advantage over Africa, but was not exploited before after 
1960. The increased population density increased the potential level of internal development 
through the economics of scale and scope.16 Africa with their low population density did not 
have the potential to increase productivity to the same degree. This argument will in the 
second part of the chapter be coupled with ethnic fragmentation. Northeast Asia is ethnically 
homogenous and these “common-rules-of-conduct” could have lowered transaction costs of 
doing business, while the ethnically fragmented African region had even less potential for 
economics of scale and scope due to the increased transaction costs of doing business.17 This 
brings me over to the next point, urbanisation. Normally, urbanisation is due to increases in 
productivity in agriculture which means that labour is freed and a higher population can be 
fed by using less labour.18 Urbanisation could potentially increase the division of labour and 
the economics of scale and scope because there is an increased population density thus 
Table 4: Population density and accessibility to the coast 
Region Land Area 
(millions km2) 
Population 
(millions) 
Population 
density (persons 
per km2) 
 Population share 
within 100km from the 
coast or river 
Sub-Saharan Africa 24 580 24 21 % 
East Asia 14 1819 130 61 % 
Source: Bloom & Sachs (1998) 
                                                 
15 The aversion of trade due to the risk of diseases is for me a key point in understanding how Africa got so 
ethnically fragmented since less interaction led to increased isolation and the “pockets of people” over time 
developed their own languages, customs and this led to increasing differences. Ethnic fragmentation is a key 
point in the second part of the chapter. 
16 This argument is important to remember when I discuss how East Asia was able to combine import 
substitution and export promotion in chapter 2. My point is that the potential to do so was higher for East Asia 
than for Africa. 
17 This argument is based on Douglass North’s discussion of how ethnically defined rules in pre-modern time 
reduced transaction costs since they had a higher degree of mutual trust. Personally I find this argument to be too 
generalising since it excludes the possibility of local institutions to handle inter-ethnically trade. 
18 I say normally since increased urbanisation could be due to increased food imports as well, for instance it’s 
hard to claim that the virtually non-existent agriculture sector in Hong Kong and Singapore contributed to the 
growth of their city sizes. 
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increasing agglomeration effects. Urbanisation has traditionally been low in Africa.19 In East 
Asia the picture in general is not that much different apart from Japan.20 Nevertheless there 
are two trends are important; i) Urbanisation was traditionally higher in East Asia than in 
Africa, if nothing else just due to the higher population density; and ii) Urbanisation increased 
far more rapidly in East Asia since 1960 and has been facilitated by increases in agricultural 
productivity. The urbanisation in Africa, though increasing, is still lower than for other 
regions and is not necessarily driven by increased agricultural productivity, but perhaps the 
opposite, failing crops combined with a high population growth which leads to over-
urbanisation since the foundations in agriculture to support urbanisation had not been laid. 
 
Water transportation and population density could also be combined to be used as an 
explanation for the growth divergence. Gallup et al. (1999) found that a high population 
density close to the sea or a ocean going water way promoted trade, but that a high population 
density in the inlands was neutral or even negative for economic growth. East Asia has had a 
high population density along the rivers and the coast (see table 4). This boosted economic 
growth by facilitating increasing trade and the availability of technologies. Africa has the 
lowest population density along coasts and rivers of all continents.21 The population density 
along the coastlines could have been extremely important especially after 1960 when the East 
Asian countries had a high degree of technological catching-up. The reason for this emphasis 
is that a more sophisticated division of labour and scale economics might have facilitated a 
process where technologies were more effectively learned and exploited than in other regions. 
 
1.1.3 Demography 
A demographic transition is a process where a society goes from having a high fertility rate 
and high mortality to a society which has a low fertility rate and a low mortality rate. This 
process is a modern phenomenon and is well documented empirically, but is not as equally 
understood theoretically. It normally starts with a decline in mortality rates due to for instance 
                                                 
19 According to Bloom & Sachs (1998) this is a natural consequence of the foundations of many African cities. 
Often cities in Africa did not emerge on the basis of being local trading centres, but rather as the administrative 
and political centre for the colonial powers or as a centre for support services to the mining industries. It’s an 
interesting feature that the African countries with the highest urbanisation often have large mining sectors. 
20 Under the Tokugawa isolation period, which lasted 250 years until 1853, there was a urbanisation process in 
Japan with Edo and Nagasaki growing as centres for commerce and trade in a integrated national market (see for 
instance Mosk, 2001). 
21 A plausible explanation might be the established patterns of behaviour (read institutions) that developed as a 
response to slavery, the less accessible your tribe was for others, the better. However, this might only be true for 
weaker tribes since the slave trading tribes which sold slaves needed to be close to waterways to do business 
with Europeans and Arabs. 
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better hygiene, better medication and better nourishment due to an increased standard of 
living. While mortality rates fall first, the fertility rates normally adjust more sluggishly 
perhaps due to established customs. After a certain amount of time with mortality rates still on 
the decline, the fertility rates starts to decline due to decreased need to have many children 
since more children make it to adulthood and changing preferences due to a higher standard of 
living. Finally, a society ends up in a situation with a low fertility and low mortality rate 
which can be observed in many developed countries. Since mortality rates decline before birth 
rates, this facilitates an increased population growth during the demographic transition. The 
dependence ratio is the relative share of the non-working population, the population under 15 
years and over 64 years relative to the working age population from 15 to 64 years. An 
increased dependency ratio is perceived to be costly for society since there is an increased 
fiscal burden on the working population to cover the costs for the non-working population due 
to for instance schooling and pensions. Both Africa and East Asia have experienced 
demographic transitions, but with partly opposing experiences: 
 
• In East Asia the mortality rates started to decline after World War II leading to a high 
population growth. The birth rates adjusted faster than was the case during the 
European demographic transition and started to fall quite rapidly. This led to an 
increasing working population relative to the non-working population and a 
decreasing dependence ratio (see table 5). This led to a situation where: i) The 
economic growth led to a higher spending per pupil even if the percentage of GDP to 
schooling did not change leading to a better quality of education; and ii) A boosting of 
output due to the increased working population, a factor increase, without having the 
same increasing social costs of a increasing dependence ratio. This effect for East Asia 
has been termed a “demographic bonus”.22 
 
Table 5 – Population growth (Average annual growth 1965-90) 
 Total Working age Non-Working age 
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.82 % 2.74 % 2.91 % 
East Asia 1.75 % 2.43 % 0.66 % 
World 1.84 % 2.14 % 1.39 % 
Source: United Nations (UN) – World Population Prospects: The 2000 Revision. 
                                                 
22 For a useful schematic illustration see Crafts (1998). 
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• In Africa the mortality rates also declined after World War II which facilitated an 
increased population growth. But, unlike East Asia, the birth rates did not adjust as 
rapidly and only started to show a declining trend in the beginning of the 90s. The 
effect therefore was the opposite; the growth of the non-working population was 
higher than the working population leading to an increasing dependence ratio (see 
table 5). This led to a situation where: i) The lack of economic growth, especially after 
1980, led to a decreasing spending per student even when the spending on education 
as a percentage of GDP did not change dramatically, leading to less resources per 
student and a decreasing quality of education; and ii) The economic growth that was 
achieved was often “eaten up” by the increased population growth, instead of boosting 
output the demographic transition increased the social costs by increasing the 
dependency ratio. To continue the analogy this effect for Africa could be termed a 
“demographic drag”. 
 
The causes for the different effects of the demographic transitions are debated. Two major 
explanations have been fronted. There seems to be a consensus that there is a complex link 
between economic growth and the demographic transition. Both are both causes and effects. 
Bloom & Sachs (1998) puts the emphasis on the demographic transition and claims that the 
demographic transition mainly was a cause for low growth in Africa and implicitly the reason 
for the high growth in East Asia. The reason for the lack of decline in fertility in Africa 
according to Bloom & Sachs is due to: i) In the absence of income, children are often the 
main insurance for parents for when they grow old; and ii) The special socioeconomic 
institutions in Africa such as for instance polygamy and other institutions that may go as far 
back as slavery. Collier (1998a) puts the emphasis on economic growth and claims that lack 
of economic growth in Africa was the cause for the lack of decline in fertility rates; while the 
presence of economic growth in East Asia implicitly was the cause for the decline in fertility 
rates creating a virtuous circle. The debate is far from settled and in part shows the lack of 
theoretical understanding of the demographic transition process.23 The message from the 
literature seems to be that there is a complex link between economic growth and demography. 
Both factors are causes and effects without a universal agreement which of these factors is the 
main driver. 
                                                 
23 A problem with the arguments from Bloom & Sachs (1998) is that the fertility has declined in African 
countries like Botswana and Mauritius that did experience sustained economic growth. However, a problem with 
Collier’s (1998a) argument is why the fertility in African countries like Cote D’Ivoire, Nigeria and Kenya did 
not decline in the 1960s and early 1970s when these countries did exhibit economic growth. 
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 1.2 Other structural causes 
There are a host of other important structural aspects that have limited the African and 
perhaps enhanced the East Asian economies potential for economic growth. I will look at 
three of them in this section; i) History; ii) Ethnic fragmentation; and iii) Primary goods 
dependence. 
 
1.2.1 History 
Historical factors affect the development of the current events; this is the idea of historical 
path-dependency. I will not discuss the effects of slavery on the economic growth in Africa 
extensively, but this does not mean that these are not paramount. Quite the contrary, 
institutions that developed as a response to slavery, especially the trans-Atlantic one, could 
have had adverse effects by for instance influencing the pattern of settlement with an 
increased population in the interior away from the sea. My focus will, though, be on the 
effects of colonisation since it’s a more recent phenomenon and my focus is not on the burden 
of history per se. 
 
The extent of colonialism was large in both regions from the 19th century until the aftermath 
of the Second World. Apart from two small countries, the whole African continent was 
dominated politically by European powers.24 In East Asia, Japan and Thailand remained 
independent, officially so too China even though there policies were influences by foreign 
powers and they lost some of their land such as Macao, Hong Kong and Taiwan. The 
literature on the adverse effects of colonisation is diverse and different factors are used to 
explain the difficulties of the colonial legacy. I will look at three of these: 
 
I. Identity and status: Bertouchi & Canova (1996) looked at the identity and status of the 
colonial power and economic growth in Africa and concluded that: i) British colonies 
developed better than French with the other former colonial powers trailing thereafter; 
and ii) Protectorates have had a more positive development following independence 
than pure colonies. Africa’s only “miracle” growth country, Botswana, was a former 
British protectorate. The reason for the better performance of British colonies, according 
to Bertouchi & Canova could be: i) Their indirect rule which did not disturb the pre-
                                                 
24 The two small African countries that remained independent were Liberia and Ethiopia. 
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existing institutions as much as other colonial powers allowing for continuity; and ii)  
The superiority of the British parliamentary system compared with the French 
presidential system. The South East Asian countries seem in general to fit the colonial 
heritage pattern that’s found in Africa with former British colonies such as Hong Kong, 
Singapore and Malaysia showing better economic development than many other former 
European/American colonies in the region. However, the Japanese colonial heritage in 
Korea and Taiwan warrants some special attention. The effects of Japanese colonisation 
are heavily debated, especially in South Korea. In general there are two general views; i) 
The colonial heritage was positive and contributed to economic growth after the Second 
World War; and ii) The colonial heritage was either virtually neutral or even negative 
and did not contribute significantly to economic growth after independence. The first 
school, which is most popular among non-Korean researchers, says that the colonial 
heritage was positive due to; i) The building up of infrastructure; ii) Increasing the 
human capital; iii) Creating institutions that “obviously” were favourable for economic 
growth; and iv) The establishment of an authoritarian state which could “force” policies 
through (see for instance Cumings, 1984; and Eckert, 1991). The main evidence that 
these scholars emphasise is the correlation between the economic growth in the pre-
1945 period in South Korea and the post-1960 period and the broad similarities to the 
“Japanese economic model”. The second school, comprising of mostly Korean 
researchers, in general argue that the contribution was not that positive and emphasise 
that; i) Most of the infrastructure was destroyed during the Korean War; ii) Human 
capital increased vastly between 1945 and 1960; iii) Most of the industry was placed in 
North Korea; and iv) The institutions that were favourable for economic development 
gradually developed after the Second World War. Jonghoe (2004) said that the Japanese 
colonial heritage only was marginally positive, but did have two positive side effects, 
namely the removal of the corrupt Choson regime in 1911; and the Japanese occupation 
created a sense of national Korean identity among the people in general. No matter 
which school one finds most convincing, the key period seems to have been from 1945 
to 1960; with one school claiming that the advantages from Japanese occupation were 
upheld, while the other claims that they were eroded, especially during the Korean War. 
There can, however, be less doubt that Korea and Taiwan got a very different treatment 
as colonies as opposed to how Europeans treated their colonies. Many of the highly 
negative effects of colonisation that were present in the former European colonies were 
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not present in Korea and Taiwan. For instance, neither primary goods dependence nor 
high income inequalities were as in other former colonies. 
 
II. Economic structure: The arguments based on the heritage of economic structure can be 
divided into two major effects: i) Primary goods dependence which I will come back to 
in subsection 1.2.3; and ii) Income inequality which often stemmed from preferential 
treatment from colonial powers to some groups in society which often generated 
ethnically based income differences. The effects of these I will comment in the next 
subsection 1.2.2 on ethnic fragmentation. Angeles (2003) attempted to link the 
organisation of the agricultural sector to income inequality since all colonies (apart from 
some city states such as Hong Kong and Singapore) were predominantly agricultural 
societies.25 The result was that income inequality was highest for the colonies where the 
agriculture was organised in large production units that were labour intensive and had 
the character of a “patronage” system. Often these colonies had large ethnically 
European populations such as in South Africa, South Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and North 
Rhodesia (Zambia). However this way of organisation could also be found in some 
former colonies without a large European population such as Belgian Congo (Congo 
DR), the Central African Republic, Chad and Malaysia. The income inequality was 
smaller for former colonies that organised their agricultural sectors with small farmers 
where colonial powers dictated what was being allowed to produce to what price, but 
where farmers were allowed to keep their profits. The majority of the population 
preferred working independently on the farms than to work in the mines for a higher, if 
somewhat more volatile, wage under harsh working conditions. Examples of such 
former colonies are French West Africa, French Indochina and the former British 
colonies the Gold Coast (Ghana) and Uganda. 
 
III. Institutions: The hypothesis of Acemoglu et al. (2001) was that the institutional quality 
was linked to the mortality rates of European settlers at the time of colonisation. A low 
mortality rate increased the inflow of European settlers which demanded “high-quality” 
institutions such as the rule-of-law, transparency of government and private property 
rights such as in their home countries, African examples can be South Africa and 
                                                 
25 The former Japanese colonies were also excluded due to their different character. 
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Zimbabwe.26 A high mortality rate led to a small inflow of European setters which 
established a higher degree of exploiting institutions which in the literature often is 
termed “patronage” or “predatory”. The examples could be numerous such as Angola, 
Burkina Faso and Nigeria. Africa had a higher influx of European settlers to the Eastern 
and Southern parts, and these parts of Africa tend even today to be richer than the 
Western and Central parts of Africa. The vital component of this hypothesis is the path-
dependency of institutions. Colonial institutions, such as the state itself, often persisted 
after independence and thereby endured. This hypothesis might be less applicable to the 
Asian case. Englebert (2000) had another institutional explanation connected to the 
colonial era namely the origin of the state. The organisation of the state, especially with 
relationship to the existing institutions such as local customs and values is of great 
significance for the legitimacy of the state. In most African countries the state was 
created exogenously through the colonial powers and did not take the existing power 
structure, hegemony and ethnically composition into account. This led to the splitting up 
of ethnically groups through artificial borders with some groups being put together that 
did have nothing in common and some ethnic groups were divided between countries. In 
East Asia the state formation process was to a higher degree an endogenous process to 
the society based on local institutions and power structure. I will come back to this 
argument when I discuss the role of legitimacy in section 4.2. 
 
The natural question is which of these explanations seems most plausible. Arguments based 
on identity and status seems easy and intuitive. The former Japanese colonies, South Korea 
and Taiwan pursued a similar strategy with slight deviations as their former colonial master. 
To what part this is attributed colonial heritage or a common Confucianism cultural base 
seems unclear though. I would contend that the arguments of Bertouchi & Canova (1996) are 
useful in identifying stylized facts, but are too simplistic. In Africa, different British colonies 
and protectorates fared differently; and so did the French. Both the British and French used 
both direct and indirect rule depending on the colony in question. 
 
                                                 
26 The hypothesis seams to fit best with the American continents. The US and Canada with low population 
densities at the time of the arrival of Europeans, but with favourable climates were more populated by Europeans 
than Latin America. In Latin America the native population was larger and the climate less favourable and the 
institutions set up were to a higher degree focused on extracting resources. After independence many of these 
institutions remained and can be used to explain the income differences between the North and Latin America 
due to “better” institutions in North America (Acemoglu et al., 2001). 
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The arguments based on economic structure I often found more promising. Income inequality 
related to the colonial period has often been a cause for social and political upheavals in the 
post-colonial period, especially when this is connected to ethnic groups. High social and 
political instability increases the risk of investment and economic activity in general and 
makes economic growth virtually impossible. Moreover the primary goods dependence 
argument, which I will elaborate on further, gives a plausible explanation for how the colonial 
powers disrupted the “natural” trade pattern. The production structure of former colonial 
economies often reflected the demand conditions in the markets of their former colonial 
master’s economies rather than their own demand conditions. This, without doubt, 
popularised import substitution as a viable strategy after independence. Africa and many 
South Eastern Asian economies were left with high primary goods dependence, while the 
colonial legacy was slightly different in North Eastern Asia. Still, there are limitations to such 
a explanation since it does not explain how some countries are able to break the primary 
goods dependency cycle (for instance South East Asia); while others achieve successful 
economic growth based on primary goods (for instance Botswana); and how some countries 
are able to handle their income inequality better than others (for instance Malaysia). I think 
arguments based on economic structure have to be complemented by some institutional 
explanations to have more explanatory power. 
 
Arguments based on institutions are becoming increasingly popular. Both the approach by 
Acemoglu et al. (2001) and Englebert (2000) are promising points of departure for an analysis 
of how colonial regimes left a devastating, more “invisible” heritage. Taken together they 
explain some of the more rooted problems of why certain African governments did not 
promote economic growth to the same extent as East Asian governments. I think that the three 
aspects of colonial heritage in part can be used a complementary explanation effects of 
colonial heritage. For instance, Botswana was a British protectorate which meant that the 
indirect rule allowed the indigenous political institutions to stay in place. This might have 
made the process of state formation more endogenous and since the British did not set up the 
same extractive institutions as in other African colonies leaving a more “healthy” political 
structure in the form of a parliamentary democracy. These institutions might help explain for 
why the primary goods structure did not have the same adverse effects as in other African 
countries. 
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1.2.2 Ethnic fragmentation 
Ethnic fragmentation has often been treated as a major cause for the weak growth 
performance in Africa. There are, though, difficulties in defining what constitutes an ethnic 
group. As  Hoetnik (1975) pointed out, there are four criteria’s of ethnical groups; i) 
Geographic belonging (for instance home country); ii) Concepts of a common origin (“race”); 
iii) Linguistic; and iv) Religious differences.  The presence of only one of these four criteria 
was enough to constitute an ethnic group. Hoetnik (1975) himself opposed the notion of 
“ethnic” groups since it excludes the possibility of overlapping groups and preferred the term 
“socio-racial”. An additional problem is that the weighting of the differences between ethnic 
groups is different from country to country.27 Yeoh (2001) attempted to construct an index of 
ethnic fragmentation (EF index) based on the probability that another random person was 
perceived as belonging to a different ethnic group. Results of this estimate, illustrated by 
diagram 1, shows that ethnic fragmentation in Africa is far higher than in East Asia. In fact, 
31 of the 50 most ethnically fragmented countries according to this index are African. 
Diagram 1 - Ethnic fragmentation index
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If a country as a value of 1 every person is perceived to belong to a different ethnic group; a value of 0 
means that the probability for a random person belonging to another ethnic group is perceived to be 
zero. A higher value on the EF index indicates more ethnic fragmentation. In total 240 areas were 
analysed with some areas counting twice; for instance Ethiopia pre-1993 and post-1993; also the 
relative shares are not population weighted. Still, the figures are representative as a crude indicator of 
ethnic fragmentation. 
Source: Yeoh (2001)
 
                                                 
27 For instance religion is the main criteria in Northern Ireland; language in Belgium; and race in South Africa. 
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I believe that the literature on the link between ethnic fragmentation and economic growth 
roughly argues along three lines: 
 
I. Reduced incentives for public goods: Easterly & Levine (1997) argue that ethnic 
fragmentation reduces the incentives to promote public goods since the perceived 
benefits also benefit “the others”. According to Easterly & Levine ethnic fragmentation 
leads to lower public expenditure on schooling, worse financial institutions and lower 
spending on infrastructure and that these effects account for 28 % of the growth 
difference between Africa and East Asia. 
 
II. Social and political instability: There is a risk of social and political instability by 
having social tensions due to ethnical differences. Africa has had more civil wars than 
any other region which needs to be seen as both a cause and effect of the lack of 
economic growth. A number of case studies conducted by the OECD identified 
ethnically income differences created by the colonial period as one of the major causes 
for social and political instability in Africa.28 This does not mean that East Asia has 
been spared for social and ethnic tensions, for instance Indonesia, Malaysia and the 
Philippines have at times had social and political upheavals. These seem, though, to 
have become less frequent and must partly be attributed to the presence of economic 
growth. 
 
III. Transaction costs: North’s (1990) argument is that in pre-modern society’s economic 
activities is easier within the same ethnic groups due to the lack of supporting 
institutions such as private property rights, rule of law and other institutions that are 
common in modern economies. North East Asia has large homogenous populations 
which could have given them an historical advantage over both South East Asia and 
African countries. Collier (1998b) combined the transaction cost argument with political 
instability and claimed that coordinating a uprising is easier with a few large ethnical 
groups than with many smaller ones and that moderate ethnically society’s were more at 
risk for civil wars than highly ethnically diversified societies.29 
 
                                                 
28 Gordie & Neyepta (1999) for Southern Africa, Klugman et al. (1999) for three Eastern African countries Aram 
et al. (1999) for the Sahel countries. 
29 Congo DR, the most ethnically divided country on the EF index has nearly been in a constant state of civil war 
since 1994 and does not support Collier’s (1998b) argument. 
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These explanations can partly be used as complementary. Easterly & Levine (1997) argument 
that 28 % of the growth difference is due to ethnic differences is, though, difficult to accept at 
face value. This is not only due to econometric difficulties with regard to measuring ethnic 
differences, but more fundamentally it assumes correlation as causality and it’s difficult to 
asses how much of the public goods produced is due to ethnic fragmentation alone. 
Nevertheless, even though the numerical exercise is questionable, the argument still holds and 
can in part explain some of the difficulties with ethnic fragmentation. Also, the political and 
social instability argument due to ethnic fragmentation is another plausible and easily 
observed factor that affects economic performance. I will comment more on this in subsection 
1.3.2. The transaction costs argument is based on institutional economics and gives a partly 
account of pre-modern economies. It could help to explain long-run differences between 
Africa and East Asia. Still, this argument looses some of its explanatory power when the 
observed income differences between Africa and East Asia first diverged on a large scale after 
1950. Until 1950 income levels in the two regions was comparable, and as I mentioned in the 
introduction, was in 1950 even higher Africa than for East Asia. I would claim that the 
institutional foundations for economic growth within ethnic groups; and not only between 
them, need to be in place for economic growth to take place. For instance, the lack of the 
institutional and supporting state might have put natural strains on the growth potential of the 
Chinese economy.30 Another example is Japan where the foundation for the economic growth 
during the Tokugawa period; and in the post-Meiji period (from 1868) also has to be 
attributed more favourable policies and institutions towards economic growth rather than 
ethnic homogeneity by itself. But, it’s not difficult to agree that economic growth might have 
been easier due to the homogenous populations. Also, Collier (1998b) assessment of 
transaction costs for communicating between ethnic groups excludes the possibility for inter-
ethnic communication institutions which developed as a response to the historical ethnical 
divisions. Nevertheless, I believe that the higher ethnic fragmentation in Africa compared to 
East Asia makes the political and economic climate more complex and thus increasing the 
potential adverse effects of ethnic fragmentation in Africa. The channels for how these 
potential conflicts come into being are nevertheless complicated, multi-faced and interlinked 
with other factors, making assessing the effect of ethnic fragmentation alone a difficult task. 
                                                 
30 See also Landes (1999). 
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1.2.3 Primary goods dependence
As I have mentioned, primary goods dependence is linked to both geography and history 
through colonisation. Sachs & Warner (1995) emphasised the “primary goods curse” and 
points to the lower economic growth of those countries with a high degree of primary goods 
exports. I would like to emphasise four effects that the literature mentions: 
 
• Long-term price trend: The Prebisch-Singer hypothesis states that there is a long-term 
decline in the prices of primary goods relative to industrial goods. It’s likely that this 
differs among different primary goods with oil perhaps being the best counter 
example. But there seems to be a certain support for the long-term declining trend in 
the very long-run, see Bleaney & Greenaway (1993). 
 
• Price volatility: Potentially more important than the price trend is the price volatility 
of primary goods. In theory positive price shocks can stimulate economies, but Collier 
& Cunning (1999a) points to evidence that although positive price shocks might have 
positive short term implications, in the long-term they increase uncertainty and 
increase the perceived costs of doing business. The implication is that both positive 
and negative price shocks can have adverse effects on economies. 
 
• Learning effects: The “Dutch disease” literature has grown vast and diverse. The 
simple argument is that there are increasing potential learning effects through 
industrial production relative to the production of primary goods. Put simple the 
learning effects are higher in industrial relative to primary good production and long-
term economic growth is facilitated through long-term learning and innovations. The 
presence of a high primary good sector will lock resources through capital and labour 
in the primary good sector thereby lowering the overall learning and innovation in 
society by partly crowding out the manufacturing sector and thereby decreasing long-
term economic growth (Sachs & Warner, 1995). 
 
• Political and social instability: Collier (2002) combined the ethnically division 
argument with primary goods. Collier mentions that a higher degree of primary goods 
and ethnically divisions is correlated with increased political and social instability. 
Primary goods can have potentially high resource rents which can lead to increased 
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rivalry to control these rents which can facilitate social conflicts. I will come back to 
this argument in section 1.3.2. 
Table 6: Primary Goods as a Share of Merchandise Export 
 1970 1980 1990 2000 
 PG IG PG IG PG IG PG IG 
SSA in total 87 % 11 % 87 % 12 % 80 % 18 % 71 % 25 %
Individual countries: 
     Botswana n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 72 % 28 %
     Congo, DR 93 % 7 % 70 % 6 % 81 % 17 % n.a. n.a.
     Ethiopia 98 % 2 % 100 % 0 % 95 % 5 % 85 % 9 %
     Kenya 87 % 12 % 88 % 12 % 71 % 29 % 79 % 21 %
     Nigeria 99 % 1 % 100 % 0 % 98 % 2 % 100 % 0 %
     South Africa* 66 % 28 % 61 % 38 % 63 % 34 % 33 % 54 %
     Sudan 100 % 0 % 99 % 1 % 99 % 1 % 92 % 8 %
     Tanzania 87 % 13 % 86 % 14 % 82 % 18 % 66 % 16 %
 
E. Asia in total 34 % 65 % 26 % 72 % 14 % 85 % 10 % 88 %
Individual countries: 
     China n.a. n.a. 52 % 48 % 27 % 71 % 12 %  88 %
     Indonesia 99 % 1 % 98 % 2 % 64 % 35 % 43 % 57 %
     Japan 21 % 78 % 4 % 95 % 3 % 96 % 3 % 94 %
     Philippines 94 % 6 % 63 % 21 % 31 % 38 % 8 % 91 %
     South Korea 25 % 75 % 10 % 90 % 6 % 93 % 9 % 90 %
     Thailand 92 % 4 % 72 % 25 % 36 % 63 % 22 % 75 %
     Vietnam 98 % 2 % 86 % 14 % n.a. n.a. 56 % 41 %
Source: Based on figures from UNCTAD; PG stands for Primary Goods and IG for Industrial Goods. 
* South Africa in 1970, 1980 and 1990 stands for the South African Customs Union which are South 
Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland which are separated in the 2000 figures. 
 
Japan and the First Generation Tigers started their high economic growth before 1973.31 The 
growth of the world economy and the stability in prices was greater in the period from 1950 to 
1973 than the post-1973 era.32 The characteristics of Japan and the FGT are; i) Virtually no 
dependence on primary commodities exports; and ii) High shares of industrial goods exports 
the whole period partly offsetting the volatility in primary good prices. Many analysts agree 
that these countries in part were lucky since they got their economic take-off in a more stable 
period than other East Asian countries which got their take-off later on. But East Asia as a 
whole has had a declining share of primary goods exports relatively to industrial goods as a 
share of merchandise export (see table 6). The region’s export of primary goods declined from 
34 % of its merchandise export in 1970 to 10 % in 2000. Countries such as Indonesia, 
Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam all had over 90 % of its merchandise export in primary 
goods in 1970. With exception of Vietnam which had 41 % of its merchandise export in 
manufacturing, all countries had over half of its merchandise export in manufacturing in 2000. 
For Africa as a whole the dependence on primary goods has declined, but very slowly and 
                                                 
31 Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan are often denoted the First Generation Tigers (FGT). 
32 See appendix 4 for the growth rate of world merchandise exports and its various components. 
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primary goods still constituted 71 % of the merchandise export income in 2000. 
Manufacturing goods grew faster than primary goods on world basis during the whole period 
and in Africa its share increased from 11 % of merchandise export in 1970 to 25 % in 2000 in 
Africa. The only country of the bigger African countries that has over half its merchandise 
exports in manufacturing is South Africa with 54 %. Nigeria, the most populous country in 
Africa is overly dependent on oil. Ng & Yeats (1997) reports that African countries three 
biggest export products constituted 36.5 % of their total export income in 1962-64. In 1991-
93 the figure had risen to 62.3 % which indicates a concentration, rather than a diversification 
of their export structure. 
 
How then did the different effects of primary good dependence come into force? It’s difficult 
to relate the long-term decline in price trends for primary goods directly to Africa’s growth 
performance. There is no doubt, however, that the higher growth of manufacturing exports 
compared to primary goods stimulated East Asian exports and reduced some of the potential 
for African countries. There seems to be more evidence for the second argument, the volatility  
 of primary good prices. The Berg rapport assumed that all developing countries faced the 
same macroeconomic shocks and that therefore the internal policies not the external 
macroeconomic environment was to be blamed for Africa’s poor growth.33 This has been 
contradicted by a number of scholars which claim that there is a high correlation between 
macroeconomic shocks and the economic performance in Africa (see for instance Fischer, 
1993; and Mendoza, 1994). Soludo (2002) claims that Africa lost 50 billions USD due to the 
fall in primary goods prices between 1986 and 1990; in 1986 alone they lost 19 billion USD. I 
think a strong case can be made that those countries which have a high income from primary 
goods exports suffer from greater macroeconomic instability since the price volatility often is 
greater for these types of goods. Africa’s primary good dependence thereby increased 
macroeconomic instability, while East Asia’s declining share of primary goods provided the 
countries with a higher potential to maintain macroeconomic stability. 
 
The long-term learning effects of primary goods seem to be limited as compared to 
manufacturing. East Asia has been able to learn new technologies and upgrade its production 
structure during the period, so there seem to be some intuitive support for this argument. Not 
                                                 
33 Personally, being from Norway, find this reasoning problematic. It is like saying that all developed countries 
suffer the same external shocks. But, the Norwegian economy reacted differently to the oil price shocks in 1973, 
1979 and 1986 than other developed countries. 
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everyone agrees though. A study from Martin & Mitra (2001) cited by Hagen (2002) showed 
that the total factor productivity (TFP) growth in agriculture has been higher than in 
manufacturing in the period 1967-92. I am a bit sceptical to these figures though. Firstly, there 
will be natural limitations to increases in productivity for primary goods production, 
especially for agriculture. I don’t think it’s plausible that Africa could have had the same 
productivity in its agricultural sector as East Asia due to a host of geographic differences such 
as climate and rainfall. Secondly, an estimate such as TFP might not capture all potential 
qualitative differences in an economy.34 Related to this, new and more frequent innovations 
make it less feasible that the whole learning curve is exploited.35 I will come back to 
industrial learning in subsection 2.2.2. 
 
1.3 Political aspects 
This section will attempt to relate the two previous sections to the government. Geography 
and demography are difficult to relate to policies directly apart from for instance increased 
health expenditure on diseases in tropical environment. Rather geography will be discussed as 
a cause opposed to policies and institutions. Historical aspects together with ethnical 
fragmentation and primary goods dependence are easier to relate to the political environment 
and I will attempt to assess some of these effects. 
 
1.3.1 Geography versus policies? 
Bloom & Sachs (1998) argue that the whole debate around politics and institutions is 
overstated since up to two thirds of the poor growth in Africa is explained by poor geographic 
conditions. For instance climatic aspects do plausibly explain a lot of the long-run difficulties 
Africa has. But the message is deterministic and thereby grim. To put it bluntly, the message 
is “don’t live here”. Differences across time and within Africa are, though, not as easily 
                                                 
34 An example illustrates my point. When a widescreen TV is produced in 2000 using only half of the labour and 
capital it took to produce a non-colour TV in 1950 the statistics will show a 100 % increase in TFP. The quality 
of the product, though, as increased by far more than the productivity figure indicates. This qualitative increase 
which increases the consumers well being is not taken into account in a measure such as TFP. Agricultural 
production seems to have less potential. It is fully possible to think of innovations in agriculture which raises 
nutrition and give more cost-effective production, but there are limitations to this process and to fast innovations 
through for instance biotechnology can give negative reaction from consumers. A potential counterargument to 
my point is that higher prices will reflect the increased value of the product. I would contend that this is not 
necessarily the case in the presence of intensive price competition, higher real wage and scale economics in 
research and development (R&D). 
35 New models are produced all the time. For instance when a new TV model is produced in 2000 which replaces 
the 1999 model it’s not feasible to continue the production of the outdated model since the competitors will not 
do so either. This means that scale economics with regard to production not necessarily will be exploited to full 
effect before starting the production of a new model. 
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explained. One can also ask the question what the implicit message is for other regions, like 
East Asia. Were the aspects of a more favourable environment a necessary, but insufficient 
condition for growth? East Asia seemed to have fewer strains caused by geographical 
hindrances compared with Africa so policies and institutions were more effective and 
dominated geography more than in Africa. Still, there are limitations to such reasoning. It’s 
not possible to give weights such as two-thirds to geography. One of the reasons is that 
geography, such as climate, is interrelated to politics, history and institutions. They interact in 
a dynamic way so looking at them in isolation would give an unclear representation. 
 
Collier (1998a) disagrees with Bloom & Sachs (1998) and claims that politics and institutions 
explain most of the economic growth between countries. Even so, Collier (1998a) admits that 
geography puts more strains on certain regions compared with others. Many of the factors that 
Bloom & Sachs (1998) call geography are challenged by Collier (1998a) as being a result of 
politics. For instance the problem of landlocked countries in Africa is a result of past policies 
of the former colonial powers that set many of the current borders. Thus policies and history 
shaped this “geographical” problem. Another example is the transportation costs in Africa 
between countries that are often determined by tariffs and the poor infrastructure in the 
region, which both have a political cause. Another example can be the high population density 
in inland regions in Africa away from waterways, which according to Collier (1998a) can be 
seen as a result of policies that preferred inland over coastal regions. 
 
Geography and demography provides a framework for understanding part of the growth 
divergence puzzle. They show that policies and institutions might naturally be more effective 
in East Asia as compared with Africa and that the economic potential of the former was 
higher than the latter due to for instance population density and access to waterways. No 
numerical weight will be put on geography, however, since it’s interrelated to other factors 
that in practice are almost impossible to differentiate. Even though I agree with a lot of the 
arguments of the more deterministic literature on geographical strains, one has to be nuanced 
and remember that ideas around deterministic explanations change over time, for instance 
Myrdal’s “Asian Drama” which has been proven to be wrong. 
 
1.3.2 Political environment 
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Table 7: Political-economic matrix 
 Majority group in control of 
the economy 
Minority group in control of 
the economy 
Majority group in control of 
the state 
This subsection will be looking at three aspects of how structural factors affect the political 
environment; firstly how history together with production structure creates a tension between 
the political and economic power; secondly how primary good dependence is though to be  
linked to political instability in the presence of ethnic fragmentation; and lastly how history 
and ethnic fragmentation taken together form the historical political climate of how ethnic 
differences dominate the political live. Soludo & Ogbu (2004a) mentioned that governments 
are interested in two things; i) Generating income; and ii) Keeping unemployment low. 
Industry has the potential to generate both at the same time. So a pro-industry and hence pro-
growth policy would be preferred to increase industrial production which generates income 
and employment. But there are difficulties when a strong private sector constituting of 
manufactures becomes a strong force so it gains political influence. As Mkandawire (1995) 
noted, governments exist in a dependency relationship to its main sources of finance. If 
governments generate their own revenue they are more isolated and do not necessarily choose 
a pro-growth policy. When governments are dependent on a few key players for their income, 
these key players will get a greater political influence in what kind of policy the government 
pursues. In Japan and South Korea the government was dependent on a strong private sector 
which got a great deal of influence on the policies that were initiated. Many African countries 
which experienced increasing debts and need for foreign aid have lost some of their political 
autonomy and have to meet some of the political demands of donors, see subsection 3.1.1. 
 
Firstly, history influences the political structure through the historical distribution of 
economic and political power. Soludo & Ogbu (2004a) claims that a majority group in power 
Pro-growth and industrialisation 
policies: 
Pro-growth and industrialisation 
policies: 
Kenyatta regime in Kenya Mauritius, Botswana, Ivory 
Coast, Zimbabwe (1980 to the 
middle of the 90s) 
Minority group in control of 
the state 
Anti-growth and industrialisation 
policies: 
Anti-growth and industrialisation 
policies: 
Moi regime in Kenya Apartheid regime in South 
Africa, Tutsi regime in Rwanda 
Source: Soludo & Ogbu (2004a) 
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in Africa is likely to generate a pro-industry and pro-growth policy (see table 7). If the 
majority group has control of the government and the same group has control over the  
economy promoting this group becomes politically feasible, for instance the Kenyatta regime 
in Kenya. If a majority group has political power, but a minority group has control over the 
economy, a pro-industry policy will be pursued in so far the minority group does not pose a 
political threat to the political establishment, for instance Zimbabwe from 1980 until 1995 or 
South Africa since Apartheid ended in 1994. In 1995 white farmers started to back a political 
opponent of Mugabe and their land was taken by the government and given to “more loyal” 
people. The rhetoric used was the unfair legacy from colonialism which left a high income 
inequality between white and black farmers in Zimbabwe. Before 1995, however, the income 
inequality was more tolerated since the white farmers didn’t pose a political threat. If a 
minority group has political power an anti-industrialisation will be pursued according to this 
framework. If a minority group has political power while the majority group has economic 
power, policies will go to for instance a redistribution of income, for instance the Moi regime 
in Kenya. If a minority has economic and political power there is no need to industrialise 
since it might upset the status quo, for instance the Apartheid regime in South Africa where 
the minority ethnically white people had the political and economic power. The cases where 
minorities have political power are usually unstable. As a mentioned previously, the colonial 
powers often left a legacy of large income inequalities. Some groups were actively promoted 
to support the colonial powers, while other fractions were more oppressed, which created 
disparities in the economic power structure. When the colonial powers left Africa, often the 
state was given to a preferred ethnic group as a “reward” for the political support. So there 
were also direct legacies in the political power structure as well. 
 
This framework seemed to fit well with the African examples I mentioned. But it looses much 
of its explanatory power when looking at East Asia. Many countries are ethnically 
homogenous, like Japan and South Korea, so a pro-industry and pro-growth policy seems a 
natural outcome. The differences in the political environment become clear when looking at 
Taiwan were a small group, which were ethnically Chinese, had the political power as a 
minority group over the majority ethnically Taiwanese. Pro-industrial and pro-growth policies 
were nevertheless pursued, but the character of ownership and the industry structure was 
markedly different from Japan and South Korea. Because the Taiwanese government didn’t 
want large private companies which could threaten the political power, an economic structure 
with small and medium-sized companies was promoted. The large Taiwanese companies were 
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either public or “privately-owned” by the KMT party, which made them de facto public. 
Another example is Malaysia where the political power lay with the majority Malay 
population, but the economic power with the ethnically Chinese. When the Chinese 
threatened to increase their political power at the end of the 1960s this led to mass riots and 
violence. Since then, an active policy favouring redistribution has been followed. But, 
contrary to many African experiences this ethnic redistribution has been facilitated on the 
backdrop of economic growth. So, it was a relative, rather than an absolute redistribution. The 
message I want to make with these examples is that there are large qualitative differences in 
how ethnics, economic and political power influenced the political environment within the 
two regions. 
 
Secondly, the production structure can affect the political stability of a country. Collier (2002) 
found that primary goods dependence increased the potential for ethnically fuelled conflicts. 
One possible reason might be that primary goods normally leads to “easy riches” due to the 
potential high incomes leading to increased conflicts over the potential sources of finance. In 
Africa the primary goods sectors are often publicly owned since they were “strategic 
industries”. Since the government themselves were in control over such a major source of 
finance it became more isolated and did not necessarily pursue a policy that promoted 
economic growth (Mkandawire, 1995). I believe that control over the state, and thereby the 
primary goods revenues, itself became a major source of conflict as Englebert (2000) 
mentioned. More than a coordinating institution which could promote economic growth the 
state was itself a major cause of conflicts. This could have lowered the possibilities for 
economic growth in Africa due to their high primary goods dependence combined with their 
high ethnic fragmentation which increased rival tensions which in combination increased the 
potential for social and political conflicts. As I mentioned, Africa has been the region in the 
world with the most social and political unrest the last 50 years and this has made economic 
growth problematic. One cannot escape the fact that poverty is one of the main causes for 
violence and the lack of economic growth causes poverty. Violence leads to increased social 
and political unrest which create increased transaction costs and thereby lowers the potential 
for economic growth, creating a vicious circle. 
 
East Asia has, as I mentioned, a higher degree of manufacturing in their production structure 
and parts are of the region are very ethnically homogenous. Two of the potent causes of social 
and political upheavals in Africa, ethnical fragmentation and primary goods dependence, were 
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less present in East Asia which could have decreased the potential level of social and political 
unrest. This does not mean that conflicts did not arise or that some countries had a higher 
potential for conflicts. Malaysia had racial motivated riots in the 1960s when the country still 
was mainly a primary goods exporter. An interesting question could be whether 
manufacturing by itself is an industry of peace. It can also be that manufacturing is an 
industry that increases naturally with economic growth and higher economic growth causes a 
higher standard of living. I would argue that manufacturing is not by itself the cause for less 
conflicts, but is interlinked as both a cause and an effect of the growth process, but that the 
real cause for less social and political instability is due to income growth. Some East Asian 
countries that did exhibit primary goods dependence and high ethnic fragmentation were able 
to break the vicious circle of poverty and violence. Increased manufacturing production was 
both a cause and effect of higher economic growth which led to an increased living standard; 
the higher living standard created a more stable social and political environment which laid 
the foundations for future economic growth, hence a virtuous circle. 
 
Lastly, historical aspects like the political history are important for understanding how 
institutions work and how various factors are linked to the political process. An example 
illustrated this point. Nigeria and Indonesia are comparable in important aspects such as 
ethnic fragmentation and a high income from oil exports. Chang (2001) mentioned that the 
way the political parties were organised determined how people voted. If a country organises 
its parties along ethnical criteria, the changes are far higher that voters will vote along these 
ethnically lines. In Indonesia, the political life was less organised along ethnical lines than in 
Nigeria (Ikpeze et al., 2004). This meant that ethnics did not dominate the Indonesian political 
life as much as in Nigeria. When politics are more organised along ethnically lines, the 
problems of ethnically fragmentation and competition for resources gets potentially larger. 
My point is that the African political process in general has been more organised along 
ethnically lines than in East Asia and this has divided rather than unified many African 
countries. 
 
I believe that all the structural aspects taken together give a comprehensive background for 
understanding some of the differences between Africa and East Asia. But what these 
explanations often have in common is that they explain why “bad” policies were pursued and 
not “how” these policies worked. For instance, the colonial argument of extractive institutions 
says that African policies are not necessarily committed to economic growth. They do not 
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state which policies deliver economic growth. This is an inherent limitation to such literature 
since it often assumes that a commitment to economic growth is all that is needed to achieve 
economic growth. But which policies promote economic growth is still a controversial topic 
as will be shown chapter 2. My main message from this chapter is that structural aspects in 
general gave African countries more strains than the East Asian countries. In the next two 
chapters I will elaborate on economic policies and institutions so a more complete assessment 
can be made on the government’s role in the two regions. 
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Chapter 2 – Economic Policy 
The economic profession has seen a considerable paradigm shift within the period from 1950 
until today. From the start of the 1950s to around the middle of the 1970s import substitution 
policies dominated the developmental economics debate. From the end of the 1970s until 
today neo-liberal policies have dominated developing economics and the policies dictated the 
operational workings of the Breton Wood Institutions (BWI), namely the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD; also known as the World Bank) and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
 
Following the Second World War there was a near agreement on the need for an import 
substitution (IS) strategy in developing countries. One reason for this near consensus was the 
general believe at the time which thought that the economic challenges of the 1950s would 
resemble the economic challenges in the 1930s which witnessed economic hardship following 
the Great Depression. There were three fundamental principles behind IS (Bruton, 1998): 
 
I. Market scepticism: There was a general scepticism regarding the market as a mechanism 
for development. These arguments did not so much go against the concept of market 
failures, but more the international division of labour which left developing countries 
producing primary goods while leaving the developed countries producing industrial 
goods. To break out of this pattern countries should follow a path of import substitution-
led industrialisation (ISI). At the time there was also a great belief in what economic 
planning and the state could achieve.36 This resulted in high state intervention and a 
focus on economic planning. 
 
II. Capital accumulation: It was believed, with right reason, that the capital available per 
worker was higher in the developed countries than the developing. This was seen as the 
main reason for the higher production in the north relative the south. As a natural 
consequence the way to achieve economic growth was to facilitate a process of capital 
accumulation. This had at least two implications: i) An overvalued exchange rate was to 
facilitate increased access to capital imports by making imports cheaper. To prevent 
large balance of payment (BoP) difficulties there were set up a number of trade barriers 
                                                 
36 In the 1950s not much was known about the economic system of the USSR and from the outside it would 
seem that this form of economic organisation functioned reasonably well. 
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to prevent imports of “unnecessary goods”, which went especially for consumer goods; 
and ii) To facilitate the process of capital accumulation and investments in capital 
intensive industries a low interest rate was set to make access to credit lending cheaper 
and capital intensive investments were often subsidised or facilitated through public 
investments. 
 
III. Imitation of rich countries: The underlying idea behind IS was that the goods that 
previously were imported by the developing countries from the developed countries 
would be replaced with similar products produced by domestic producers. Lewis (1954) 
made a dual economy model comprising of a traditional and a modern sector. Most of 
the investment and labour were to go to the modern sector and labour was to be drawn 
from the traditional sector. Over time the modern sector would “force out” or 
“substitute” the traditional sector. An important aspect emphasised by Lewis (1954) and 
Fei & Ranis (1964) was that the agricultural sector should be stimulated so the transition 
from a traditional to a modern economy was made through increased efficiency, not 
forced transfer of factors. 
 
How did the IS function in practice? In East Asia almost all countries had a IS strategy at 
some stage. Countries like Indonesia and Thailand had several periods with ISI in an attempt 
to stimulate economic growth. The communist countries, for instance China, North Korea and 
Vietnam, did not follow a IS strategy and had a planned economy. But there were broad 
similarities between the ISI and a planned economy with a high degree of state planning, 
public (or collective) production and a focus on capital accumulation. The results from the ISI 
or the planned economy models were in general not as intended. There were some common 
problems with the IS and planned economy regimes such as i) Macroeconomic problems 
stemming from increased trade restrictions, balance of payment difficulties, increased 
inflationary pressures and increased public deficits which increased the debt levels; and ii) 
Inefficient use of resources with a ineffective manufacturing sector through the lack of 
competitive pressure due to lack of market competition and an inefficient agriculture. There 
were some countries in East Asia, however, that abandoned the ISI at an early stage, such as 
Japan and Singapore in the 1950s and South Korea and Taiwan at the start of the 1960s. The 
trigger for such a shift seemed to have been macroeconomic problems such as the inflationary 
pressures and BoP difficulties stemming from a faster than expected rise in imports that 
facilitated this shift. These countries opted for a more open economy strategy which has been 
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termed an export promotion strategy. Some scholars (for instance, Soludo, 2002b), however, 
have said that Japan, South Korea and Taiwan did not abandoned the ISI strategy, but 
combined it with the export promotion strategy to use them as complementary. These 
countries were characterised by some attributes that also were common in the countries that 
pursued a “pure” ISI strategy namely; i) High state intervention and economic planning; ii) 
Use of protectionism to foster or simply protect domestic producers; and iii) Focus on capital 
accumulation. The main difference seems to have been the active promotion of exports of 
industrialised goods. Japan and the First Generation Tigers (FGT) were the first of the East 
Asian countries that exhibit high economic growth as they got their take of in the 1960s (in 
the case of Japan the 1950s).37 Given that these first mover countries grew faster than other 
developing countries; this gave the impression of an attractive alternative to the ISI strategy. 
Many East Asian countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand shifted to an export 
promotion strategy during the 1970s.38 Also China (in 1978) and Vietnam (in 1986) 
eventually opted for a more export-oriented economy. 
 
Most African countries got their independence around 1960 and started to pursue ISI 
strategies. No other region had a worse starting base measured by the amount of 
infrastructure, human skills and inexperienced administrators. A number of countries did 
manage to achieve economic growth during the 1960s and early 70s such as Cote D’Ivoire, 
Kenya and Nigeria. There was a high degree of public investment and the manufacturing 
sector expanded. Some labour intensive sectors such as textiles emerged and even some 
sectors with more capital intensive production such as steel and iron emerged. But the 
problems that were common to those countries pursuing an ISI became evident in African 
economies. There was a worsening of the macroeconomic stability due to increased trade 
restrictions, balance of payment difficulties, increased inflationary pressures and increased 
public deficits which increased the debt levels. In addition, there were some problems more 
African in nature such as small home markets due to a low population density which 
dampened the potential for ISI. African domestic markets were made even smaller due to the 
high proportion of economic activity confined to urban areas and the lack of income in, and 
access to, rural areas. IS proved unsustainable and the broad decline of the viability of such a 
strategy came with the oil price shock in 1973 which affected most African countries 
negatively. 
                                                 
37 The FGT countries are Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan. 
38 These three countries are often known as the Second Generation Tigers (SGT). 
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 The lack of results from the ISI and the success of more export oriented countries in East Asia 
contributed to the legitimacy of the neo-liberal paradigm which started to dominate the 
mainstream at the end of the 1970s. The new paradigm saw the state as much of the reason for 
the failure in developing countries. To sum up bluntly, the idea that “policy failures” were 
greater than “market failures” started to dominate. The new presumption was the economic 
planning did not work in developing countries, but that markets on the other hand did. There 
were three main aspects that are important and which the neo-liberals criticised the ISI for: 
 
I. Macroeconomic stability: For markets to function optimally there must be a predictable 
economic climate. Macroeconomic stability is important since it gives this stability and 
makes long-term commitments such as investment feasible. If, for instance, the inflation 
rate is very high the price now longer can be trusted to give a correct market signal 
regarding the scarcity value of a resource and economic actors will be confused 
regarding the real value of goods and factors. This could lead to less investment and 
hence less economic activity thereby lowering economic growth. According to the neo-
liberals at the start of the 1980s the only task of the government was to maintain 
macroeconomic stability so that market actors would have a stable economic 
environment.39 Keeping macroeconomic stability was being called “getting the 
fundamentals right”. This was according to the neo-liberals the first of three reasons 
why the ISI failed. Macroeconomic stability was not prioritised under the IS regime. 
This raised the uncertainty of doing business by raising transaction costs and thereby 
lowered investments and economic growth. 
 
II. Free market ideal: To the neo-liberals the free market was the ideal version of economic 
organisation. Free markets would give neutral incentives where prices would reflect the 
scarcity value of goods and factors. Rational market actors will maximise their utility 
function given their budget constraint and the prices of goods and factors. This would 
give an optimal allocation of goods and resources since prices reflect their scarcity value 
and this will lead to a Pareto optimal allocation of goods and factors. A free market will 
therefore, according to the neo-liberals, give the most efficient usage of resources and 
will give the most efficient long-term growth rate. State intervention would disrupt the 
                                                 
39 Some would also emphasise that many neo-liberals also saw the provision of public goods such as the rule-of-
law, infrastructure and the military as some of the few necessary tasks of the government. 
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price signals and would therefore give a less than optimal allocation of resources. The 
high state intervention during the ISI was seen as the second of the three major reasons 
for why IS failed. The arguments against state intervention apart from the efficiency 
argument are; i) According to the “public choice” argument the state as a rational actor 
will attempt to maximise its own utility function (for instance staying in power) and will 
distribute “rents” to achieve this objective (see for instance Krueger, 1974; and Bates, 
1981). Hence, those who benefit from a certain policy, the vested interests, will be able 
to capture the state and use it to protect their own interests. This is damaging for the 
economy since it for instance can generate monopoly profits for the vested interests and 
prevent structural change; and ii) The state will be inefficient in correcting market 
failure since they have less information than private market participants regarding 
market conditions and can therefore not take informative decisions. 
 
III. Open economies: More open economies, which are better integrated into the 
international market, will have a more advanced division of labour based on 
international market conditions. This allows countries to exploit their endowed 
comparative advantages which would make economies more productive which would 
boost their long-term economic growth. Economies that are more open can upgrade their 
production structure by having better access to technology which would increase their 
ability to catch-up with the leading countries by upgrading their production structures to 
more advanced modes of production. Moreover, the increased competitive pressure from 
international markets could make domestic producers more efficient. Protected home 
markets would not be as much affected by international market forces and hence be less 
efficient since it relies on a smaller domestic market. The protectionist policies under ISI 
is the last of the three reasons why the neo-liberals criticised the IS regime. Two of the 
arguments that are mentioned are; i) According the “public choice” literature those who 
benefited from the protectionist policies became strong enough to defend these policies 
even though the society as a whole lost out due to protectionism; and ii) An overvalued 
exchange rate made exports more expensive for foreigners and hindered a high export 
growth during the ISI. 
 
The neo-liberals took the high economic growth in South Korea and Taiwan as evidence for 
their views. At the start of the 1980s the neo-liberals interpreted these two countries with the 
following characteristics; i) Governments were able to keep a stable macroeconomic 
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environment; ii) Apart from keeping macroeconomic stability, there was little state 
intervention, citing the low levels of public investments relative to GDP compared to other 
developing countries; and iii) The economies were open and adjusted to international market 
conditions. Japan was already at the start of the 1980s known to have used high state 
intervention and protectionist measures and was seen as the exception thanks to the work by 
Johnson (1982).40
 
The IBRD (1981) issued a rapport on Africa, also called the Berg rapport, where the causes of 
the poor development in Africa were discussed. The rapport concluded that policies were at 
fault for much of the reasons I mentioned above. It was this interpretation that laid the 
foundations for much of the increased donor involvement from the start of the 1980s and 
onwards. In 1982 there was a debt crisis in many African countries and given that they could 
no longer obtain credit in international credit markets this led to increased loans from the 
BWIs. These were on two levels. On the first level, the IMF was to secure short-term 
macroeconomic stabilisation through the stabilisation policies. One of the measures was the 
scaling down of public expenditures which involved less expenditure on infrastructure, 
schooling and agricultural subsidies. Also it meant a tightening of credit to control the 
inflationary pressures and the introduction of user fees on schooling and health services to 
increase the state income so the public deficit was lowered. On the second level, the Structural 
Adjustment Programs (SAP) by the IBRD was to secure the long-term competitiveness of the 
African economies. This meant the privatisation of publicly owned companies, scaling down 
the public sector, secure a market-based interest rate, liberalise foreign trade and a scaling 
down of the manufacturing subsidies. This would facilitate a vision of free markets in a 
macroeconomic stable environment which were integrated in the international economy. This 
was how the neo-liberals at the time thought South Korea and Taiwan were able to grow so 
rapidly. Free markets were thought to work at any stage of development. The results of these 
donor programs, however, were disappointing. Africa had negative economic growth from 
1980 to 1995. Much of this has to be attributed to political and social conflicts. But, even in 
those countries that were stable and reforms were implemented more successfully, the results 
were disappointing.41 The BWIs, however, did not believe in the inadequacy of the SAPs. The 
                                                 
40 It is important to remember that this is a comment to mainly the American academic debate. The view of 
seeing South Korea and Taiwan as “pure” market economies was controversial right from the start in other 
academic forums, without it being given much attention by the American profession. 
41 The IBRD (1992) rapport was to be titled: “Why Structural Adjustment has not succeeded in Sub-Saharan 
Africa”, but this rapport was withdrawn and given a less controversial title. See UNIDO (2000), p.14. 
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blame for their failings was not the contents, hence the policies that it facilitated, but faulty 
implementation by the African governments. Thus the blame was to be laid, not on the neo-
liberal policies, but on the African governments. One of the major paradoxes for the 
supporters and the critics of the SAP alike has been the fact that the SAP would reduce the 
state’s power in Africa. But at the same time it was the state itself that had to implement these 
reforms that would reduce their own power. This was an inherent contradiction which did not 
make sense in the “public choice” literature and paved the way for a more strict practice of 
conditionality. If a policy was not implemented, a country would not receive any more loans. 
 
The neo-liberal paradigm has come under heavy criticism, part of which it has incorporated. 
It’s interesting how some of the increased legitimacy of the neo-liberal paradigm came from 
the export-growth of South Korea and Taiwan. The revisionists first came into the fore when 
criticising the neo-liberal interpretation of the economic growth in these same countries. What 
I term revisionist are structuralist that argue for a “developmental state” model for economic 
development. In this perspective neither the market nor the state alone can promote economic 
growth at a low stage of development. These institutions are complementary and need to work 
together to develop beyond a low stage of development. A key intellectual feature is that 
markets are not regarded as natural nor are they automatically the most efficient mechanism 
for the allocation of resources. A strong state is needed not only to support markets but also 
enhance their workings. According to Chang (1999b) a developmental state has four 
functions: 
 
I. State coordination for change: The state is probably the only institutions that can 
coordinate investments that are needed in several markets at the same time at a lower 
stage of development. This is the so-called complementary investment argument also 
known as the “Big Push” argument. 
 
II. Growth vision: A vision of how an economy is to come from a lower development 
equilibrium to a higher development equilibrium. Visions can reduce uncertainty, 
increase the mobilisation of resources and increase government commitment to 
economic growth. 
 
III. Conflict management: Structural changes and changing power relationships that may 
arise from economic growth can provoke political or social reactions. Given the 
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necessity of political and social stability for economic growth to take place these 
challenges need to be dealt with to maintain economic growth. 
 
IV. Institutional building: In institutional theory the state is seen as an endogenous product 
of the society over which it presides and will therefore partly be a product of the 
institutions that surround. This means that any developmental state is by definition 
unique to the society where it exists and needs to adapt to the specific needs that specific 
country has. Within institutional economics the deeper causes for low economic 
development is that the institutions in the country are not adapted to the new 
technological and market opportunities that exist. It thus becomes the state’s job to 
support and build these institutions, including markets. 
 
The debate has been heated over the appropriate interpretation of the “East Asian growth 
miracle”. Amsden (1989) and Wade (1990) showed that South Korea and Taiwan did use a 
high degree of state intervention and protectionist measures. The new slogan became that 
South Korea and Taiwan grew because they “got the prices wrong” and promoted sectors in 
which they did not have a natural endowed comparative advantage. The whole concept of a 
developmental state was first launched by Johnson (1982) in commenting the high economic 
growth in Japan. The developmental state interpretation was now being used to analyse South 
Korea and Taiwan as well. The reaction initially from the neo-liberals was either to ignore the 
evidence or to claim that the industrial policy was ineffective since the same industrial 
structure would have emerged had the economies been subject to market forces. The problem 
of accepting the presence of state intervention in the economy was not only due to the 
predictions of the “public choice” literature, but also because East Asian governments did not 
correct market failures in the neoclassical sense. IBRD (1993), “the East Asian Miracle” was 
an attempt to make a consensus of the viewpoints, but was able to create more smoke than 
light. It was unique in the sense that it was the first time the neo-liberals admitted that the 
industrial policy was present in East Asia outside of Japan. The rapport even claimed that 
some elements, such as the complementary investments and export promotion had under some 
conditions been successful. However, IBRD (1993), this was due to “historical fortunate 
circumstances” such as a Confucian style bureaucracy and a strong state which were not 
present in other countries and hence could not be emulated. Most industrial policy, the rapport 
concluded, had been ineffective and that East Asia grew despite, rather than because the 
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industrial policy. IBRD (1993) certainly did not dampen the debate, but it definitely created a 
new phase of the debate. 
 
The debate is just as fierce in Africa. Stein (2000) and Soludo (2002b) readily argue for the 
creations of “African developmental states” and cite how Botswana and Mauritius have 
exhibited sustained economic growth using more heterodox economic policies. There are a 
number of factors that are criticised in the Berg rapport regarding the neo-liberal 
interpretation of the economies which laid the foundations for the SAP. I can mention four of 
these. Firstly, macroeconomic shocks were ignored as a cause for the poor African growth 
performance, despite the oil price shocks during the 1970s and the fact that African exporters 
rely heavily on primary goods. The reason given by the IBRD was that all developing 
countries suffer the same shocks and therefore the internal policies, not external shocks, were 
at fault for the macroeconomic instability. I have already commented on the infeasibility of 
this argument in subsection 1.2.3. Secondly, it was presumed that microeconomic inefficiency 
was the cause of macroeconomic crises even though there is no evidence to back such an 
assessment. Thirdly, the Berg rapport gave a incorrect picture of African development prior to 
1980. According to the rapport the situation before 1980 was a total disaster, ignoring the 
economic growth that did take place in Africa from 1960 to 1973. Lastly, there was a 
presumption within the SAP that a scaling back of the state automatically would lead to that 
the private sector took their role in the economy. The private sector, on the other hand, was 
badly organised and weak. During colonial times there was no large accumulation of private 
wealth which often was discouraged by the colonial masters. IBRD pointed to the fact that 
there was a large informal sector which could take this role. But this informal sector is often 
just a supplement to a job in the formal sector to earn enough income to stay alive. To sum up 
the criticism against the SAP, the IBRD did not take historic and institutional conditions into 
consideration when forming its policy. The IBRD (1994) rapport “Adjustment in Africa” 
attempted to show that “adjustment works”. This rapport was as controversial as the IBRD 
(1993) rapport in the East Asian debate and created more debate rather than to damp them. 
Not even IBRD (1994) own figures were able to show a consistent story and many accused 
the IBRD for manipulating the numbers so they would fit their own policy agenda, the so-
called “market friendly view”. However, it was the first time that the IBRD admitted that 
“adjustment is not enough”. 
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The debate about the “correct” economic policy is unlikely to die any time soon. There have 
been differences and similarities between the economic policies pursued in Africa and East 
Asia. Many would claim that to understand the growth divergence one should focus on what 
differentiates the two regions with regard to their economic policies. Different economic 
policies are an important key to understand growth divergence. But there is a problem of 
which different policies to focus on. This problem is reflected by differences in policies 
within the two regions in question. For instance Hong Kong had very liberal policies and is 
perhaps the country in the world that has come closest to the neo-liberal ideal. While the 
South Korean developmental state with high government intervention, relatively high debt 
levels and protectionism could be regarded as a potential opposite. I will emphasise 
differences in general policies and how relevant they are for understanding the growth 
divergence. But does this mean that similar policies between the two regions are irrelevant? I 
believe the answer is firmly in the negative for two reasons. Firstly, every part of economic 
policy is part of a coherent whole and should be seen in relationship to other aspects of 
economic policy. Secondly, a similarity in the official policy often does not say anything 
about the effective policy. My point is that the implementation of policy varies between 
countries and this might be a key factor in understanding the growth divergence. Hence, 
similarities in economic policy will also be assessed in so far they contribute in the 
understanding of the growth divergence. To be able to assess the role of economic policy I 
will focus on three aspects of economic policy that have been contested and often mentioned 
in debates; i) Macroeconomic policies; ii) Industrial policies; and iii) Trade policies. 
 
2.1 Macroeconomic policy 
There can be little doubt that the relative macroeconomic stability in East Asia was an 
important aspect of the “growth miracle”. Equally, there is little doubt that the 
macroeconomic instability greatly contributed to the poor growth performance in Africa. Due 
to this near consensus I will only briefly review the policies that facilitated these outcomes by 
looking at three main indicators of the macroeconomic environment: 
 
I. Inflation: The inflation in East Asia was reasonably low and perhaps more important, it 
was relatively stable. Compared to Latin America, African countries on average did not 
have the same high rates of inflation, but what characterised the inflation rates in Africa 
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was their high volatility.42 This led to increased uncertainty which increases transaction 
costs which might have put investors off and created by creating an unstable 
environment. An important variable that was affected by inflation was the real interest 
rate which was kept low in both regions during the 60s and 70s. The increased volatility 
of the African inflation rate intuitively spurred a more unstable real interest rate which 
increased the uncertainty for investments and loans. I will come back to the effects of 
the interest rates in subsection 2.2.1. 
 
II. Debt: The debt crisis in the beginning of the 1980s was one of the most pronounced 
macroeconomic shocks that hit the developing countries. Debt levels in the East Asian 
countries were mixed with Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan with virtually no debt; 
while South Korea had very high debt levels around the beginning of the 1980s. An 
important question is why the debt crises didn’t affect the Korean economy in the same 
fashion as other developing countries. There are two main explanations. The first, 
prompted by the neo-liberals and the main explanation in IBRD (1993), states that South 
Korea was more open than other developing countries and that their flexibility was the 
main determinant for why the short term credit was allowed to roll on. The second 
explanation, fronted by the revisionists, says that the neo-liberal argument does not hold 
water since some more open economies in Latin America did suffer from capital shocks 
in the start of the 80s; while more closed economies than South Korea, like India and 
China did not suffer the same shocks. The revisionist argument states that South Korea 
got the continued investors trust by being in a high growth region. Had South Korea 
been a Latin American country, it’s not sure that investors would have the same degree 
of faith (see for instance Soludo, 2002b).43 Africa did suffer a capital supply shock in 
the beginning of the 80s while East Asia did not (Singh, 1995). For Africa this meant 
that foreign currency had to come from other sources and led them to seek SAP loans 
(Stein, 1999). These packages, as I will elaborate on later in this chapter, did in general 
not promote economic growth. However they did increase the debt level for African 
countries even further.44 This had a number of adverse effects, for instance; i) A high 
                                                 
42 SAP with its devaluation caused the inflation to raise in the short run which in the Latin American case, due to 
strong labour unions, did not facilitate a decline in real wages which spurred episodes of hyper inflation. In 
Africa, labour unions in general were less strong and episodes of hyper inflation were in general avoided. 
43 This is a “horde mentality” interpretation behind investments and capital accumulation process, for a 
theoretical foundation see for instance Minsky (1978) and Kindleberger (2000). 
44 As Stein (1999) reported, the international debt level of Africa was 227 billion USD, which was three times 
the level as in 1980. This meant that every citizen in Africa owed 379 USD in 1996. 
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proportion of GDP went to debt serving; and ii) Increased dependence for external 
donor support prompting a relative loss of political autonomy (see section 4.1.1). 
 
III. Exchange rate: East Asia, due to its dependence on exports, relied heavily on 
convertible exchange rates. During the Breton Wood gold standard system the Asian 
countries had stable convertible exchange rates to the USD. Japan was able to exploit 
this to full effect. While manufacturing was more productive in the US, the Japanese had 
a higher relative productivity growth compared to the US partly due to a catching-up 
effect which meant that the Yen was de facto devalued.45 After 1973 the East Asian 
exchange rates have been either been “realistic” or slightly undervalued to not hurt 
exports. Most importantly, an overvaluation was in general avoided. An overvaluation 
of the exchange rate raises the prices of exports for foreigners which intuitively reduces 
exports. More recently, China has been the target for US criticism for using a similar 
strategy as the Japanese. The Chinese Yuan has had a fixed exchange rate relative to the 
USD which due to the higher relative productivity growth in China vice versa the US 
has led to an overvalued USD relative to the Yuan which is fuelling some of the trade 
deficit the US has with China. In Africa, on the other hand, the exchange rates were 
often overvalued during import substitution to make imports cheaper. But, this 
overvalued exchange rate made the country’s own products more expensive for 
foreigners and thereby dampened exports. The devaluations that have followed the SAP 
have in general not spurred an increase in the African export performance (Kandiero & 
Randa, 2004). It has been suggested that one of the reasons for this failing is that 
devaluations only have a short term effect in affecting relative prices. Also, the 
devaluations seem to have contributed, at least in the short run, to increased inflationary 
pressures. Another factor dampening African exports has been the lack of convertibility 
of the exchange rates which intuitively did not promote international trade.46 
 
The ISI policies deserve a mentioning here. There is no doubt that one of the main failings of 
the approach was that it did not prioritise macroeconomic stability as much as it should. There 
were increased trade restrictions on exports which limited the foreign exchange earning and 
                                                 
45 In a system of flexible exchange rates the Yen would have appreciated to take into account the changes in 
relative competitiveness. According to Singh (1995) the USD appreciated 60 % measured in PPP relative to the 
Yen in the period 1950-73. One can ask oneself the question whether this was “getting the prices right” as the 
IBRD (1993) claimed. 
46 An exception to this general rule were the countries a group of former French colonies in CFA zones which 
used a fixed exchange rate relative to the French franc (see Hoffmaister et al., 1997) 
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worsened the balance of payment difficulties. Also the overvalued exchange rate made 
imports “artificially” cheap and increased imports. This was also the intension of the IS 
strategy, the problem was that the imports increased much faster than was anticipated 
increasing the BoP difficulties. There were also increased inflationary pressures stemming 
partly from the increased public deficits. African governments were in the 1960s and 70s 
accused of financing part of their public deficit through increased seignorage. In addition the 
public deficits increased the debt levels and laid some of the foundations for the debt crisis 
which hit the developing countries in the beginning of the 1980s. These debt levels were 
partly fuelled by a high public consumption stemming from high prices on primary goods and 
well willing lenders of money internationally. It seems the neo-liberals were spot-on when 
criticising the macroeconomic policies of the IS regime. Also the “new structural paradigm”, 
the revisionists, has acknowledged this fact and policies that maintain macroeconomic 
stability have become common ground in economics. 
 
Macroeconomic instability was higher in Africa than in East Asia and explains a considerable 
proportion of the causes of the growth divergence. But they are not the entire story. At the 
start of the 1980s the neo-liberals claimed that by “getting fundamentals right” through 
macroeconomic stability was all that was needed to promote economic growth given that 
governments did not intervene beyond this. As I mentioned, the Berg rapport claimed that all 
developing countries suffered the same shocks and that the main culprit behind the 
macroeconomic instability were the internal policies. The stabilisation policies of the IMF 
have drawn criticism on the grounds that it only focused on macroeconomic stability from 
1980 to 1985, leaving nothing for development. The problem was that an unstable 
international environment led to external shocks which made macroeconomic stability a 
“moving target”. Long-run macroeconomic stability, say the critics, can only be achieved 
through long-term economic growth and therefore one should go beyond macroeconomic 
fundamentals and also focus on “growth fundamentals”. There is no doubt that East Asian 
countries have profited greatly from governments that have chosen relatively “sensible” 
macroeconomic policies. African governments have often not done so and despite the well 
intensions from the IMF, it seems that external donors have contributed rather than resolved 
macroeconomic instability. To be fair on the IMF, they did eventually manage to stabilise 
many of the African economies. But, the reduced spending on higher education, infrastructure 
and the introduction of user fees on education and health might have dampened some of the 
prospects for long-term economic development. It is not so much that anybody denies that 
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something drastic had to be done regarding the macroeconomic instability of the African 
countries, but some have criticised the IMFs policies for being too contractive. The consensus 
that has emerged, however, is that macroeconomic stability is a necessary, but by itself 
insufficient condition for economic growth. 
 
2.2 Industrial policy 
Industrial policy is one of the most controversial topics in developing economics. It is also a 
topic that is often confusing in the sense that different authors mean different concepts when 
discussing industrial policy. The reason for the controversy is partly that some authors talk 
past each other when discussing industrial policy. One version of the concept highlights the 
selective element that some industries are fronted at the expense of others; see for instance 
IBRD (1993) and Noland & Park (2003). Another version of industrial policy highlights the 
deviation from free markets, for instance Lall (1996). Another version highlights a broad 
definition that includes elements such as interference in financial markets, labour markets, 
technological learning, and competition rules; see for instance Johnson (1982). 
 
The outcome of the effect of industrial policy might partly be due to the definition chosen. 
That is why one should proceed with caution. Haggard (2004) attempted to structure the 
industrial policy debate in East Asia and highlighted market errors as the foundation for 
industrial policy. I will use his structure as the basis for my definition of industrial policy 
which includes four elements, where three of these will be discussed in subsequent 
subsections: 
 
I. Financial system: A key argument in discussing industrial policy is the role of 
underdeveloped financial institutions at a low stage of development. I will look at the 
functioning of the financial system in the two regions in subsection 2.2.1. 
 
II. Learning- and technological transfer: Difficulties in the learning process at a lower 
stage of economic policy has also been a key argument in favour of industrial policy. I 
will look at the role of learning and technology transfer in the two regions in subsection 
2.2.2. 
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III. Coordinating: At a lower stage of economic development there might be certain sectors 
that are underdeveloped which might hinder the development of other sectors. This 
gives rise to the “Big push” argument where governments invest in a number of 
complementary sectors which might be difficult for private actors to coordinate. I will 
develop this line of argument somewhat further and highlight the role of policies and 
institutions in the economic take-off and the continuation of economic growth (or the 
lack of economic growth). I will look at this topic in subsection 2.2.3. 
 
IV. Agglomeration economics: A last line of industrial policy debates is about 
agglomeration economics which came into being after Krugman’s (1991) observation 
that “national” economies are driven by regional clusters. Even though agglomeration 
economics has some potential benefits in explaining the growth divergence in the two 
regions I feel it is of lesser relevance than the other three elements and hence will not be 
discussed further. 
 
2.2.1 Financial system 
The financial system is an essential part of an economy and critical to promote economic 
growth. In essence the financial system has three major tasks in the saving-investment-growth 
nexus (Nissanke & Stein, 2002): 
 
I. Channelling funds from surplus to deficit units by mobilizing resources and ensuring an 
efficient transformation of funds into real productive capital. 
 
II. The maturity transformation between savers and investors, while providing sufficient 
liquidity to the system as the need arises. 
 
III. Reducing risks from the system through diversification and techniques of risk sharing 
and risk pooling. 
 
The financial systems worldwide have gone through two distinct periods in the post-WWII 
economic area. The first period from the end of WWII to approximately 1980 was 
characterised by Keynesian policies with limited capital mobility and repressed interest rates. 
The second period from approximately 1980 and onwards has seen increasing financial 
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liberalisation and increasing capital mobility across borders. These impulses also affected the 
countries in Africa and East Asia. 
 
Import substitution (1960s - approximately 1980) 
Import substitution was based on the Harrod-Domar growth model. The reason for the higher 
production in the richer countries was due to the increased capital per capita (see for instance 
Stein, 2000 and Wange & Semboja, 2002). Thus the perceived way to achieve economic 
growth was to promote capital accumulation (Bruton, 1998). Two factors are worth 
remembering. Firstly, markets were not perceived as the appropriate mechanisms since they 
were prone to market failures. Secondly, there was a great belief that the governments were 
able to promote economic growth. These factors contributed to the idea of a supply-driven 
economic growth based on capital accumulation and it was thought that the economics-of-
scale would automatically be achieved through bigger companies.47 Governments, in 
cooperation with the private sector, should promote the financial sector by decreasing the 
transaction costs and increase the economics-of-scale. To promote economic growth the 
financial system under import-substitution should (Seemogerere, 2002): 
 
I. Lower the cost for investments: The interest rate should be kept low to promote 
investments. Keynesian theory postulates that the interest rate is a cost for investors, by 
having a low interest rate it lowers the cost for investment thereby intuitively raising 
investment levels. 
 
II. Financing public expenditure: The low interest rate can finance an increased public 
expenditure. The increased public expenditure could increase the investments in 
infrastructure, schooling and public investments to promote the rural areas. 
 
III. Sector limits for credit: A limit to the amount of credit going to each sector. This would 
promote the allocation of credit into sectors that had a higher social relative to private 
benefits which would be rationed out of a purely market driven system due to the high 
perceived risks of investments in developing countries. 
 
                                                 
47 This got Lewis (1955) to summarise; “The central problem in the theory of economic growth is to understand 
the process by which a community is converted from being a 5 % saver to a 12 % saver”. 
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IV. Increase savings: Economic growth would increase the savings which would secure the 
supply of liquidity to the financial system. To increase the financial savings the 
operational structure of the financial system should be in place to enable the 
transformation of savings into financial savings.48 
 
In practice, this form of financial organisation had different effects for the two regions. 
Hellmann et al. (1997) conclusion was that “financial restraint” as implemented in Japan, 
South Korea and Taiwan promoted economic growth. They also mentioned that Japan around 
1973 started to liberalise its financial sector which could indicate difficulties with this type of 
financial organisation when countries reach a certain level of development. There are four 
factors that I believe have been important in these three countries: 
 
I. Government interference: Chang (2004) mentioned that the government control over 
financial flows was more important that control over production. The financial system 
was important to promote industrial policy. This was done in different ways. In South 
Korea and Taiwan this was done through direct ownership with many state-owned 
banks, in both countries the bank sector was at one stage wholly state-owned. In Japan 
the banks were predominately private, but the post-office saving programs were publicly 
owned.49 
 
II. High ability to increase savings: There is no doubt that the high financial savings in 
Japan and the FGT were in part a function of the high economic growth. But the 
countries also showed a high ability to capture the increased savings, especially in rural 
areas were many saving programs were launched and the authorities lowered the 
transaction costs for people to save financially. For instance Japan initiated so-called 
post-office saving programs to increase the availability of financial saving services. In 
the case of Japan some authors even rapport that employees in banks went physically to 
                                                 
48 Desai & Mellor (1993) elaborated on six organisational principles behind the financial system under IS; i) The 
promotion of many financial institutions, more than one per service; ii) The promotion of a variety of 
organisational forms among these institutions; iii) Secure a vertical organisational structure from the local to the 
regional to the national; iv) Promote a high geographic concentration of field offices; v) Make financial services 
available to a large parts of the population – especially in rural areas; and vi) Promote a diversification and 
multitude of services through a horizontal diversification thereby meeting the needs of the clients. 
49 Before WWII the bank sector in Japan was publicly owned, but under American administration these were 
privatised. The tight cooperation between the government and the private banking sector nevertheless continued 
after 1953 which could indicate that the institutions changes less rapidly than formal ownership. 
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the clients home to collect savings.50 Another factor that has received attention was the 
so-called limits on luxury consumption which have facilitated a decrease in 
consumption and hence an increase in savings. 
 
III. Increased quality of transactions: Institutions to support the working of the financial 
system were set up while the economic growth was ongoing. In Taiwan the informal 
sector was not discouraged, but supported to increase the quality and quantity of the 
financial transactions. A high proportion of the total financial savings came from the 
informal sector (Adams et al., 1993; Cho, 1990; and Shae, 1994). For instance the 
quality of the “post-dated checks”, which was the most used financial transaction in the 
informal sector in Taiwan, was improved The government managed to increase the 
quality of these transactions by imposing punishments, even jail sentences for those 
which were not able to meet their obligations (Wade, 1990; and Shae, 1994). 
 
IV. Conditional state support: Preferential loans with low interest rates were not given 
unconditionally. The continuation of these preferential loans was dependent on 
production and/or export goals and these yardsticks were forcefully implemented. This 
gave the companies an incentive to increase production and upgrade their production 
structure; I will come back to this argument in the next subsection 2.2.2. 
 
The effects of “financial repression” in Africa were different than for East Asia. Some 
supporters of import substitution will point to evidence that the financial system was able to 
support the economic growth from 1960 to 1973. But there were qualitative differences with 
East Asia and the financial system did not function as smoothly. I would like to highlight four 
factors: 
 
I. State interference: The negative effects of state interference were underestimated 
(Seemogerere, 2002). Private relationships to obtain credit became important for access 
to formal credit systems. The poorest therefore got “rationed” away from formal credit 
markets due to the lack of personal contacts. 
 
                                                 
50 See Kitagawa & Kurosawa (1994) and Teranishi (1994). 
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II. Problems with the low interest rate: The low interest rate had two adverse effects for the 
African financial system; i) Many financial institutions went bankrupt since the low 
deposit rates gave them little possibilities to increase their earnings to cover the 
operational costs; and ii) Capital was allocated inefficiently into sectors with low 
profitability leading to a accumulation of non-performing loans (Inaga & Ekpenyong, 
2002). 
 
III. Urban bias: Most of the formal financial institutions were placed in urban areas which 
meant that a lot of people in the rural areas lacked access to the formal credit market. 
 
IV. Unconditional state support: Preferential loans initiated by the government were often 
given without production and/or export performance criteria. In those instances that they 
were given, they were loosely implemented and had few consequences if they were not 
met. 
 
The natural question that arises is what factors differentiate the “financial repression” in East 
Asia and Africa. Financial systems with “financial repression” had some common attributes: 
i) They were bank dominated; ii) Had low profitability for financial institutions; iii) There 
was a tight regulation of the bank sector; and iv) The financial sector was dominated by 
imperfect competition. There are at least four factors that account for the different experiences 
of “financial repression”: 
 
I. Economic growth: The economic growth was far higher in East Asia than in Africa also 
in the 1960s and allowed for continued liquidity to the financial sector. 
 
II. Rural presence: The governments in East Asia were more competent in increasing the 
rural presence of financial institutions relative to Africa and this enhanced their ability 
to increase the financial savings stemming from economic growth.51 
 
III. Type of investment financed: This is most likely the single most important explanation 
for the different experiences and three arguments needs to be stressed; i) The presence 
                                                 
51 This must be set into perspective by remembering my previous argument in sub-section 1.1.2 regarding 
population density; the costs of having an increased rural presence in Africa might naturally be higher than for 
East Asia since an increase population density might allow increased economics-of-scale which would decrease 
unit costs. 
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of conditionality with preferential loans in the East Asian case promoted a more 
efficient utilisation of capital than in the African case; ii) In East Asia the financial 
system was able to promote large flows of private investments, while in Africa the 
financial system promoted large flows of public investments. This might have made 
investments in Africa less efficient than in East Asia, not because they were public per 
se, but because the state sector in Africa very inefficient; and iii) Investments in East 
Asia were often in “sunshine” industries that were able to promote the long-term 
competitiveness of the economy. The financial system was important in financing these 
so-called “sunshine industries” since they were long-term investments with high-risks 
which under a market-driven financial system might not have been financed; the African 
investments did not manage to show the same abilities in “picking winners” as East 
Asia; I will come back to this argument in the next subsection 2.2.2. 
 
IV. Coordination with other policies: In East Asia the financial system was an integrated 
part of a wider vision for economic growth which was more effectively implemented 
relative to Africa. Some African countries, for instance Nigeria since 1970, have 
emphasised industrialisation, but the policies conducted towards the financial sector 
(and other parts of the economy) have not matched this objective. The high coordination 
of economic policies with the stated objectives in East Asia is something I will 
emphasise in subsection 2.2.3. 
 
The traditional perception by the neo-liberals is that the financial system did not promote 
economic growth in East Asia since it wasn’t different from other developing countries (see 
for instance IBRD, 1993). I don’t agree with this assessment and I have to agree with 
Hellmann et al. (1997) that financial repression as implemented in East Asia seems to have 
promoted economic growth.52 For me, the major difference between the East Asian and 
African case is the more effective implementation of “financial repression” in the former and 
the organisational and institutional failures that hindered the functioning of the financial 
system in the latter. 
                                                 
52 For similar conclusions see Stein (1999), Stiglitz (2001) and Weiss (2005). 
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Financial liberalisation (from approximately 1980) 
The neo-liberal based their arguments for financial liberalisation from 1980 on the 
McKinnon-Shaw model. The basis is a free market model as in neoclassical economics with 
full information and perfect competition. On the demand side the private sector will lend 
credit and invest the capital to maximise their expected return. On the supply side banks will 
asses the credit worthiness of the projects and allocate their funds accordingly. The interest 
rate functions as the market clearing price. If there is excessive demand for credit the interest 
rate will increase which facilitates two effects; i) This increases the cost of capital and thus 
effectively decreases demand; and ii) Increases savings since the interest rate is the reward for 
saving as opposed to consuming in the current period and thereby facilitating increased 
liquidity to the financial system which increased the supply of money. Thereby the market 
equilibrium will be restored. Perfect capital markets will according to this theory give a Pareto 
optimal expansion of economic activity and the projects with the highest profits are also the 
projects with highest social value. 
 
According to the neo-liberals “financial repression” had a number of disadvantages which 
slowed economic growth (Seemogerere, 2002): 
 
I. Low profitability of investments: A low interest rate will make capital “artificially” 
cheap and promotes investments with low profitability which reduces economic growth 
by a less than optimal allocation of capital since capital is not priced by its opportunity 
cost. 
 
II. Low savings: A low interest rate does not encourage savings since the reward of 
postponing ones consumption, hence savings, is dependent on a reward of parting with 
liquidity which is the interest rate which was low. 
 
III. Burden on financial institution: There were several burdens on financial institutions 
during financial repression which include: i) A low profitability due the lack of 
independence in setting the interest rate; and ii) The high capital requirements was an 
implicit tax for the financial institutions thereby reducing their profitability. 
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IV. Discrimination of small agents: Small rural agents were often “squeezed out” of formal 
financial systems due to the lack of personal contacts and the costs of obtaining 
information regarding loans was often higher than the utility of the loans. 
 
According to the neo-liberals financial liberalisation would have a number of benefits that 
would promote economic growth (Inaga, 1995): 
 
I. Effective investments: The increased “financial deepening” will give more effective 
investments which will boost the overall productivity of the economy and hence 
economic growth. 
 
II. Higher interest rate: A market-based interest rate (normally higher than the one under 
IS) will promote: i) An increase in the flow of liquidity to the financial system by 
increasing the reward of savings over consumption; and ii) More efficient investments 
by allowing capital to be priced according to their opportunity cost thereby disciplining 
investors. 
 
III. Privatising: Privatising public financial institutions will: i) Reduce opportunistic 
behaviour; and ii) Increase the level of competition which will give better qualities on 
the services that financial institutions provide. 
 
Both Africa and East Asia liberalised their financial systems to a more market-based 
approach. The experiences are again mixed. In East Asia the liberalisation was more 
successful, but there seems to be increased volatility following liberalisation and it’s not clear 
whether financial liberalisation and more capital-market based financial system have 
contributed to increased economic growth. With regard to the financial liberalisation that has 
taken place in East Asia there are three major points which I believe explain the more 
successful liberalisation in East Asia: 
 
I. Country differences: The speed and nature of financial liberalisation was adapted to the 
needs the economy and “one-shoe-fits-all” solutions were avoided. In Japan the banking 
system started to liberalise in 1973 by removing some of the regulations on banks and a 
deregulation the interest rate. When Malaysia started to liberalise in the 1980s it first 
raised the interest rate prior to liberalisation to observe the health of their banking 
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sector. This allowed a more informed liberalisation process where the weaker elements 
of the banking sector were able to be given closer attention. The point is that this 
incremental liberalisation succeeded since they were country specific (Inanga & 
Ekpenyoung, 2002). 
 
II. Economic growth: The reforms were initiated during economic growth and were a result 
of changing government policies rather than an economic slowdown. South Korea is a 
example were from the 1980s, and especially from the end of the decade, there was a 
growing internal pressure to liberalise the financial sector even though economic growth 
rates were still high. 
 
III. Institutional building: Institutions were build while economic growth was ongoing to 
increases the governments’ ability to monitor capital flows to keep macroeconomic 
stability and create an adequate institutional framework for a more liberalised financial 
setting.53 Malaysia choose to increase the regulatory and monetary capacity of the 
central bank while keeping, the above mentioned, high interest rate to be able to identify 
some key challenges prior to liberalisation. 
 
The liberalisation in Africa has had far worse repercussions than in East Asia. Again, the 
experiences are mixed. Botswana and Mauritius were able to liberalise their financial systems 
on the backdrop of country specific policies and economic growth, which I mentioned were 
trademarks for the East Asian liberalisation process. The general picture is, though, far more 
bleak. There are four factors that explain the weak liberalisation results: 
 
I. Non-tailor made solutions: Liberalisation in Africa in general followed four types of 
reforms (Seck & El-Nil, 1993); i) A liberalisation of the interest rate which would 
increase the interest rates to market levels increasing savings and thereby investment 
rates; ii) Restructuring of the banks, with many of the non-performing loans being 
written off; iii) Privatisation of the banks, most of them were state-owned; and iv) Bank 
liquidations. But these reforms did not take country-specific needs into consideration. 
According to Villanueva (1988) and El-Nil (1990) there were different motivations for 
                                                 
53 Some would claim that the liberalisation in countries like South Korea went too far in abolishing institutions 
that monitored capital flows at the start of the 1990s on the recommendations of the IMF. In addition, a looser 
regulatory framework is by many believed to be a major cause for the build-up to the East Asian financial crisis 
which hit the South Korean economy hard. 
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financial liberalisation which included; i) Increasing the monetary control system, for 
instance Botswana and Mauritius; ii) Increasing the mobility of savings by reforming the 
legislation for the banking sector, for instance Kenya and Zaire; iii) Increasing the 
quality of the banking system and the level and structure of the interest rate, for instance 
Mauritania and Senegal; and iv) A combination of these different motives, for instance 
Nigeria and Zimbabwe. I believe many of the reforms failed because they were not 
custom-made to the specific needs the different African countries had. 
 
II. Lack of economic growth: The reforms were more often a result of a growth slow-down. 
One of the most severe implications of the lack of economic growth is the difficulty to 
obtain increased liquidity to the financial system since economic growth is correlated 
with increased savings. I believe this argument is easiest shown by looking at the 
financial liberalisation in Botswana and Mauritius which did exhibit economic growth 
and were able to liberalise their financial system relatively well. 
 
III. Macroeconomic instability: As I mentioned in section 2.1 there was a high degree of 
macroeconomic instability in Africa during the 80s and partly the 90s. Often African 
countries attempted to liberalise their economies while there still was macroeconomic 
instability present. There is a near consensus that financial liberalisation in an unstable 
macroeconomic environment increases difficulties. In Nigeria and Kenya the reforms 
were implemented while there was instability in the banking sector and macroeconomic 
instability (Soyibo, 1994). One of the results was a capital flight from Nigeria between 
1986 and 1994 (Lewis & Stein, 1997). In other countries, such as Zaire and Zambia 
there was stability in the banking sector, but there was still macroeconomic instability. 
The reason why macroeconomic instability has such adverse effects is that even rational 
market participants want to place their money in activities with a rapid pay-off such as 
imports or speculation since the long-run situation is uncertain. 
 
IV. Institutional weakness: The banking sector and the regulation-institutions were often 
weakly development. In addition, the banking sector was often in disarray when 
liberalisation started as I mentioned. Another key failing, I believe, is the lack of 
institutional building that followed with the SAP. Stein (1999) mentioned that financial 
institutions should be tailor-made since they need to co-exist with the existing 
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institutions, such as informal markets which are large in Africa. I will comment on this 
further later on. 
 
A comparison between the two regions shows a number of key points for why the financial 
liberalisation was more successful in East Asia than Africa: 
 
I. In East Asia financial liberalisation was to a greater extent custom-made to the needs of 
the economy, while the SAP more often dictated “universal” solutions for African 
countries bypassing country-specific needs. 
 
II. The presence of economic growth in East Asia facilitated a continued inflow of liquidity 
to the financial system thereby “fuelling the machinery”. The lack of economic growth 
in Africa meant that the saving rate did not increase and this decreased the liquidity and 
eventually led to the drying up of investments. 
 
III. The relative macroeconomic stability gave investors in East Asia the possibilities to 
make long-term investments due to the higher perceived pay-off than in Africa where 
macroeconomic instability led to a capital flight in many countries. 
 
IV. East Asia was able to build the institutions which helped the transition to a more 
liberalised financial system, in some countries such as China, this process is still 
ongoing, in Africa the institutional weaknesses were not remedied before liberalisation 
leaving a at time battered financial system worse off. 
 
The controversy 
A host of scholars, which I dubbed revisionists, do not agree with the neo-liberal assessment 
of financial liberalisation. The theoretical underpinning is often a more Kenysian perspective, 
such as the promoters of import substitution, but the international capital mobility make a 
similar solution implausible. There are number of theoretical and empirical arguments that the 
revisionists have criticised the neo-liberals for: 
 
I. The link between interest rates and savings: There is a weak theoretical and empirical 
support for the notion that savings increases with a higher interest rate. On a theoretical 
level a higher saving rate does promote postponing ones consumption and hence 
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savings, hence a substitution effect. But at the same time the higher interest rate has a 
welfare effect which indicates that one would to prefer to consume today rather than 
postponing ones consumption. These are opposing effects. It is clear that the McKinnon-
Shaw model assumed that the substitution effect strongly dominated the welfare effect, 
but the empirical proof for this relation is weak.54 It’s not the interest rate that 
determines the level of saving, but it might determine the level of financial savings. 
Thus a higher interest rate might only increase the saving rate up until overall savings 
equals financial savings. 
 
II. The link between real income growth and savings: The link between the increase, not 
necessarily the level, in real income and savings seems to be far more robust (see for 
instance Hoff & Stiglitz, 2001). When real income increases the established 
consumption pattern adapts more slowly, there is a so-called lag, meaning that 
consumption not necessarily rise as fast as real income thereby increasing savings. 
 
III. Determinants of investments: There seems to be two major determinants for 
investments; i) The availability of profitable projects; and ii) The availability of finance. 
From the perspective of the company the demand for finance is determined by the 
company’s willingness to be indebted to make future income. From the perspective  
from the bank the demand for finance is the willingness of a company to get indebted 
and the finance supply is the bank acceptance of the company’s ability generate future 
surplus value. 
 
IV. Externalities: Stiglitz (1994) is one of the neoclassical economists which have claimed 
that externalities are far greater than neo-liberals like to admit and they are especially 
paramount in financial markets. There are at least seven market failures worth 
mentioning; i) The solvency of a bank is a public good which leads to undersupply of 
the good and a possible misuse of the good by users; ii) Externalities are present in the 
monitoring, selection and the loan functions. The presence of one or two bad banks will 
make it increasingly difficult for other banks to obtain credit; iii) There are major 
externalities present connected to bank liquidations where the social costs far outweigh 
the private costs; iv) Financial markets are imperfect through risks and information 
                                                 
54 Warman & Thirwall (1994) mentioned that with empirical tests of the McKinnon.Shaw model there is 
normally little effort made to differentiate between total and financial savings. 
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problems which leads to problems such as moral hazard and adverse selection problems 
which reduces the markets ability to handle such phenomenon; v) Financial markets 
often have multiple participants where banks have information regarding their one 
customers that other banks do not have. This means that the new customers become 
more risky projects and the “exit” option a customer normally has, is reduced; vi) 
Financial markets left to market forces will not be Pareto optimal. A higher interest rate 
will increase the possibility for insolvent loans. It is therefore in the interest of the banks 
to hold the interest rate artificially low, something that leads to a oversupply for finance 
which leads to a situation where banks are able to choose the most preferred projects. 
The interest rate will not always give a good indication of the quality of the investment 
since a maximisation of profit not always is equal to the social contribution, for instance 
investments in real estate; and vii) Even if full information regarding all relevant market 
conditions was available, it would be impossible for humans to process it all due to 
limited cognitive capacity. These seven market failures are severe in developed 
countries. In developing countries, however, they add to problems such as 
macroeconomic and political instability and institutional weaknesses. 
 
V. Institutional underpinning: The McKinnon-Shaw model lacks an understanding of 
institutions, still institutions remain crucial for the financial sector (Stein, 1996). This 
can be seen on two levels. The first level relates to the regulations and controls that need 
to be in place to promote a smooth functioning of the market such as property rights, 
institutions that secure macroeconomic stability and institutions that correct some of the 
market failures of financial markets. The second level relates to the micro level and 
involves the banks, credit institutions and other financial institutions. Institutions need 
legitimacy to function as intended and some economies do not have traditional banking 
habits. These might need time to develop which might require an environment of 
participation and availability (Stein, 1999). 
 
The neo-liberals and revisionist disagree regarding the success of the financial system in East 
Asia. The revisionist point out three factors regarding the growth in East Asia: 
 
I. Park & Patrick (1994) shows that the interest rate did not have any large effect on the 
savings rate in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. The interest rate was low, but positive 
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and fairly stable. The main determinant for savings seemed to be the high economic 
growth in these countries rather than the interest rate. 
 
II. The neo-liberal argument was that the low profitability of the financial system indicates 
it ineffectiveness. This argument presumes that the private pay-off reflected the social 
pay-off which is not necessarily the case (Chang & Singh, 1993). Projects that have a 
large social pay-off often demand a long-term commitment and involve high risks, such 
as investing in a new technology. As pointed out by Chang (1998), the Anglo-American 
capital market driven financial systems are more profit-seeking with a more short-term 
perspective. Moreover there is a greater divide between the financial and the real 
economy in the Anglo-American model than in bank-based financial systems. One of 
the attributes of the East Asian financial systems was their ability to provide long-term 
loans in risky new investments such as investing in more technology-intensive sectors. 
 
III. The neo-liberals created a myth that financial market driven financial systems are the 
norm and that East Asia was deviation from this norm. The truth, however, is the 
opposite. It’s only in Anglo-American countries and former British colonies that 
normally have capital market driven financial systems. The norm, for both developed 
and developing countries, is to have bank based financial systems (see for instance 
Zysman, 1983; and Cox, 1986). Another myth is that there is an “East Asian model” for 
financial systems. It’s true that most of the financial systems were bank-based, but there 
were large differences between countries. In China banks are mostly state-owned; the 
same was true previously for South Korea and Taiwan. In Thailand, however, banks 
were by and large privately-owned. Japan had a mixture with private-owned banks, but 
publicly-owned saving schemes. 
 
The controversy is especially large regarding two major episodes in East Asia: 
 
I. The Japanese banking crisis: Japan liberalised its financial system far earlier than other 
Asian countries, the process started already in 1973. The financial liberalisation was 
incremental and started with a deregulation of the interest rate and less regulations for 
banks. The increased competition within the banking sector led to a decline in the banks 
“franchise value” and prompted an increased investment in high profitable sectors such 
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as real estate.55 The bubble finally busted in the end of the 80s and led to a crisis in the 
Japanese banking sector. For the neo-liberal academics this was the “proof” that 
financial systems with repressed interest rates led to weak financial systems that did not 
tolerate increased market competition. Hellmann et al. (1994) did not agree with this 
explanation since Japan started liberalising long before other Asian countries and the 
process was caused more by faulty liberalisation rather than “financial repression”. 
According to Hellmann et al. there were two major causes for the banking crisis; i) No 
increased capital requirements which decreased the “franchise value” due to the 
increased competition which prompted the need for increased income which was 
obtained through real estate speculation; and ii) No model for liberalisation, but a 
pragmatic step-by-step liberalisation which led to half-solutions. 
 
II. The East Asian financial crisis: In 1997/98 the East Asian financial crisis came more 
unexpected than other financial crisis’ since it was driven by private, rather than public 
capital streams as in Latin America. The crisis prompted a lot of criticism from the neo-
liberal profession towards East Asia, for instance; i) “Crony capitalism” due to selective 
industrial policies and personal contacts led to unsustainable investments which 
hampered long-term economic growth; and ii) Financial repression hindered the 
development of high-quality domestic financial institutions, it was more preferable with 
capital-market driven, rather than bank-driven financial systems (Mishkin, 2001). These 
interpretations of the deeper causes of the crisis are controversial. A number of 
arguments have been raised; i) According to Singh (1997) there is still no clear-cut 
evidence that capital-market driven financial systems give more productive investments; 
and ii) Three out of four countries that were affected most badly by the crisis, Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Thailand, had earlier been hailed as good examples for other developing 
countries since they relied more on the market than their North-Eastern counterparts (see 
for instance IBRD, 1993). The last of the four major crisis countries that was affected 
was South Korea, which since 1980 had been liberalising its economy (especially after 
1990). The so-called developmental state and industrial policy were largely absent in the 
build-up to the crisis. The counterargument to the neo-liberal interpretation was that the 
East Asian financial crisis was more one of excessive and uncritical liberalisation rather 
than industrial policy failure (Chang, 1998). 
                                                 
55 The speculation in the real estate sector led to increased prices which eventually did not longer represent their 
fundamental value and thus created a “bubble”. 
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 In Africa the financial reforms that followed the SAP have been highly controversial. IBRD 
(1994) admitted that the financial reforms had not delivered much success and cited three 
reasons for it’s failings: 
 
I. Lack of commitment: There was a high resistance against the reforms from the state-
level since the financial system provided much of the finance for the state which the 
ruling elite was depended upon. An implication of these reforms would mean that they 
would lose some their financing and hence their commitment to do so was limited. 
 
II. Sequence: There was a faulty sequence of reforms, something that McKinnon (1993) 
criticised the SAP for.56 For instance, Nigeria opened it economy for capital flows when 
it’s banking system and macroeconomic environment still was in disarray. 
 
III. Institutional support: There was a lack of supporting institutions to monitor and support 
the financial system. 
 
IBRD (1994) was not very nuanced and in limited degree questioned the policies of the SAP. 
Implicitly, if the above problems were solved, the results would be as the McKinnon-Shaw 
model had predicted. The revisionists didn’t agree with this assessment and point out to a 
number of arguments: 
 
I. Increased interest rates and a decline in savings: The increase in interest rates due to the 
SAP and the reduced credit due to stabilisation policies to control inflation decreased the 
availability of capital and increased its cost. Both private savings and private investment 
decreased during the 1980s as a result. 
 
II. Increased urban bias: One the arguments of the neo-liberals was that “financial 
repression” led to a urban bias since people in rural areas did not have personal contacts 
to access formal capital markets. Under the SAP, however, the urban bias became even 
more pronounced. The requirements of having rural presence were abolished to allow 
                                                 
56 The optimal sequence according to McKinnon (1993): i) Inflation control; ii) Interest rate liberalisation; iii) 
Privatisation and commercialisation; iv) Full convertibility of the exchange rate; v) Trade liberalisation; and vi) 
Opening of the economy for international capital flows. 
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more freedom for the banking sector. It was not cost-effective to have many of the banks 
in rural areas and they moved to urban or semi-urban areas with a higher population 
density since the agglomeration effects allowed a higher economics-of-scale and scope 
with falling unit costs. This meant that people in rural areas, which had been squeezed 
out of the formal financial system under import substitution, were even more squeezed 
out of formal capital markets under the SAP. 
 
III. High risks: African economies are predominantly agriculture-based. The agriculture 
sector in Africa is a high risk sector where low population density, variable rainfall and 
poor transport facilities makes investment in such sectors risky. After liberalisation, the 
poor started to be squeezed out of formal capital markets even further due to high 
perceived risks which banks often were not willing to finance. 
 
IV. Informal sector: The SAP attempted only to restructure the formal economy, but much 
of the finance, especially in rural areas, came from the informal financial sector (Stiglitz, 
1993). This informal sector uses direct rationing to solve supervision and 
implementation problems in those cases where there is information about the borrowers 
and sanctions can be imposed to collect the loans. The professional lenders in this 
market give rewards to those who are able to meet their obligations and they actively 
collect information regarding the credit worthiness of their clients. Given these direct 
mechanisms these kinds of market solutions are only available to small pockets of the 
population. The problem in the formal sector is that interest rate is only the market-
clearing price up to a certain point. Due to the increased insolvency due to the increasing 
interest rates banks want to keep their interest rates “artificially” low. Another argument 
against the SAP was that an increase in the interest rate only will increase financial 
savings if the savings from the informal sector were idle. If not, the increased interest 
rate will simply mean a redistribution of savings from the informal to the formal sector 
(Simmons, 1992). Some, for instance Solis Fallas & Owen (1989), claim that such a 
transfer would be preferable since a transfer to the formal sector would make investment 
more effective. The problem with the argument is that it does not address the problem 
that formal financial markets do not clear. 
 
V. No institutional strategy: IBRD (1994) blamed the lack of institutional support for the 
failing of the financial reforms of the SAP, but did not have adequate institutional 
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building policies included in the SAP to support the build-up of these. According to 
Stein (2000), a shock therapy financial liberalisation is unlikely to succeed since not 
only the institutions need to be in place to support the financial system, but also the 
legitimacy and the banking habits that go with it need time to develop. The solution, 
according to Stein (2000), would be to have transformative institutions as a bridging link 
between the new and old institutions were these transformative institutions are laid close 
the local ones. An example could be how the Taiwanese government encouraged the 
informal capital market and increased the quality of these transactions before they 
became formal. 
 
The debates are for a large part unresolved. I believe a strong case can be made that the East 
Asian financial crisis was driven not by faulty industrial policy, but by faulty liberalisation. 
Financial liberalisation was far less in Taiwan than in South Korea prior to the East Asian 
financial crisis. The use of industrial policy was comparable in both states with Taiwan 
having less direct intervention, but a higher state ownership. Still, the South Korean economy 
was hit far harder than countries that did not liberalise their financial systems as much such as 
China and Taiwan which passed the tremors of the financial crisis surprisingly smooth. If 
industrial policy was the cause, it’s likely to have been reflected in other countries as well, 
with Taiwan as the best example.57 I think a strong case can be made that capital restrictions 
are good in preventing the spread of financial crisis, but might hamper economic efficiency in 
normal times. Liberalisation thus has its dangers. Still, Japan and South Korea started to 
liberalise their financial systems, as China is doing presently indicating that there are major 
benefits from financial liberalisation in terms of effective investments. What has come out of 
the debates so far is the need for institutional control. The institutions that govern financial 
markets were for a large part lacking in their functioning in both Africa and East Asia at the 
time of liberalisation. Should economies foster their institutional framework by keeping 
restrictions on financial flows until the institutional framework is in place? Restrictions on 
capital flows are made more difficult today due to the pronounced role of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) which makes a fully financial repression strategy implausible. The evidence, 
on balance, is mixed. I believe that fully liberal capital markets do not function as optimally 
as their proponents claim and involve high risks. At the same time, a certain degree of 
                                                 
57 Even some neo-liberal authors have changed their mind regarding the causes if the East Asian financial crisis 
such as Radelet & Sachs (1998), Feldstein (1998) and Stiglitz (1998); even though the last was the least a 
surprise. 
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openness is needed and too high capital restrictions will make investments less effective. So 
the conclusion might be that a sort of middle way which might be preferable, but where this 
middle way is set might be different for countries and stages of economic development. 
 
2.2.2 Learning and technology 
There is a near universal consensus regarding the vital importance for learning and 
technological upgrading for the long-run sustainability of economic growth. Bruton (1998), 
one of the former proponents of IS, said that the IS approach failed mainly because it wasn’t 
able to secure this long-term learning and technological upgrading. The main channel for 
technological upgrading during the IS was to be through capital imports which would 
facilitate a process technological through for instance reverse engineering. In East Asia 
industrial policy was more successful, as acclaimed by the supporters and sceptics of 
industrial policy alike, since there was conditional state support which provided incentives for 
technological upgrading. There was no such process present in Africa, with the lack of human 
skills and weak developed technological institutions making the situation even worse. In the 
IS period technological upgrading was not as easy as anticipated. Bruton (1998) criticised the 
neo-liberals for not learning two very important lessons from the IS era. The first was the 
difficulty of policy implementation which meant the policy that was formulated was not 
always the same as the policies implemented. The second lesson was the difficult nature of 
technology transfer. 
 
The neo-liberal case for technology learning is rooted in neoclassical theory. In its simplest 
form, the standard neoclassical model and the Solow model, technology is presumed to be 
universal where companies without costs and risk can attain a given technology. Government 
intervention to promote technological learning in such a world would only distort the price 
signals leading to a less than optimal allocation of resources and hence damping long-term 
economic growth. In the more relaxed version with learning curves and economics-of-scale a 
case could be made for infant industry support even though this would be only regarded as a 
second-best solution since capital markets would be the preferred option. Moving away from 
the more idealistic standard models is the new growth theory that does operate with learning- 
and technology externalities. In these models state intervention could in some cases be 
justified depending how much rigidities there are presumed to be in the learning process. State 
intervention to promote industrial learning is, nevertheless, usually not recommended by the 
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proponents of such models given the dangers of policy failures. The usual recommendation 
from the neo-liberals is therefore not to use state intervention to promote the learning process, 
even though opinions differ about the effectiveness of the market in stimulating the long-run 
learning and technological upgrading. 
 
The criticisms against the neo-liberal interpretation of the “catching-up” process are vast. 
Perhaps it’s the technology attainment argument where neo-liberals have the hardest time 
arguing against industrial policy; partly because some of their own models do not give a 
conclusive answer that developing countries eventually will catch-up using free markets. The 
evidence against the easiest presumption, the universal availability of technology, is vast.58 
It’s not so much that anybody doubts that a lot of the knowledge and technology are public 
goods and relatively freely available. The problem first arises if one starts assuming that all 
knowledge and technology is freely available. Many neo-liberals admit that the neoclassical 
presumption of the universal availability of technology is most likely false, see for instance 
Crafts (1998). To support the learning process of firms some neo-liberals are instead arguing 
for functional, rather than selective industrial support that will help companies in a neutral 
way. In this way the price signals do not get blurred and the market mechanism is not as much 
disturb. In practice it’s almost impossible to differentiate between functional and selective 
industrial support. If the government supports the attainment of tertiary education, which is 
important for building strong learning capacities in companies, the government favours 
sectors that are more skill intensive and discriminate against sectors that are more labour 
intensive and uses fewer skills. The neo-liberals tend not to argue against industrial support as 
such, but rather against “government failures”. Firstly because selective intervention can 
create rents favouring some over others and this can create a situation where the state 
eventually will use this mechanism to gain support to stay in power such selective 
intervention is dangerous. The best way to prevent unfavourable rents is to avoid selective 
state support from the outset. Secondly, the state does not have enough information about the 
                                                 
58 There is also an inherent contradiction within the “pure” neoclassical model with regard to long-term learning. 
If technology is universally available and there is full information, why should anyone care to innovate? An 
innovation will immediately spread to other market participants and the benefit from one’s own innovation will 
be limited. This is the criticism Schumpeter had against the neoclassical learning process and he argued that it’s 
through imperfect competition that the long-run innovation process best can be upheld trough scale economics in 
the learning and technology process. Many neo-liberals might disagree with this assertion, but will have more 
difficulties in explaining why the most innovating and dynamic sectors in the world economy are dominated by 
just a few large companies. 
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market conditions that private market participants have and should therefore not intervene 
since it cannot make informative decisions.59
 
The message from the neo-liberals is partly confusing. They acknowledge that it’s not certain 
that free markets will facilitate increased technological learning. At the same time they 
acknowledge that all of today’s rich countries have used industrial policies themselves at an 
earlier stage to stimulate the learning process. Still, because of weak states today’s developing 
countries should not do the same. Does this mean that they should accept their fate and let the 
market decide their outcome? If one accepts the idea of rigidities in the learning process and 
the concept of “getting the prices right” is to promote increased learning and productivity 
growth in the long run there needs to be a different definition of “getting the prices right” than 
the one given by free markets (see for instance Stiglitz, 1987; Cheney & Srinivasan, 1988; 
and Amsden, 1989). I believe that looking at the neo-liberal theory alone will not give a 
complete understanding of the learning process in the two regions that are being compared. 
 
Another approach is the evolutionary theory which draws more on the bounded rationality 
concept of Herbert Simmon and looks more at the channels for technology transfer. Lall 
(2000) mentioned that capabilities are needed as well as capacity to exploit the technology 
available. Capability is unique to the company and is the institutional knowledge that 
individuals have obtained where the knowledge has accumulated over time. The total 
capabilities are though not a mere accumulation of knowledge as such, but a process where 
there are a number of synergies between individuals and between individuals and the 
company. Technological learning does not only confine itself to the technological frontier, but 
involves a wider perspective where companies get access to, implement, absorb and build on 
the knowledge attained in the production process. There are a few key points following this 
approach: i) Technology cannot be transferred to developing countries like a physical product 
since it’s effective implementation requires important co-defined knowledge; ii) If learning 
costs, uncertainty and leakages are high some technology will not be learned even if it is more 
profitable to do so; and iii) Learning needs of specific sectors and even specific companies is 
                                                 
59 As a response to this “lack of information” argument Deraniyagala & Fine (2001) said:”If governments are 
less well-informed than the private sector (and less able), does it follow they should do nothing? The answer is 
resoundingly in the negative and should not come as a surprise. For the implication is that we should leave the 
generals and the military industrial complex to make defence policy since they know more about waging war and 
the true costs and capabilities of weapons. Alternatively, to be topical, chemical companies should be allowed to 
make policy on genetic engineering.” 
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often unique and some state support to facilitate the learning process therefore by definition at 
times needs to be selective. 
 
The approach I will use later on myself to create an institutional framework for understanding 
the technological learning in the two regions is called the National System of Innovation 
(NSI) and is in part an extension of the evolutionary approach. I will come back to this 
framework in chapter 4, but will discuss vital elements that are important to that framework in 
this subsection and tie the threads of these arguments together in the start of chapter 3. 
 
The different approaches, neo-liberal and the evolutionary, have some common ground. I will 
use this common ground to elaborate on the learning- and technology process in the two 
regions in the rest of this subsection. The consensus is that: 
 
I. Human skills play a crucial role in the long-run learning of economies. 
 
II. Learning is mostly done at the firm level. The role of state support is however more 
controversial, as I will comment on further. 
 
III. Most technology is generated internationally and access to this technological pool 
becomes imperative for technological upgrading. 
 
Skills 
There is a near consensus for the need for human skills to promote economic development. I 
will look at the human skills present in the region at the outset of the period in 1960; and how 
the development proceeded over time. 
 
The basis with regard to human skills seemed to have been favourable in East Asia. I would 
like to stress two points: 
 
I. High levels of human capital in 1960: Rodrik (1994) showed that the East Asian 
countries had a large stock of human capital relative to their income level in 1960. It 
goes without saying that Japan had high levels of human capital compared to others in 
the region due to universal primary education in the post-Meiji era (from 1868). The 
American administration, which lasted until 1953, also made secondary education  
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II. mandatory which increased levels of human capital even further. Japan’s colonial legacy 
also left relatively high levels of human capital in South Korea and Taiwan. While Hong 
Kong and Singapore got influxes of human capital to their city states; Hong Kong got a 
mass influx of high quality human capital after the communist take-over in China in 
1949. But even countries in Southeast Asia such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand 
had higher levels of human capital relative to other countries with the same level of 
income in 1960. Without a shadow cast of a doubt this was a major advantage the region 
possessed which raised the potential for economic growth. But this goes only for the 
potential for economic growth, not growth by it self. The Philippines had one of the best 
educated labour forces in the region in 1960, but their economic growth has been very 
disappointing. 
Table 8 - Gross enrolment ratios 
 Primary education Secondary education Tertiary education 
 1960 1980 2000 1960 1980 2000 1960 1980 2000 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Botswana 36 91 102 1 19 73 n.a. 1,2 4,0
Congo DR 72 92 50 n.a. 24 18 n.a. 1,2 1,0
Ethiopia 6 36 60 1 9 17 n.a. n.a. 7,0
Kenya 47 115 94 2 20 31 n.a. 0,9 3,0
Nigeria 37 105 103 3 16 36 0,1 2,2 n.a.
South Africa 82 85 106 82 n.a. 85 28,0 n.a. 15,0
Sudan 25 50 58 3 16 32 0,4 1,7 7,0
Tanzania 24 93 64 2 3 n.a. n.a. 0,3 1,0
East Asia 
China n.a. 113 118 n.a. 46 65 n.a. 1,7 10,0
Indonesia 59 107 110 6 29 57 n.a. 3,6 15,0
Japan 103 101 101 79 93 102 9,5 30,5 48,0
Philippines 91 112 113 26 64 77 12,9 24,4 31,0
South Korea 96 110 100 27 78 94 4,7 14,7 78,0
Thailand 136 99 96 7 29 83 1,9 14,7 36,0
Vietnam 101 109 106 11 42 67 0,9 2,1 10,0
South: UNCTAD (1974), (1984), (1997) and UNCTAD online database. 
 
III. Informal institutions: A number of countries were able to increase the levels of human 
skills using non-formal institutions. For instance, in South Korea the government was 
able to increase the literacy rate from 22 % in 1945 to 71 % in 1961 using informal 
public institutions (Chang, 1998). 
 
East Asia was able to exploit the early advantage by building on their favourable skill base 
from 1960 and onwards. Regarding the skill formation I want to emphasise four elements: 
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I. Increase in formal enrolment: Governments managed to increase the formal education 
level (see table 8). There are two points I would like to make; i) This was not done by 
increased relative spending on school; the percentage of GDP going to education was 
about the same as for other regions (Thomas & Wang, 1997), but the economic growth 
allowed a higher absolute spending on education thereby increasing the quality of 
formal education while the period proceeded; and ii) Governments showed a high 
willingness to invest in rural areas and raised the education level of the general 
population. 
 
II. The role of job training and informal institutions: The role of job training and informal 
institutions was very important in improving on the human skill base. Job training is 
often more relevant than formal education. Also the organisation of work can enhance 
learning. Chang (1998) took the example from Japan where employees are given more 
decision making power than is usual in western companies. This is done to promote 
learning at all levels of the organisation. In South Korea there was set up a number of 
public training institutions and the training of employees was made mandatory in the 
70s for larger companies. Some of these companies outsourced this job training to the 
government to not overspend resources on these activities (You & Chang, 1993). In 
Singapore the government in the 1980s launched a number of programs to increase the 
quality of the labour force as for instance “Basic Education for Skill Training”, 
“Working Improvement through Secondary Education” and “Core Skills for 
Effectiveness and Change” (Ashton & Green, 1996). 
 
III. Emphasis on “core” education: The focus on “core” education such as maths, 
engineering and chemistry is often more relevant for the industrial sector than more 
social educations such economics, sociology and psychology. IBRD (1993) focused on 
primary and secondary education and claimed that the social pay-off from these was 
higher than from tertiary education. Singh (1995) did not downplay the importance of 
primary and secondary education, but claimed that it was not feasible to compete in 
high-skill sectors on the world market without high quality tertiary human skills. In East 
Asia the government showed a high ability to prioritise higher education, and not least, 
its direction. Tertiary education in the so-called “core” areas was subsidised by the 
government, while tertiary education in more social oriented studies were given by 
private institutions. 
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 IV. Ability to educate the entire labour force: The governments in East Asia recognised the 
importance of educating the whole labour force and not just small technocratic elite at 
the top. To achieve this primary and secondary education were made mandatory. Chang 
(1998) goes further and claims that the type of secondary education was important to 
promote economic growth. In Japan and South Korea the secondary education was 
organised after the German model with a high focus on vocational training. This was 
according to Chang (1998) a reason for why these countries had a higher level of human 
skills than the countries in south and Southeast Asia which modelled themselves more 
after the Anglo-American model of education with little focus on vocational training. 
For instance, in South Korea basic engineering is given at the secondary level. This does 
not make them specialists in the field, but might increase, in general, the labour force’s 
production and learning ability. Chang’s (1998) view might be regarded as a harsh 
criticism of the Anglo-American system and critics might point to the higher stock of 
human capital in Japan and South Korea at the outset of the period which explains some 
of the differences. But still, studies that measure the quality of education by conducting 
tests across countries often find that the highest scores are obtained from students 
coming from Japan, South Korea and Taiwan which in general score higher than their 
counterparts in developed countries (Lall, 2000). 
 
V. Coordination with other policies: As Lall (2000) pointed out, the capability and skills 
have to come together with the appropriate technology to function efficiently. The 
process of skills development through formal education and job training is complex. 
One problem, for instance, is that the need for a certain type of skill is not known before 
it arises, but it takes time for a certain education is completed by new students. These 
“lags” means that the supply of a certain type of worker with the right educational 
background does not always match the demand and vice versa. Which education to 
promote might be easier for countries attempting to catch-up with leading countries 
since they can choose a pre-existing technology that has not so far been applied 
previously within the country. Many analysts have pointed out the underlying concept 
behind this idea, that the East Asian countries were far better in “using” rather than 
“creating” ideas. To be able to exploit the appropriate technology from abroad the 
human skills to do so need to be present. The East Asian governments showed a high 
ability to correlate their educational policy with the need of their industries and the 
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direction, in form of economic structure, they wanted to pursue. In some instances the 
human skills needed were absent and this led to the hiring of expatriate expertise. For 
instance the promotion of foreign skills in the educational system in Singapore in areas 
where local skills were inadequate (Lall, 1992; Page, 1994). Many developed countries 
are today concerned with regarding to the quality of their educational system which 
might indicate difficulties with choosing educational policies at the technological 
frontier. 
 
With regard to human skills present Rodrik (1994) showed that Africa had a lower stock 
measured by formal education than any other developing region in 1960. I would like to stress 
three points: 
 
I. Low levels of human capital in 1960: The education level measured by schooling 
enrolment was low. This is a legacy of the colonial period. In Africa the colonial powers 
were not interested in educating the broad masses since they might revolt.60 
 
II. Educational inequality: Ethnic inequalities increased since it often was a “preferred” 
ethnic group that received educational privileges. The colonial powers often educated 
small local elites to be “puppeteers” for the colonial masters to increase the legitimacy 
of colonial rule. This might have contributed to increasing the problems of ethnically 
income inequality which I discussed in section 1.2.2. A higher education might have 
meant higher income and increased productivity for those groups which were privileged. 
This might have maintained ethnic income inequality. 
 
III. Social studies focus: The small elite educated were mainly educated in social tertiary 
science rather than technical subjects. There was no desire to industrialise the colonies 
since they might compete with the colonial powers home market. Instead, it was more 
desirable to education them within social sciences so they could help the administrators 
keep control over the broad masses. These policies might have backfired somewhat after 
World War II when African states started to demand their independence. 
 
                                                 
60 This was summarised by a quote of Lord Lugard in Nigeria: :”(the expansion of missionary schools in 
southern Nigeria) seems to have produced discontent, impatience of any control and an unjust assumption of 
self-importance in the individual.” (quoted in Oyelaran-Oyeyinka (2004a)) 
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African skill formation has improved during the period, but this development has been far 
slower than in East Asia. There are four elements that have been worrying: 
 
I. Increased enrolments, but…: Enrolments at all levels have increased since 1960, but are 
still lower than for any other developing region. The process of increased enrolments, 
especially at primary levels, did suffer a setback in the 1980s due to a host of factors 
which included; i) The high population growth which increased the financial strains of 
the government which suffered from the weak growth performance; ii) The cutback of 
social spending, partly due to the SAP which clammed down on government 
expenditure;61 and iii) IMF’s introduction of Anglo-American style intuition fees for 
primary education which raised the costs of schooling and thereby effectively excluding 
the poorest from obtaining education.62 
 
II. Continued emphasis on social sciences: The structural composition of tertiary education 
since colonial times has been remarkably stable with most students still enrolling in 
social sciences. This is despite the increased need for technical skills and a declining 
demand for social oriented labour (Fabayo, 1996). Lall (2000) reported that 60 % of all 
studying choose more social oriented studies, while only 40 % choose more technical 
subjects. 
 
III. Declining quality of education: Clark (2000) reported that the quality of African 
education is below the world average and that students from Africa score low on 
international tests. The expenditure on education has shifted character since 1980 due to 
the SAP with more funding going into primary education and there has been reduced 
spending on secondary and especially tertiary education. There have been attempts to set 
                                                 
61 In appendix 5 there is a graphical illustration of the development of enrolment levels in Sub-Saharan Africa in 
the period 1960-95; a graphical illustration of spending on schools from 1970 to 1996 which saw a dramatic 
decline from 1990 and onwards (partly due to the more effective implementation of the SAP due to the end of 
the Cold War, see section 3.1.1); and finally how spending per education type developed from 1970 to 1995 
showing the largest decline in the financing of tertiary education. 
62 In addition there is the phenomenon of “Brain Drain” where leading intellectuals and highly educated labour 
migrate from Africa, often to the Western world. According to Udogo (2004) there are a number of both pull and 
push factors affecting this development. Among the pull factors that attract people emigrating from Africa are; i) 
Higher incomes; ii) Better standard of living; iii) Better working conditions; iv) Better research facilities; and v) 
Better career opportunities. Among the push factors which wants them to leave are; i) Pessimism about ones own 
future; ii) Under exploitation of ones profession; iii) Economic hardship; iv) Bad working conditions; and v) No 
confidence in the policies conducted. But according to some, for instance Darko (2003), the “Brain Drain” 
problem is over focused since the skills that are present in Africa are underexploited. 
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up informal institutions to increase the literacy of farmers, but these were often of poor 
quality (Clark, 2000). 
 
IV. Decreasing state support: The state institutions that were supposed to support job 
training and capability formation have experienced declining funds since the initiation 
of the SAP. This has limited their functions and has meant that the African firms’ 
capabilities have suffered further strains. To be fair on the IBRD, the state-driven 
support institutions did function as smooth in Africa as they did in East Asia and some 
only gave preferential support to some “preferred” segments before the 1980s. Still, the 
declining funds due to the cutback of government expenditure has decreased the 
development of appropriate skills even further and have led to a decrease in the 
competitiveness of African firms since there was a lack of support for human skill 
developed at the company level. Several studies, for instance Wangwe & Semboja 
(2002) have emphasised that the African companies that were able to compete most 
effectively on world markets had entrepreneurs with a higher formal education and skill 
base within the company. However, most African companies do not invest in job 
training and most job training in companies operating in Africa comes from 
multinationals. The typical African company has entrepreneurs with a low education, a 
low educated work force and no strategy no method how to upgrade the technological 
capacity of the company. 
 
Technological institutions 
For an economy to be able to master and diffuse technologies it’s dependent on its National 
System of Innovation (NSI). This analytical framework, partly the result of the evolutionary 
approach literature, attempts to capture the nature and the channels of technological learning 
and upgrading. It emphasises the role of a number of interrelated institutions which broadly 
can be divided into five categories (OECD, 1999): i) Private enterprises and the research 
institutes that they finance; ii) Governments that set the policy agenda; iii) Bridging 
institutions which include research councils and research institutions which act as the 
intermediate between governments and the users of knowledge; iv) Universities and related 
institutions that provide key knowledge and skills; and v) Other public and private 
organisations that play a role in the national innovations systems. To get some useful insights 
in this increasingly popular framework see for instance Adeoti (2002) and Edquist (2001). I 
will come back to this approach in chapter 4. For now the focus is on two levels which are 
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widely mentioned in the industrial policy debate; i) Firm capabilities; and ii) State support. 
Both the neoclassical and the evolutionary approach stress the role of learning at the company 
level since firms are the dominant mode of production and learning in an economy. State 
support is at the heart of the industrial policy controversy since its effect, especially in 
promoting specific industries over others, is hotly debated. 
 
The support from the state can come from a number of sources. In the case of East Asia the 
involvement from the state in the technology learning process was in general high. But there 
were major differences. State interference was without doubt highest in Japan and South 
Korea; with also Malaysia and Taiwan having high levels of state support. China and Vietnam 
are a bit more difficult to asses given the different nature of their economies, but had in 
general high levels of state support. Hong Kong, and partly Singapore, had more liberal 
regimes even though Singapore did attempt to direct the nature of structural changes. 
Indonesia and Thailand relied more on the markets than for instance Malaysia and Taiwan, 
but did not have as liberal policies as the city states. I would like to emphasise three elements 
regarding the state support in East Asia: 
 
I. Direct support: East Asian governments often gave direct support to certain industries 
over others through tax incentives, subsidised loans and other measures.63 The support 
given to manufacturing was normally conditional on a set of production and/or export 
demands. This disciplined companies by giving them incentives to increase production 
and facilitate technological upgrading for continued state support. The effectiveness of 
this state support is often at the heart of the controversies when discussing industrial 
policies.64 Econometric studies attempting to measure the profitability or productivity of 
preferred industries over non-preferred industries often conclude that industrial policy 
not always was effective; see for instance IBRD (1993). Normally these are the 
arguments that the neo-liberals support. But, the picture is bigger than that. I would like 
to emphasise four arguments that make simple econometric analysis difficult. Firstly, 
there are certain industries that have a higher degree of backward and forward linkages 
than other industries and the lack of promotion of such “strategic” industries might have 
dire implications for the emergence of other sectors. Given such key industries, it’s 
                                                 
63 Direct subsidies were normally not used for manufacturing support, but were normally used for promoting 
agricultural production and other “sensitive” industries. I will come back to their role in section 3.2.2. 
64 For some, for instance IBRD (1993), this is the very definition of industrial policy. 
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doubtful to measures the sector’s contribution to the economy be measures such as 
productivity or profit gives a good indicator of the industries social contribution. 
Complementary investments are mentioned in section 2.2.3. Secondly and partly related 
to the first argument, is the fact that some industries do exhibit externalities in 
production such as higher technology intensity which can have externalities through for 
instance increased job training which might benefit other sectors as well. Rodrik (2000a) 
mentioned that selective industrial support could promote economic growth if sectors 
that were more technological advanced, were more interlinked with the rest of the 
economy and had higher surplus potential were promoted over industries that did not 
exhibit the same potential. This does not mean that mistakes were not made. In Japan 
the biotechnology sector never got a real foothold and was an example of failed 
industrial policy. But the presence of “bad” industrial policy does not mean that all such 
support is unwanted. Another example from Japan is the information technology (IT) 
sector which is an industrial policy success story. Thirdly, it’s very difficult to separate 
one policy from another in such a fashion as in IBRD (1993). The conclusion in IBRD 
(1993) was that industrial policy in general was not favourable, but that the export 
promotion strategy was. But sectors were promoted on the basis of their export potential 
and thus industrial and trade policy could in many cases not be separated (Chang, 
1999a). Lastly, there is a lack of historical evidence of countries that have grown into 
today’s rich countries without using selective industrial policies at some stage.65 This 
debate is likely to remain unresolved for some time to come. Measuring all the effects 
that I mentioned will be near impossible and will allow for multiple interpretations. The 
whole question boils down to whether the East Asian countries, particularly Japan, 
South Korea and Taiwan, would have grown as fast without this direct support or not? I 
believe they wouldn’t and my argument is not only based on the East Asian experience, 
but also the past experience of Western Europe and the USA which all, contrary to what 
many Western governments often recommend today’s developing countries, did use 
direct support and protectionist measures themselves to grow rich.66 But this debate is 
not likely to die any time soon since empirical results are mixed. 
                                                 
65 Perhaps Hong Kong is the only exception so far. The problem is that Hong Kong is such a special case due to 
its nature as a city state and also a number of attributes in 1960 such as a well developed financial system and 
high levels of human capital that make their case less relevant for other developing countries. 
66 This argument is adequately summed up in Chang (2001):”Kicking Away the Ladder”. Lall (2000) makes the 
point that the only country without a real active direct scheme, Hong Kong, is the only economy that has 
experienced a deindustrialisation during the whole period, but has managed to grow due to its close ties with the 
Chinese mainland. According to Lall (2000), the reason for why Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand still have not 
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 II. Role of universities: The universities provide at least two key elements to companies and 
other institutions such as the state sector; i) The provision of human capital; and ii) 
Conducting knowledge generating activities. In East Asia universities have been able to 
fulfil both these role to high effect. I already commented on the high levels of tertiary 
education and the high quality of this education in northeast Asia. In addition, 
universities were able to play a research generating role for the industrial sector. One of 
the best examples comes from Taiwan and how universities linked themselves with 
firms to provide increased research for companies which they often could not manage 
themselves due to the low size of the average Taiwanese company. 
 
III. Public research institutions: Public research institutions also played a vital role in 
generating knowledge. Often, these public research institutions are the antenna of a NSI 
which are able to catch up the latest trends within technology. This allows the 
government to make more informed decisions regarding its technology policies and 
support private companies willing to investment by giving them access to information. 
In East Asia these institutions functioned well, an example is from South Korea were the 
“Korea Institute for Science and Technology” (KIST) played a prominent role. 
 
IV. Connection between the various research institutions: Just as important as the 
functioning of each of the components of the NSI are the linkages between the various 
elements. I have already commented on the tight linkages between universities and firms 
in Taiwan. A number of studies confirm that networking among companies and among 
companies and research institutions is higher with the presence of large quantities of 
human capital. The high presence of highly skilled labour might thus have increased the 
linkages between firms and research institutions even further. 
 
V. Wider institutional support: Part of the so-called broader NSI framework is the general 
institutional support for economic activity (see chapter 3). Evans (1995) mentioned the 
importance of small and medium enterprises (SME) support institutions in all East Asian 
economies to promote learning. Some important institutions include secure property 
                                                                                                                                                        
been able to upgrade their production structure successfully beyond labour intensive production is the absence of 
successful state support since active state support is needed to get beyond a “simple” to a more “advanced” 
industrial structure of the type found in the developed countries and in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. 
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rights, competition policies and transparent government through the rule-of-law. I will 
comment on private property rights and the rule-of-law in subsection 2.2.3. I will 
comment on competition rules in this section since it might have helped promote 
increased efficiency in East Asia. Three points are worth mentioning regarding the East 
Asian competition rules; i) Governments often promoted oligopolies and at times even 
monopolies if the scale economics were thought to be significant. Estimates regarding 
increased welfare from price competition are often not more than 1-2 % of GDP, while 
costs saved through scale economics can be as much as 30-50 % of GDP (Chang, 1999). 
In North East Asia governments often used “administrative guidance” to increase 
economics-of-scale.67 Secondly, governments were afraid of excessive competition. 
Overcapacity becomes a problem when one is dealing with “specific assets” where 
assets such as specialised labour and investments have a irreversible part see Williamson 
(1985) where much of its productive value is lost with an alternative usage. 
Bankruptcies will then have large social costs and support was given to so-called 
declining industry, see subsection 2.2.3. Finally, antirust laws were “relaxed” in those 
cases where scale economics were thought to be significant. That’s how the Japanese 
conglomerates known as the Keiretsu system. In South Korea there was no anti-
monopoly law before 1981 and the Korean conglomerates known as the Chaebols grew 
large especially during the 70s. 
 
Firms in East Asia had in general a relative high capability and were able to learn new 
technologies. I believe there are at least four main reasons for this development: 
 
I. Favourable state support: As I mentioned, the state support along the criteria I 
mentioned above, were all favourable to the East Asian development. The support for 
learning and technology by the government by financial and institutional support 
increased the capabilities of firms to exploit more advanced technology over time. The 
strategy was different, though, from country to country. In Japan and South Korea large 
companies were actively promoted. A lot of the research effort in South Korea was 
conducted within these large conglomerates, the so-called Chaebols. Today South Korea 
has the largest private R&D expenses in the world (Lall, 2000). In Taiwan a large 
                                                 
67 In Taiwan and in South Africa the car manufacturing sector had around 10 producers each which produced a 
few thousand cars each. This was in a sector were the minimal efficient scale lies at around 300 000 cars (Chang, 
1999a). The same may go for the highly fragmented Chinese car manufacture sector. 
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support network for SME was established to cut the costs of attaining new technology. 
Most of the research was conducted not by private companies, but by the state. 
 
II. Competitive pressure and incentives: Just as important as state support is the role 
competitive pressure and incentives for technological upgrading. I have already 
mentioned the conditionality attached to financial support. Conditionality in the form of 
production and export targets led to increased discipline since the continuation of such 
support was dependent on that the targets were met. This provided the incentive to 
upgrade the production structure and become more effective over time. Such state 
support was often temporary and companies were opened up to international 
competition when they were thought be ready for it. This is how trade policy got linked 
to the technology policy in what is often referred to as the “infant industry argument”. 
 
III. High skills: The abundance of cheap and highly skilled labour proved to be one of the 
major assets that East Asian companies had. It’s hard to overstate the importance of 
human skills in the East Asian development. Higher skills allowed companies to become 
more productive, to achieve higher learning abilities and increase their linkages with 
other technologic institutions. 
 
IV. Access to finance: Financial resources are needed to build the capacity to exploit the 
potential capability. One of the attributes of the East Asian financial systems, as I 
mentioned in subsection 2.2.1, was their ability to give cheap long-term loans to finance 
investments in sectors with new technologies.. 
 
V. Organisation: The organisation of the job itself often enhanced the learning capabilities 
of firms. There are two elements of the organisation that were emphasised by Chang 
(1998); i) The role of the high decision-making power of employees at all levels of the 
production hierarchy. People at the “ground level” were given more decision power 
since they often had more information regarding operation-specific issues at this level 
and might be more knowledgeable on how to increase the productivity of these 
operations; and ii) The departments were often well integrated. Instead of making the 
engineers develop products that the market department had to sell, there was a tight 
cooperation between the various departments making which reduced the time of making 
new products and increased their potential market value. This tight integration managed 
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in general to avoid products that would become “engineering dreams”, but would have 
low marketing value. 
 
African state support for the technological process has varied. I would like to emphasise three 
elements: 
 
I. Changing paradigms: Under import-substitution state support for industries was, at least 
on paper, favourable. Financial resources were made available through the financial 
system, but these were often directed at selective groups. Under SAP, the policy 
changed dramatically. State support, under the neo-liberal paradigm, was seen as 
unwanted and distorting and was to be abolished. Direct support for industries has 
declined in Africa, especially from the end of the Cold War around 1990. Gibbon (1996) 
thought that IBRD (1981) had a minimal understanding of the complex realities of 
Africa. The “true” private sector in Africa normally comprised of one-man companies 
or family businesses that conducted activity for survival purposes. There were several 
structural hindrances that limited the further development of these companies such as a 
primitive technology, difficulties in obtaining credit, competition with other one-man 
enterprises for income sources and poorly developed infrastructure. Most of what was 
called the private sector in Africa was very dependent on state connections for subsidies, 
access to credit and factors, state contracts and the protection from domestic and 
international competition. The state is therefore a dominant economic actor in African 
countries were there exists a complex two-way relationship (Ogbu & Soludo, 2004a). 
Simple neoclassical models that differentiate between private and state ownership are 
likely to meet a lot of so-called “grey zones” in Africa.68 
 
II. Role of universities: Universities in Africa have not provided the technical skills needed 
for industrialisation and the quality of the human skills coming out is often weak. Also, 
the research conducted at African is often little relevant for African firms and does not 
match the needs of the economy. Part of the reason is the declining funds that 
universities in Africa have received following the initiation of the SAP programs, which 
                                                 
68 Botswana in the 1980s was one of the few African countries that went the other and conducted some selective 
support which proved to be quite successful (Owusu & Samatar, 1997). The main concern with selective state 
support in developing countries is whether companies will be able to compete when the support stops. Most of 
the companies were able to maintain there production after the state support was abolished, something which 
indicates that the state support was successful and that companies managed to achieve cost effectiveness. 
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meant that the resources available declined. Oyerlara-Oyeyinka (2004b) conducted case-
studies in Nigeria, Kenya and Zimbabwe and found that the funding of research as 
measured by the gross academic expenditure (GAE) had declined. For instance, the 
funding of university research in Kenya in 1993 was only 40 % of the level in 1986.69 
 
III. Public research institutions: Public research institutions in Africa were often set up after 
independence and were modelled after the institutions in rich, often European countries. 
Their functioning has not been as intended (see for instance Oyerlara-Oyeyinka, 1996; 
and Adeboye, 1997). Oyerlara-Oyeyinka (2004a) mentioned two main reasons for its 
failings. Firstly, there was a lack of human skills to operate these institutions, which was 
a part of the colonial heritage. Secondly, it’s important to remember that the European 
institutions not were the result of a fixed model, but were the result of an evolutionary 
path were the institutions in question adapted to the changing environments and 
technological demands. Implementing the result of such an institutional evolution 
without having gone through the same process this led to the lack of relevance of these 
institutions within the African context. Adeyinka (2005) looked at the role of R&D 
institutions in Nigeria.70 The funding of R&D had experienced a slight increase during 
the 70s, but fell by almost 2/3 between the mid 70s until the mid 90s. The RDIs have 
performed poorly measured by their ability to support production and support the 
creation of new markets.71 Enos (1995) attempted to measure the impact of the SAP on 
the science and technological effort and found that the resources were being drawn more 
towards areas that were prioritised by foreign rather than domestic interests. According 
to a number of scholars, what they call the anti-state attitude of the BWIs, has led to a 
situation today where few African countries have a science- and technology policy. 
According to Abiodun (1998) only 0.004 % of the regional GDP went to R&D. 
 
                                                 
69 80 % of the funds go to wages alone. 
70 In the 70s a federal body named the National Council for Science and Technology (NCST) was established to 
coordinate various sector specific R&D institutions. In 1977 the body was replaced by the National Science and 
Technology Department Agency (NSDTA), which was replaced by the Federal Ministry of Science and 
Technology (FMST) in 1979 which merged with the Ministry of Education in 1986. 
71 The reasons for the failing were according to Adeyinka (2005); i) Poor infrastructure support for research; ii) 
Inadequate or low funding leading to involvement in revenue-generating activities at variance to their research 
mandates; iii) Human capital shortage both in quality and quantity;; iv) Inadequate database to guide research; v) 
Poor extension liaison services; vi) Poor linkages between research institutes, universities and end-users; and vii) 
Lack of continuity in policies, and particularly frequent changes of the agencies, actors and structures for 
supervising the R&D system. 
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IV. Connection between the various research institutions: The link between the various 
institutions was in general weak in Africa. I already mentioned how the universities 
conducted research which was less relevant for firms; and I also mentioned how public 
research institutions were exogenously imported institutions rather than endogenous 
created institutions which limited their links with other elements of the economy. 
Several studies by Oyelaran-Oyeyinka have confirmed that the linkages between firms 
and technological institutions are weaker in Africa than for other regions. For instance 
Oyerlaran-Oyeyinka & Lal (2004) where e-business technology adoption was compared 
between Nigeria, Uganda and India; where the adoption of e-business technology was 
far higher in India due to the higher linkages between the research institutions and firms. 
A higher level of human skills within the firm seems to promote increased linkages with 
research institutions. 
 
V. Wider institutional support: The wider institutional support was weak in Africa. 
Measured by property rights, competition rules and rule-of-law the African states did 
sometimes not have the capacity and sometimes did not have the willingness, or 
sometimes both, to promote such institutions. Competition rules also promoted large 
companies in Africa just like in East Asia. The major differences are i) The larger 
potential economics-of-scale in East Asia due to the higher population density; and ii) 
More importantly, there were production and/or export requirements for East Asian 
companies that African companies often lacked. 
 
Firms in Africa have not shown the same capabilities as East Asian firms. I believe that there 
are at least four developments that can explain this discourse: 
 
I. Varying state support: As I mentioned, the direct state support was varying over the 
period. Under import substitution there was state support, but this was not readily 
available for all. Under the SAP the direct state support declined, leading to increased 
difficulties in building up capacity for African firms in the light of increased 
competition and more volatile conditions. In addition, I mentioned how the technical 
support through universities and public research institutions was weak and got worse 
under the SAP. All these came in addition to the weak wider institutional support and 
the macroeconomic instability which all made economic activity very difficult and all of 
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these factors did not promote a wide scale improvement in the capacity or capabilities of 
African firms. 
 
II. Varying competitive pressure and incentives: Import substitution did not have any 
“real” provisions for production and export goals for obtaining state support. This led to 
a situation were firms did not have competitive pressures and hence no incentive for a 
technological upgrading or expansion of their production. The SAP changed the 
situation and the competitive environment became far higher, but without the direct state 
support to manage to compete. Many manufacturing firms were simply out-competed 
after import liberalisation. I think the “carrot-and-stick” analogy of Rodrik (2000a) is 
rather fitting in this context. To be able to compete efficiently firms need a certain 
amount of support (“carrot”) and a certain amount of discipline through competitive 
requirements or production targets to efficiently exploit resources (“stick”). In East Asia 
both the “carrot” and the “stick” was given to firms. In Africa, there was plenty of 
“carrot” during the ISI period, but little “stick”. During the SAP there was plenty of 
“stick”, but little “carrot”. Both approaches seemed little balanced in this respect. 
 
III. Low skills: One of the main reasons for the weak capabilities of African firms is their 
weak human skills. These findings are confirmed by a number of studies such as 
Oyelaran-Oyeyinka (2004b) where higher skills where linked i) A higher learning 
process; ii) Increased links with research institutions; and iii) Higher profitability. 
 
IV. Lack of access to finance: The weak access to finance, both during the financial 
repression and after liberalisation, is putting major strains on African firms. I already 
commented on the financial system in subsection 2.2.1. 
 
The contrasts between the two regions with regard to technological learning capabilities and 
support is vast. I believe that the differences can be bluntly summarised as: 
 
I. The state support for technological learning was higher in East Asia relative to Africa 
due to i) Better and more consistent direct support for firms; ii) More effective use of 
state support resources for firms through various learning and technology institutions; 
iii) Higher relevance of the human skills and research provided indicating a more 
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integrated NSI; and iv) The ability to create and maintain a general supporting 
institutional environment for economic activity; 
 
II. Firms capabilities were higher in East Asia than in Africa due to; i) Better overall state 
support; ii) Better incentives through production targets and/or competitive settings to 
exploit resources more efficiently and facilitate technological upgrading; iii) Better 
access to human skills; and iv) Better access to financial resources. 
 
Availability of technology 
So far I looked at the learning and technology argument of industrial policy economies from 
the inside by looking at internal elements such as finance, skills and technologies as the result 
of internal policies. Technology, though, is most often generated internationally and countries 
and industries need to access this technology. This can be done through various methods. One 
of the forms of technology transfer most mentioned in the literature is through foreign direct 
investments (FDI), this form therefore warrants some special attention. 
 
The neo-liberals normally attach three properties to FDI (Lo, 2004b); i) FDI gives a higher 
access to financial resources above the saving rate of the country; ii) FDI gives higher access 
to foreign exchange than the domestic country’s own export sector can produce; and iii) FDI 
can give technology transfers which can facilitate an increase in productivity in the recipient 
country due to access to better technologies, better organisational practice or information 
about the international market. The revisionists do not deny these advantages, but also claim 
that these need to be put into perspective by looking at two potential disadvantages of FDI 
(Lo, 2004b); i) FDI, especially from large multinationals may out-competed local producers 
since the large multinationals have far greater economics-of-scale. Some of the most dynamic 
sectors in the world economy are dominated by imperfect competition and they can lower the 
level of competition in recipient countries; and ii) FDI, again especially form large 
multinationals, can disturb the domestic economic structure by competing for scarce labour 
and capital. The presence of large multinationals might prevent the development of domestic 
“upstream” activity. 
 
The main research on the effects of FDI has been within the neoclassical tradition. Variables 
such as exports, profit and productivity are being tested to see whether they are correlated 
with FDI. The general result from this literature is that there is a “crowding in” effect of FDI. 
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Also within the revisionist tradition it has become increasingly popular to do research on FDI. 
Normally variable such as local capital formation are considered and the conclusion in general 
is that there is a “crowing in” effect of FDI which leads to a more efficient utilisation of the 
local capabilities. Both traditions might have the fundamental problem of differentiating 
between correlation and casualty. There are studies that indicate that certain types of FDI 
might be more efficient than others, I will come back to this later. 
 
In East Asia the strategy how to access foreign technology differed substantially from country 
to country: 
 
• In Japan and South Korea there was a very low dependence on FDI as a means for 
technology transfer. The usual mechanisms were to a higher degree reverse 
engineering through the use of capital imports, licensing and turnkey contracts. All 
these methods required a high quality technological institutional framework to spread 
the knowledge to end users, which these countries possessed. 
 
• Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan to a larger extent relied on FDI as a mechanism 
for technological upgrading; this goes especially for the city states. While Hong Kong 
adopted a more “laissez-faire” approach and did not discriminate against foreign 
investors, Singapore attempted to affect the pattern or FDI coming in. This was done 
to upgrade the technological intensity of their production structure over time. Taiwan 
used FDI in their so-called export zones and often promoted joint-ventures to be able 
to learn the technologies more efficiently. The technological infrastructure was strong 
in Taiwan and they were able to learn technologies through a host of other means as 
well, just like Japan and South Korea. 
 
• The Second Generation Tigers (SGT), Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, also used 
FDI as a primary channel for technology transfer. The technology institutional 
infrastructure in these countries, however, might have been less advanced than in 
Japan and the FGT. This led to a higher dependence on foreign technology and the 
learning and diffusing of technologies might have been less in the SGT. The SGT have 
a dependence on FDI coming from Japan, and to lesser extent, the FGT. 
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•  China has received a increasing share of the region’s FDI and many countries in East 
Asia fear a “crowding out” effect since China is a like a “black hole” sucking foreign 
investments to it due to it’s immense gravity which is also increasing. Especially 
during the 1990s, FDI to China increased dramatically. The effects of FDI in China 
have been subject to much research. Lo (2004b) found that FDI stimulated the Chinese 
learning capacity in the capital intensive home-market oriented Shanghai region to a 
larger extent than the labour intensive export oriented Guandong region. This a 
deviation from what neo-liberal theory would predict due to its focus on export-led 
growth and comparative advantage. China is thought to be more effective in its labour 
intensive industries. As in Taiwan, the usual practice in China used to be to actively 
promote “joint-ventures”, but wholly-owned companies are becoming increasingly 
popular as an entry mode for foreign investors. Hu & Jefferson (2002) found that the 
FDI going into China has different effects on different sectors and in the short and 
long run. Another source of technology upgrading in China has been through capital 
imports.72 Zhao (1995) looked at the specific channels of technological upgrading in 
China in the period 1960-91 and found that the imports of more technological 
advanced products was positively correlated with; i) Domestic R&D expenses; ii) 
Investments in technological upgrading; iii) Value-added in the heavy industry sector; 
iv) Exports from the heavy industry sector. Zhao (1995) concluded that the imports of 
technology intensive products affected economic growth by upgrading the domestic 
production structure. 
 
African countries also attempted to access foreign technology through much of the same 
means as the East Asian countries, but did not have the same access to foreign technology: 
 
I. Capital imports: Many African countries had high levels of capital imports, but this did 
not facilitate increased technology upgrading in the long-run. I believe there are at least 
three reasons for this failure: i) Africa did not have the adequate amount of human 
capital or technological institutions in form of a well developed NSI to access the 
foreign technology;73 ii) Protection from foreign and domestic competition lowered the 
                                                 
72 Lo (2004a) found that the Chinese export was negatively correlated with economic growth; but that imports 
was positively correlated with economic growth. The exports, according to such a view, merely provided the 
finance for the imports. 
73 Intuitively, one needs a certain level of skills, capabilities and technological know-how in society to be able to 
access high-technological goods through reverse engineering, for instance computers and TVs. 
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Table 9 – Average ”inward” FDI 1970-2004 
(Regional share on world total; 
Country share of the regional FDI) 
 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-04 
SSA share of world inward FDI 4,2 % 1,4 % 1,2 % 1,6 %
Country share of regional FDI:  
     Botswana* 3,5 % 8,9 % 0,2 % 1,8 %
     Congo DR 6,5 % 2,7 % 0,0 % 2,0 %
     Ethiopia 1,1 % 0,1 % 1,1 % 2,9 %
     Kenya 3,5 % 5,0 % 0,7 % 0,9 %
     Nigeria 35,5 % 4,3 % 41,0 % 16,5 %
     South Africa 7,1 % 0,9 % 13,7 % 15,6 %
     Sudan* 0,2 % 0,7 % 1,2 % 7,7 %
 
EA share of world inward FDI 7,4 % 9,4 % 18,0 % 12,7 %
Country share of regional FDI:  
     China n.a. 17,7 % 40,2 % 46,7 %
     Indonesia 24,4 % 4,3 % 4,0 % -1,1 %
     Japan 8,1 % 3,8 % 4,1 % 6,9 %
     Philippines 4,2 % 1,5 % 2,0 % 0,9 %
     South Korea 7,3 % 3,2 % 3,2 % 4,5 %
     Thailand 4,9 % 5,3 % 5,5 % 2,0 %
     Vietnam 0,0 % 0,1 % 1,9 % 1,2 %
 
Developing country’s share 26,3 % 26,0 % 31,3 % 12,9 %
n.a. stands for not available 
*No figures for Botswana 1970-73 and Sudan in 1971. 
incentives for African manufactures to exploit the technology efficiently and reduced 
the incentives for continued technologic upgrading due to the lack of competitive 
pressure; and iii) Technological institutions and the government failed to match the 
technology need from the manufacturing sector with the supply of technology through 
imports. 
NB: East Asia includes five high-income countries; Africa comprises of soley developing countries..
Source: Own calculations based on data from UNCTAD (2005) 
 
II. International competition: International competition has increased in Africa. Especially 
import competition were foreign companies compete with indigenous African 
companies for market shares. As studies from Deraniyagala & Semboja (1999) and 
Latch & Robinson (1999) have shown, there is little evidence that increased competition 
has facilitated an increase in the availability of technologies for African companies. The 
lack of state support, human resources and finance has made the exploitation of potential 
better technologies either too expensive or companies were unwilling to invest. 
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III. Foreign Direct Investments: There have been increasing absolute flows of FDI to 
Africa, even though less than to other developing regions. The access of technology 
through FDI has, however, been weak for Africa. This not only due to the fact that FDI 
inflows are weaker than for any other region. It’s also due to the fact that most of the 
FDI is in primary goods which are not thought to have the same learning potential as 
FDI in manufacturing. In addition, the oil rich nations of Angola and Nigeria; together 
with regions biggest economy, South Africa received 64.5 % of the regions inflow of 
FDI, leaving very little for the rest of the region. 
 
IV. Other transfer mechanisms: As Wangwe & Semboja (2002) have said, donors often 
attempted to make technology available through other means such as turnkey contracts, 
joint ventures, contracts and licences. The problem has been the exploitation of this 
increased availability of technology. The institutional infrastructure has been too weak 
to exploit these technologies to increase the technological innovation, adoption and 
assimilation process which continue to be at a low level 
 
The main difference between the availability of technology between the regions seems to have 
been: 
 
• There was less technology available in Africa than in East Asia through FDI (see table 
9 measured by FDI inflows). 74 Most of the FDI in East Asia was is in manufacturing 
while most of the FDI in Africa was is in primary goods. In addition, East Asia had 
Japan as a primary investor in the region which thereby was able to spread the 
technology and make other countries “climb up the technological latter” in a pattern 
known as “the Wild Geese Flying”. Africa did not have a Japan, even though South 
Africa as the most advanced economy has recently attempted to invest abroad.75 
 
• The governments in East Asia were far more able in coordinating their technology 
policies with the needs of their economies. The technologies pursued, whether through 
                                                 
74 I am aware about the difficulties of measuring FDI and that flows and stocks can different outcomes. But, I 
merely wanted an indicator showing the perceived relevance of a region and inward FDI for that purpose seemed 
a useful indicator. 
75 This is however controversial. Some would claim that although the political structure in South Africa has 
changed, the economic power still lays with the minority white people. The export of FDI to other African 
countries and hence indirectly the South Africa economic structure, has by some been accused of “exporting 
apartheid”. 
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capital imports, licensing or FDI were part of a larger agenda where the technological 
needs of the manufacturing sector more often were met than in Africa. In Africa, the 
government was not able to meet the purchase of technology as good to the need the 
economy had. This is especially relevant for developing countries since they often 
have scarce reserves of foreign currencies and the long-rung sustainability of the 
economy is dependent on matching the technology need of the society with the supply. 
In Africa technologies were often chosen more on the basis of what status this would 
give the nation internationally, for instance the steel industry in Nigeria which is 
heavily protected and highly inefficient, but regarded as a “strategic industry” by the 
government. 
 
• The internal capacity grew more sophisticated due to the economic growth process in 
East Asia allowing more investments in the technological infrastructure and a higher 
availability of highly educated labour force. This increased the amount of technology 
that was available to the countries. The economic growth process in turn was partly 
driven by the technological upgrading of the production structure, hence creating a 
“virtuous circle”. In Africa the internal capacity declined over the period leading to a 
lesser ability to support technological learning which again dampened growth 
prospect, creating a “vicious circle”. But, I have to agree with Wangwe & Semboja 
(2002) in asserting that the main problem in Africa has not been the availability of 
technology, but the lack of exploitation of the technology that was availability. The 
availability of technology is in part a function of economic growth since governments 
can invest in better a more sophisticated technological infrastructure and firms 
increase their capabilities and hence their learning capacity. 
 
Learning and technology summarised 
There is a agreement that the human skill divergence between the two regions is a key factor 
explaining the growth divergence, even though the nature of the underlying reasons varies 
somewhat. Another key factor seems to have been the lack of institutional support for learning 
and technology in Africa; while this was present in East Asia. Again the nature of this 
assertion is mixed as neo-liberals are more sceptical to a large role for the state in the learning 
process. Those supporting the evolutionary approach will make the case that learning and 
technological upgrading from a low development stage might be implausible without state 
support, especially through well functioning universities and public research institutions. The 
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selective promotion of some sectors over others is even more controversial and is often at the 
heart of the industrial policy debate. I think a strong a strong case can be made that the 
counterfactual, East Asia without selective intervention, would not have exhibited the same 
phenomenal economic growth. The effects of these interventions are more on the economy as 
a whole rather than on the individual sectors in question. Selective intervention in Africa, 
however, failed. This shows that selective intervention in certain sectors, even though it 
sometimes might succeed. There are no guarantees that it always will and the measuring of its 
effects is very difficult due to the complex linkages with the rest of the economy. When it 
comes to the availability of technology it was higher in the case of East Asia than for Africa. 
This was in part the result of the economic growth that was taken place. But, there seems to 
be a strong case that the main reason for the lack of learning and technology upgrading in 
Africa has not been the availability of technology, but rather their underdeveloped 
technological structure and weak human skills in exploiting the technology available. 
 
2.2.3 Coordinating economic policy 
The complementary investment, or “Big push” argument, states that some markets are missing 
or underdeveloped at a lower stage of economic development which requires governments to 
coordinate investments in various sectors at the same time. This goes especially for sectors 
with high backward and forward linkages and thus is important for the emergence of other 
sectors. As I have highlighted under financial systems and under technological learning, 
economic growth can create virtuous circles and the lack of economic growth can create 
vicious circles. Thus achieving a certain threshold development so that economic growth will 
take-off thus becomes imperative.76
 
I will go further than the usual investment arguments and highlight that the institutional 
conditions are as least as important for economic take-off. Also, the role of agriculture as a 
supplier of labour and a strategic industry is hard to overstate. These are issues that are 
important in increasing our understanding regarding the differences in the nature of the 
African and East Asian take-off. 
 
                                                 
76 The role of complementary investments was accepted by the IBRD (1993) as one of the few “legitimate roles” 
of the government in promoting economic growth in East Asia. This was a change of heart in comparison with 
IBRD (1981). Still, such policies were not recommended other developing countries since they had weaker states 
than those in North East Asia. 
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It also highlights another stylised fact. Most developing countries have only had minor growth 
episodes. What makes the East Asian countries so unique is that they as a geographic group 
have been able to continue their economic growth over a long sustained period. I agree that 
the continuation of economic growth might be easier when growth is taken place, but most 
countries have not been able to keep this dynamic going. Also, it’s important to know what 
accounts for those countries that in long periods have not attained economic growth such as in 
Africa. In this subsection I will highlight the prospect of general policy coordination as the 
main explanation for take-off and the continuation of growth (or non-growth). 
 
There are four factors that I whish to emphasise regarding the take-off in East Asia: 
 
I. Variations in take-off: The nature and the timing of the take-offs were different for the 
East Asian countries. Earlier I mentioned how Japan started their economic surge in the 
1950s; the First Generation Tigers (FGT) in the 1960s, the Second Generation Tigers 
(SGT) in the 1970s, China from the 1980s, while other countries like the Philippines and 
Vietnam have perhaps taken off in the 1990s.77 The nature of the take-off was also 
different. According to Rodrik (1999), the economic growth in South Korea and Taiwan 
was not triggered by a surge in exports, but high investment levels. In Hong Kong and 
Singapore the trigger seems rather to be increased exports. 
 
II. Agricultural preconditions: There was a major increase in agriculture value-added in 
East Asia compared to other regions prior and during take-off (Hammouda, 2004). A 
number of countries had extensive land reforms such as China, Japan, South Korea and 
Taiwan. The goals for the land reforms were often not mainly economic, but political 
such as lowering the potential problems stemming from income inequality, for instance 
combating communist sympathies, I will comment more on this in subsection 3.2.1. I 
believe that two aspects of the agricultural policy should be mentioned. Firstly, rural 
sectors were prioritised with investments in for instance financial institutions, 
infrastructure and schooling. This led to more dynamic rural areas by increasing the 
integration of national markets, giving rural people more readily access to credit and 
increasing the quality of human skills; all enhancing productivity. Secondly, there was a 
                                                 
77 Following the analogy one could argue to call the Philippines and Vietnam; perhaps together with Cambodia 
and Laos as Third Generation Tigers. The sustainability of their economic growth is the best indicator whether 
the growth is a mere spur or a shift in their economic paradigm. In time some of these countries may be termed 
along side the other successful East Asian countries; so far it might to early to tell. 
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large state interference in determining the prices for agriculture and providing 
protectionist policies. The prices were usually kept “artificially” low, but high enough 
for re-investment to take place. Later on, with the emergence of more modern industry, 
agriculture could also benefit from more efficient machinery and methods to enhance 
their productivity. These policies, I would claim, have been successful in promoting the 
agricultural sector. The development in the agricultural sector had at least five major 
implications; i) Urbanisation increased since the increases in agricultural productivity 
released labour. This insured a steady increase of cheap and well-educated labour for the 
manufacturing sector. Wages in the industrial sector were in general higher than in 
agriculture and the increased presence of schools in the rural areas increased the general 
level of skills in these areas; ii) The countries managed to attain food security which 
meant that the foreign exchange did not needed to be used on food imports, thereby 
increasing the surplus on the balance-of-payment. Also, food security was a strategic 
goal since it allowed more self-determination and hence increased political autonomy; 
iii) Agricultural reforms were used to fight income inequality in some countries such as 
Malaysia were income inequality along ethnic lines had caused difficulties thereby 
enhancing social stability, more on this in subsection 3.2.1; and iv) The increased 
income of the rural sector increased the size of the domestic market and helped the 
economy since domestic producers could sell their products to the domestic market 
thereby increasing their income and potential for obtaining economics-of-scale and 
scope more independently from the international market. 
 
III. Visions: The role of growth visions has often been understated by the neo-liberals, but 
was important in mobilising national forces around economic growth.  There are at least 
two major reasons for this significance; i) Visions showed the intension of the 
government which reduced uncertainty and might have increased the commitment of 
investors and the direction of the investments. Hence they were able to coordinate the 
investments needed to overcome structural hurdles and the state invested in those sectors 
that were perceived to being to risky by private actors; and ii) Mobilisation of national 
forces around economic growth by playing on national pride connected to economic 
growth. In South Korea Park came to power in 1961 and started to signal his 
commitment to economic growth. His five year plans were not so much detailed 
economic objectives, but rather loosely defined visions to steer the economic policy 
after. Another example is how China after 1978 has increased their national pride due to 
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the economic growth and how nationalism has been able to mobilise Chinese around a 
common cause. The effects of such a national mobilisation might have been more 
committed investors, higher labour productivity and a feeling of common identity with 
economic growth which made policy implementation more effective. The extent of such 
a national mobilisation and the quantitative contribution are hard to measure. I will 
come back to this point in subsection 3.2.2. 
 
IV. Institutional innovations: Before the growth took off there was always a short period 
with numerous institutional innovations (Rodrik, 2000a). An important aspect of these 
institutional innovations is that they seldom were fixed solutions imported from abroad, 
so called “best practice institutions”. Rather they attempted to adapt institutional change 
to the local context by given them a “local flavour”. This point is for me vital to 
understand the successfulness of institutional innovation in East Asia. Roland (2002) 
(cited in Haggard, 2004) called this the “evolutionary institutional perspective”. There 
are number of reasons for why this was important; i) It increased the legitimacy of 
institutional change by making it more social acceptable and thereby increased the 
working and durability of such changes; ii) Institutions were more adapted to the 
specific needs the countries had as opposed to pre-fixed; thereby enhancing the 
effectiveness of the institutions for the countries in question by being more attuned to 
the domestic needs; and iii) It promoted national pride by enhancing the belief of self 
found paths to economic growth, like the “Japanese economic model”, “the Taiwanese 
economic model” etc. This could have been important for raising the national 
mobilisation around economic growth even further. 
 
The continuation of economic growth is what differentiates East Asia from other developing 
regions that have had short spurs of economic growth. I would contend that the qualitative 
foundations of the East Asian take-offs were vital for the continuation of economic growth in 
the long-run. In addition, there were a number of important government related factors that 
were vital in sustaining economic growth in East Asia. 
 
I. Coordinating institutions: The East Asian countries all had methods to coordinate their 
economic policies in a coherent manner. The most obvious might be institutions as the 
Ministry of Internal Trade and Industry (MITI) in Japan and the Economic Planning 
Board (EPB) in South Korea. These institutions comprised of technocratic elites that the 
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authority and the legitimacy to go across various departments and make the economic 
policy more coherent. The coordination of economic policy was very important in East 
Asia since there was a focus on “the bigger picture”. To meet the stated objectives there 
was a need to coordinate for instance the financial, educational, technological, 
macroeconomic, and trade policies. In Japan, South Korea and Taiwan there was a large 
focus on creating so-called “focal points” so private market participants were able to 
observe the intentions of the government (see Renshaw, 1986; and Chang, 1998). Both 
through white papers and the coordinating institutions the governments were able to get 
the private investment into the sectors it wanted. Okimoto (1989) provides an example 
from Japan where governments through the usage of preferential treatments decreased 
the perceived risks in investing in the new IT sector which has become one of the 
biggest Japanese success stories. Another example is the semiconductor industry in 
Taiwan. Private market participants found it too risky to invest in this new sector so the 
government instead invested in this “strategic industry”. After several public companies 
had emerged several private companies started to be spun of these. This was a process of 
market building.78 One example is how governments in South Korea promoted labour 
intensive exports on the basis of their earning potential well into the 1980s (Chang, 
1998). This despite the declining comparative advantage that this sector had as 
compared to other East Asian countries such as the SGTs. The foreign exchange earned 
was used to purchase more capital and technological intensive imports which due to the 
strong emphasis on increased educational and technological know-how were able to be 
used to increase the technological know-how of their manufacturing sector. To finance 
certain sectors with higher knowledge intensity these sectors were given preferential 
loans by the governments. This example shows how industrial, educational, financial, 
trade and technological policies were combined. Therefore, assessing the effect of only 
one of these, for instance industrial support, becomes an ever more daunting task 
(Chang, 1998). 
 
II. Governmental learning: East Asian governments were able to strike a balance between 
long-run flexibility and short-term discipline. The short-term discipline meant that 
exports and production targets had to be met and avoided so-called “stop-and-go” 
policies. This decreased uncertainty and thereby reduced transaction costs by increasing 
                                                 
78 Contrary to the neo-liberal view of seeing markets as natural constructs, in developing countries these might 
be underdeveloped or non-existent. This process is what Wade (1990) called “Governing the market”. 
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transparency. In the long-run, however, governments changed their policies if it proved 
to be faulty. Governments did make mistakes, they did promote certain industries that 
did not succeed and finally had to be abandoned.79 This meant that East Asian 
governments were “learning-by-doing” and had a very incremental and pragmatic 
approach towards managing the economy. Bruton (1998) called this a process of 
“government learning” rather than “government minimising”. An important part of this 
process was the consultation with the private sector. In Japan this was done through the 
so-called deliberation councils where representatives from the government, the private 
sector and third parties such as academics met to discuss the economic policy. This gave 
the policy makers a feedback mechanism so they could attune their economic policies so 
they would meet the needs of the private sector. 
 
III. Dealing with structural change: After take-off a virtuous cycle of high investment – 
high exports – high savings emerged (Rodrik, 1999; see also Akyuz et al., 1999; and 
Weiss, 2005). But the continuation of economic growth also inevitably led to structural 
changes and dealing with these is challenging. In East Asia governments not only gave 
support to so-called “sunshine industries”, but also to “declining industries”. The critics 
of industrial policy said that the support of declining industries hindered structural 
changes and leads to a less efficient allocation of resources and this will eventually lead 
to a declining growth rate.80 “Declining industry” support in East Asia often fell into 
two categories; i) Short-term industrial support due to market fluctuations that will not 
be long-lasting. Support from the government was given due to the lack of financial 
means through less developed capital markets and because they in capital markets 
perhaps would not get the funding. For instance in Japan there were the so-called 
“recession cartels”, see Dore (1986) and Chang (1994a); and ii) Long-term industrial 
support to the real declining industries was given to facilitate a more smooth transition. 
                                                 
79 In the industrial policy debate hardly anyone ever mentions that private investors make mistakes all the time 
and often go bankrupt; private investments are often prone failure as well. 
80 Most famous is Krugman’s (1994) argument that almost the entire growth process in East Asia was simply an 
accumulation of capital and labour; leaving almost nothing for productivity measured by total factor productivity 
(TFP). Given the declining marginal productivity of these factors economic growth would not be sustainable if 
there wasn’t an increase in productivity. Thus, the East Asian economic growth was according Krugman 
unsustainable in the long-run. Krugman’s arguments have been hotly disputed, for instance Nelson & Pack 
(1999) argue that an estimate like TFP underestimated East Asia’s dynamism and efficiency. They also point to 
that South Korea and Taiwan grew far faster than given by their investment levels. I would add that a key to 
understanding the continued growth are structural changes and that capital and labour is released from 
depressing sectors to more booming sectors. To maintain growth in the long-run such a process becomes vital. 
There is an attempt to avoid a situation were declining industries become “nursing homes” and lock resources 
that eventually will depress the long-run efficiency of the economy and hence economic growth. 
 107
Support was given conditionally with restructuring demands, cost demands and 
demands for the upgrading of the production structure. Time was given to either 
restructure the enterprise to become more cost efficient; or to go into more profitable 
sectors. Another example from Japan are the so-called “cartels for structural-depressed 
industries”, see Dore (1986), Renshaw (1986) and Chang (1993). Such support might 
have made structural changes more acceptable thereby reducing the opposition to 
structural change. 
 
IV. Binding institutions: The tenants of new institutional theory would emphasise the role of 
binding institutions to overcome problems with regard to commitment and time 
inconsistency associated with government involvement. Governments in East Asia were 
able to commit themselves to economic growth and gained a more favourable reputation 
as a reliable partner because of that. Reputation alone, however, is not enough. There is 
a need for institutions to constrain government power to show credible commitment. 
One such an institution is through clearly defined and secure property rights. There is a 
consensus in the literature that property rights are a fundamental institution that needs to 
be in place for economic development to take place. Clearly defined and secure property 
rights secures that market actors can enjoy the fruits of ones own labour and hence 
increase incentives innovation and production; it also binds the government since some 
sovereignty is given to market actors to control their own resources and protects them 
from exploitation.81 Another institution is the rule-of-law rather than the rule-of-men. 
East Asian government have been moving towards an increased rule-of-law during the 
period. To compensate an at times inadequate legal framework other guarantees were 
                                                 
81 There is a near consensus that clearly defined and secure property rights are needed for economic development 
to take place. At the same time there is no disagreement on the fact that the economic growth in East Asia for a 
large part was driven by private investments. Neo-liberals have seen this as the superiority of private formal 
ownership. This might, or might not be true. A number of scholars have a more nuanced approach and point out 
at least three moments; i) It’s not given that formal ownership gives full control over a property, at the same time 
certain informal mechanisms can give larger controls than formal. In many countries one has to seek permission 
to build houses on one’s own property, which indicates that property rights not yields full control; ii) It plays on 
the strong anti-state attitude of the neo-liberals which states that public ownership should be avoided. Even 
though public ownership in East Asia was low it did play a part in for instance complementary investments in 
Taiwan as I mentioned. In Taiwan the three largest companies; and seven of the ten largest companies are 
publicly owned (Fields, 1998). In South Korea the publicly owned Pohang Steel Company is known to be one 
the most efficient and technological advanced within its industry (Amsden, 1989). In Singapore there are a 
number of publicly owned companies within shipbuilding and some high technology sectors (Chang, 1998); and 
iii) China is an interesting case since the formal property rights are vaguely defined with a multitude of owners 
Often, however, the property rights de facto are very clear which means that informal institutions control the 
property rights (Nolan, 1996). This shows that in some society’s informal institutions can be as clear as formal 
ones. There is no doubt that Anglo-American cultures have an obsession with formal rules, something that’s 
reflected in the US judicial system. 
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sometimes given to show commitment to economic growth. For instance, in China 
foreign investors were given more favourable tax incentives than local private 
entrepreneurs in the special economic zones. Also in South Korea there was a strong 
pro-business bias from the 1960s to the 1980s with the leading Chaebols profiting the 
most. 
 
In Africa some countries did experience short periods of economic growth, while others did 
not. Contrasting with the take-off in East Asia, I want to emphasise four points: 
 
I. Different experiences: There are at least three groups of countries in Africa with regard 
to economic growth. The first one group of countries has had a economic take-off and 
has managed to sustain growth over a long period; only two countries qualify for this 
group, namely Botswana and Mauritius.82 The second group of countries are countries 
that have had growth spurts, but have been unable to maintain these, for instance Cote 
D’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria. The third set of countries has not had growth 
spurts and has been caught in the various vicious circles during the entire period, for 
instance Angola and Congo DR. 
 
II. Lack of real visions: Many would contend that African leaders did have visions after 
independence, quite a lot of them actually. But, these were often political and did not 
have a realistic economic entrepreneur vision attached to it. To me, the most important 
thing about the visions in Africa was that the policies that were conducted often did not 
match it. Complementary investments were often ill planned, lacked consistency and 
were subject to frequent reversals. Nigeria is a good example of how different 
government since 1970 have stated that Nigeria was to become an industrialised nation. 
But still, 99 % of the export income in 2000 was in primary goods despite at least 40 
years of different attempts of industrialisation.83 
 
III. Institutional change: There have been many and frequent institutional changes in Africa, 
or at least attempts of. This is closely connected to frequent regime changes in the 
                                                 
82 Some would want to put Uganda from the end of the 80s here as well. The problem is that it’s to early to tell 
whether their growth is sustainable, just like countries as Cambodia and Laos. 
83 From around 1960 to around 1970 the manufacturing did grow and there was a pro-industrialisation policy and 
at times rapid economic growth in Nigeria. But around 1970 large reserves of oil were discovered and the oil 
price shock a few years later led governments to prioritise the extraction of this natural resource despite much of 
the pro-industrialisation rhetoric. 
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region and shifting policies. Intuitively, this increased uncertainty and hence increased 
transaction costs leading to fewer investments given the uncertain environment. There 
were a number of reason for why institutional changes often were ineffective and 
unsustainable: i) Lack of local contents, often institutions were pure copies from abroad 
and not suited to the local African needs, for instance some of the technological 
institutions I mentioned in subsection 2.2.2; ii) Lack of consensus around policies and 
institutional change which rendered many of the changes unsustainable due to the 
frequent reversals, more on this in section 3.1; and iii) Rather than achieving their goal 
of increased certainty, institutional changes increased uncertainty both due to the 
frequency of changes which increased the danger of future reversals. In 1987 Zambia 
halted their SAP driven policies and started to undue some of the liberalisation which 
had taken place. The same goes for Nigeria which had been liberalising their economy 
since 1986, but a military regime reversed much of these policies in 1994 by for instance 
a appreciation of the exchange rate to facilitate increased public consumption for the 
military regime. 
 
IV. Agricultural developments: Under the colonial administration policies varied from 
colony to colony on how the agricultural sector was treated, as I mentioned in 
subsection 1.2.1. In general, the authorities set a fixed price for agricultural goods to 
keep up the supply of cheap food to urban areas, not least since it was in urban areas the 
potential for a revolt was the largest. After independence many of these policies were 
continued. The farmers in Africa thereby received a low, but stable income which often 
was not enough to upgrade their production structure to allow for increases in 
productivity.84 Policies towards the agricultural sector were not that different as in East 
Asia which also had low fixed prices. The main difference for me is the low public 
investments in rural areas going to infrastructure, schooling, health and institutional 
expansion such as financial institutions. One of the main objectives of the SAP was to 
allow for higher farm incomes. It was thought that a liberalisation of the prices and 
allowing for foreign trade would achieve higher prices. But, the prices did in general not 
increase in one of the most “distorted” world markets of them all with prices being 
                                                 
84 A question that remains unanswered is how large income African farmers should receive to allow for a 
productivity increase. The geographic conditions in Africa are harsh and whether the income of farmers need to 
be higher than in other regions to allow for increased wealth remains to be seen. It is not clear whether or not 
policies or geography alone were at fault in lowering African agricultural output, but the two in combination 
were devastating. 
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depressed by developed world farm subsidies. The prices did, however, become more 
volatile. The result was that farmers now got a low and volatile income with no social 
safety net to allow them to cope with the increases in volatility. Liberalisation proved to 
lead to more adverse outcome than the previous situation. The reason seems to be that 
the SAP abolished the old system without putting a new system in place. Once African 
countries had food security, but the African countries today are unable to feed 
themselves, needing food imports. Hammouda (2004) summed up the development of 
the agricultural sector during the two policy eras as the “failure of development 
experiments”. The results of the agricultural policies in Africa were; i) Urbanisation not 
due to increased agricultural efficiency, but due to hardships in the countryside leading 
to over-urbanisation since the economic fundamentals were not in place which have 
facilitated high unemployment; ii) Increased food imports which has locked much of the 
African foreign exchanges and increased the balance of payment deficit. Also, the food 
dependence has led to a increased dependence on foreign countries leading to a 
increased loss of autonomy; iii) Since most poor people are in the rural areas and the 
largest sector is agricultural most poor people are farmers. The hardships endured by 
African farmers have led to increased absolute numbers of poor people which might 
have increased social tensions and hence increased political and social instability, more 
on this in subsection 3.2.1; and iv) The rural areas did not become a market for urban 
production due to the low income and accessibility thereby lowering the potential for 
home-market led economic growth in Africa. 
 
Normally, take-offs, when achieved did not proved to be sustainable. There were also a 
number of reasons for why the lack of growth continued: 
 
I. Lack of coordination: African states have a unclear distribution of power within the state 
sector. The responsibility for the formulation and implementation runs across various 
departments. Many of the departments have stayed afloat on the backdrop of previous 
attempts of industrialisation which did not succeed. For instance, there are three 
different industrial departments in Nigeria where all of them see themselves as 
responsible for the industrial policy formulation for the country as a whole. This has 
often resulted to a lack of coherence between various political goals due to a 
contradiction between different departments. This has contributed to making policy 
formulation and implementation a more difficult process. Both the tenants of the IS and 
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SAP approaches claimed their policies failed due to implementation difficulties, not 
their own policy recommendations. The SAP policies might have been even more 
difficult to implement due to the lack of popular support in many African countries 
which made such policies subject to reversals and ineffective implementation, I will 
return to these issues in section 3.1. 
 
II. Stop-and-go policies: I have already mentioned some of the arguments regarding the 
damages of constant policy reversals. There was a more long-term commitment to IS 
than to SAP; but still the policies failed. I would claim that the short-run policy reversals 
and lack of discipline in the short-run in keeping production and export targets were at 
the heart of the problem. This was combined with preferential treatment of some actors 
over others and led to a decrease in government transparency which increased 
transaction costs and often made the government an unreliable partner. The process of 
“government learning” was not present in Africa not least due to the unstable political 
climate. Under the SAP policies the new slogan was “government minimising” since the 
government in Africa was the main reason for the lack of economic growth in Africa 
according to the neo-liberals. This process of scaling down the government led to a 
decreased state capacity which furthered reduced the state’s capacity to promote 
economic growth. Most important was due to the lack of real consultation during the 
SAP.85 This increased the danger of policy reversals due to lack of a consensus around 
policies, something than also characterised the IS period. I will come back to these 
issues in section 3.1. 
 
III. Structural drag: The ISI left many African countries with a legacy which has proven 
hard to overcome, namely a large state owned manufacturing sector which is highly 
inefficient. One major problem of the manufacturing sector in Africa is their high 
dependence on imports for continued production. The development in for instance 
Kenya followed this pattern where a manufacturing sector developed with a high 
dependence on imported capital goods and factors; there was a high uncertainty in the 
export markets in the surrounding countries and a relative small home market, all setting 
limitations for increases in efficiency (Oyejide, 2002). The SAP policies, however, 
created their own structural legacy as well. Ghana was one of the few truly “successful” 
                                                 
85 Some would disagree and say that the concept of “local ownership” attempted to consult the African countries. 
But this was often more rhetoric than real; see subsection 3.1.3. 
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implementers of the SAP and liberalised their foreign trade in 1983. Although there was 
an initial expansion of manufacturing production until 1987, it dropped until 1993. The 
companies that expanded their production were normally small, with a low productivity 
which directed towards the home market (Oyejide, 2002). Also the SAP, with its import 
liberalisation, led to a high increase in imports. The export sector in Ghana and Uganda, 
the countries with the most consistent implementation of the SAP, have a high 
dependence on imports and can only be hold afloat by increases in foreign aid. They 
have been unable to generate the foreign revenue to pay for the imports themselves. 
Thus, both development strategies left African countries with an economic structure 
which is highly dependent on imports and hence foreign exchange, which is partly 
caused by foreign aid. 
 
IV. Binding institutions: The reputation of the African states was as an unreliable partner for 
economic cooperation. This reputation is partly due to the frequent and rather turbulent 
changes in leadership and partly the lack of institutions that guarantees economic and 
political actors a certain amount of rights. These two are interlinked and the political 
instability is also reflected of how these problems do not find their solutions through 
political institutions. For economic actors the property rights often have been uncertain 
and have contributed to the low investments. A sudden and drastic change in property 
rights is known to decrease the trust of investors in a economy for a long time. In 
Uganda Idi Amin seized power and drastically took the property of Indian businesses to 
fight the income inequality in the country. Another example is Robert Mugabe seizures 
of white farmers land in Zimbabwe. There was an attempt by the IBRD to implement 
certain “best practice” institutions such as formal private property rights in some 
African countries. These did often not have the intended effect. I will comment on the 
reason of this failing in the start of chapter 4. The rule-of-law is another institution that 
increases the transparency of the government and decreases transaction costs. There was 
a lack of stability in the application in the rule-of-law which led to a high perceived risk 
in African investment. 
 
2.3 Trade policy 
The debate regarding trade policy has almost been as heated as for industrial policy. The 
export performance of East Asia has been increasing during the whole period. East Asia’s 
 113
share of world’s exports was 9 % in 1960; in 1980 it was 13 %; while it constituted almost a 
quarter of world trade in 2000. Africa’s export performance has seen an opposite trend. In  
Table 10 – Regional share of worlds exports; and Country share of 
total regional exports 
 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
EA total share 9 % 10 % 13 % 18 % 24 %
Individual country share of regional exports: 
     China 22 % 7 % 7 % 10 % 16 %
     Indonesia 7 % 4 % 9 % 4 % 4 %
     Japan 34 % 62 % 51 % 45 % 31 %
     Philippines 5 % 3 % 2 % 1 % 3 %
     South Korea 0 % 3 % 7 % 10 % 11 %
     Thailand 3 % 2 % 3 % 4 % 5 %
     Vietnam 1 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 1 %
 
SSA total share 5 % 4 % 4 % 2 % 1 %
Individual country share of regional exports: 
     Botswana 0 % 0 % 1 % 3 % 3 %
     Congo, DR 8 % 7 % 3 % 3 % 1 %
     Ethiopia 1 % 1 % 1 % 0 % 1 %
     Kenya 2 % 3 % 2 % 2 % 2 %
     Nigeria 8 % 11 % 33 % 20 % 22 %
     South Africa 35 % 29 % 33 % 34 % 32 %
     Sudan 3 % 3 % 1 % 1 % 2 %
     Tanzania 3 % 2 % 1 % 0 % 1 %
Source: Own calculations base don data from WDI indicators (2005) 
 1960 Africa’s share of world exports was 5 %; in 1980 it was 4 %; while the share dropped to 
around 1 % of world trade in 2000. This is especially worrying since the regions’ two biggest 
countries, Nigeria and South Africa since 1980, have had over half of this share leaving the 
rest extremely marginalised. 
 
The trade policy debate has been marked by what, at times has seemed to be, two extremes; i) 
Home-market led development; and ii) Export-led development. From the 1950s until around 
1980 import-substitution home-led development was within the mainstream. From around 
1980 the neo-liberal ideas started dominating the mainstream and an export-led economic 
development started to be the main recommendation for developing countries. This 
development was related to the economic growth in South Korea and Taiwan. 
 
2.3.1 Home market-led development 
Import substitution was based on the idea around home-market led economic development. 
With regard to trade policy there were three major effects: 
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 I. Substitution of imports: The whole concept of import substitution reflexes the 
replacement of imported foreign produced goods with the country’s own goods. In this 
way the country started to produce manufacturing goods which up until then were 
produced in developed countries. Thereby the international division of labour was 
broken up. 
 
II. Overvalued exchange rate: An overvalued exchange rate would facilitate increased 
access to capital and would make imports cheaper which would facilitate technologic 
upgrading. 
 
III. Increased trade barriers: Trade barriers increased based on two arguments: i) So-called 
“consumer goods” since the overvalued exchange rate made all imports cheaper and this 
could facilitate an increased import of “unnecessary” goods; and ii) Protection of home 
industry would make it possible to build up the domestic industrial capacity. 
 
For many developing countries primary good exports would give the necessary foreign 
exchange to finance the import substitution strategy at the outset. The model of import 
substitution differentiated between the first and second generation import substitution. During 
the first generation import substitution agriculture and simple labour intensive industry such 
as textiles should be promoted to give the necessary basis for further industrialisation. During 
the second generation import substitution more advanced industry which was more capital 
intensive should be promoted. Finally developing countries would have a industrial structure 
similar to those found in developed countries and they could start to open up their economies. 
To put it bluntly, the infant industry argument was now used for the economy as a whole. 
 
African countries pursued such a home-market led development through an IS strategy. 
Initially this strategy seemed to work quite well and a number of African countries did 
achieve high growth rates. Countries like Kenya and Nigeria at times recorded growth rates of 
9 % in GDP per capita. However, the growth did not prove to be sustainable and certain 
problems that were common for those pursuing an ISI strategy also became obvious in Africa. 
In addition, Africa had some problems that were specific for the region: 
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I. Standard macroeconomic problems: I have already mentioned some of the difficulties 
with such a strategy earlier. With regard to trade policy the IS created three main effects: 
i) Increased BoP difficulties stemming from a faster than expected rise in imports; ii) An 
overvalued exchange rate which created an export bias since goods were priced higher 
for foreigners; and iii) Imports of capital goods increased. 
 
II. Standard efficiency problems: The ISI, as I have mentioned previously, led to a high 
degree of state ownership in Africa and a high degree of economic planning which both 
proved to create inefficient manufacturing sectors. One of the reasons was the lack of 
competitive pressure, in the absence of conditionality such competitive pressure could 
have been provided by the international market, but this was also not present in the 
African context. Industries were often protected, often enjoying monopoly status in their 
home markets. 
 
III. Specific African problems: There were a number of problems with the ISI that were 
more specific for Africa; i) Domestic markets were small and often fragmented. This 
lowered the potential for an ISI since economics-of-scale could not be as much 
exploited; ii) Africa had inexperienced administrators at independence and policy 
implementation proved to be difficult. Some ISI proponents claim that, even though the 
IS did fail in Latin America; it did not fail in Africa simply because it was never really 
tried due to implementation difficulties (see for instance Riddel, 1990). Such a view 
says that only a handful of the larger countries such as the Cote D’Ivoire, Nigeria and 
Kenya did implement a milder form of ISI, but that smaller African countries did not 
have a real strategy. 
 
East Asian economies until the beginning or mid 1970s could be divided into two categories 
based on their trade policy pursued; i) The first mover countries with Japan and the FGT; and 
ii) China, Vietnam and the so-called Second Generation Tigers (SGT) which comprises of 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand which changed there policies subsequently to a more pro-
export stance. The latter group comprised of countries that pursued ISI and planned 
economies under communist leadership. Both these approaches suffered from many of the 
same difficulties that most IS countries did which comprised of; i) Macroeconomic problems 
which, as I mentioned above, comprised of increased BoP problems, overvalued exchange 
rates and imports of capital goods; and ii) Efficiency problems due to high state (or collective) 
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ownership and a high degree of planning leading to an inefficient use of resources. Thus the 
problems suffered in these countries were not that much different from what other economies 
suffered that also pursued an IS strategy. The first mover countries, however, instead choose 
to promote their exports. The high economic growth these countries experienced made many 
in the region aware of an alternative strategy to the ISI. The SGT changed their policies to a 
more export-oriented strategy during the 1970s; China from 1978 and Vietnam from 1986. 
With regard to the first mover countries there are three important characteristics: 
 
I. Active export promotion of industrial goods: There was a strong support for exporters 
from the state. Exporters and their supplier often got preferential loans and were given 
exemptions from import restrictions. In this way there was a clear pro-export bias which 
is markedly different from the ISI at the time. It has been suggested that the need for 
foreign exchange was the true motivation behind such a strategy. The increased foreign 
exchange was able to finance the increased capital imports which the increased 
technology learning of the country. In that sense the strategy pursued by East Asia was 
more a complementary strategy between export promotion and import substitution. 
Some have suggested that this was the only viable long-term ISI policy since it provided 
the finance for increased imports.86 In addition to these arguments there are three other 
moments worth noting; i) Active state support was given to sectors that there didn’t exist 
comparative advantages. There are a number of authors that claim that the first movers 
countries created their comparative advantages, rather than let the market decide their 
outcome. To not hurt exports, import exemptions were given to exporters and their 
suppliers to overcome some of the most adverse effects of protectionism; ii) Sectors 
were not chosen on the basis of criteria such as labour intensive and capital intensive as 
in Western models. There was a more whole worthy accession where the future export 
potential, learning effects and linkages with the rest of the economy; and iii) Industrial 
and trade policy were often two sides of the same coin. In part the market forces were 
set out of play by allowing protectionism and imperfect competition. Most likely, the 
                                                 
86 Some would claim that our Western viewpoints would not adequately describe the “Japanese” or the 
“Korean” model. The closest to such a model I think comes from Akamatsu (1961, 1962) with his “Wild Geese 
Flying” models. The Japanese economic school of thought orginateted originally more inspired by German, 
rather Anglo-American idea. This legacy can still be seen today. Okimoto (1989) elegantly summed up part of 
the difference: “There is a fundamental divergence in expectations and objectives and hence in policy actions. 
Whereas Americans are content to let the chips fall where they may, the Japanese prefer to remove as much 
uncertainty as possible from the market processes. Their disposition to bend, twist, and shape the market is 
analogous to their practice of using ropes, wires, and strings to bend and twist the trunks and branches of trees 
into shapes that fit the Japanese aesthetic composition of a landscape, garden, or bonsai plant.” 
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reason why such a policy was more effective in East Asia than in other developing 
regions were the stringent production and export requirements. 
 
II. Strategic policies: Sectors that were promoted were part of a larger picture to upgrade 
the economic structure of the economies in question. Those sectors that were able to 
compete internationally were liberalised, those that were not were given protection in so 
far they were deemed to be strategic for the country’s interests. The point is that trade 
policies, rather than being universal for all market participants, was strategic and 
adapted to the specific needs of the sectors and companies. This might have enhanced 
their working since it for instance was combined with technology policies hence 
increasing the overall learning of the economy as a whole. In addition trade policies 
were combined with other policies such as social policies. In Japan the agricultural 
protection was used to partly offset the underdeveloped welfare state (Chang, 1998). 
 
III. Institutional support: The promotion of exports also resulted institutional support for 
exports. For instance Trade Promotion Centres which often functioned as a match 
making between their own country’s exporters and potential importers abroad. For 
instance the “China External Trade Development Council” (CETPC) in Taiwan and the 
“Hong Kong Trade Development Council”. 
 
During the 1970s there was general perception that import substitution had failed. The results 
generated by this strategy were not what the proponents had been claiming. There are three 
main strands of explanations for why the IS strategy failed: 
 
I. Macroeconomic shocks: From 1973 macroeconomic shocks were more profound than 
the pre-1973 period and this undermined the IS strategy. This explanation was often 
backed by leaders which implemented the IS policies. 
 
II. Implementation: The ideas behind import substitution were valid, but the 
implementation of the policy was abysmal. For instance, the agriculture was often 
squeezed instead of promoted, which paved the way for an unsustainable economic 
development. This explanation was often backed by the proponents of IS. 
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III. Wrong ideas: Import substitution did not work since the ideas behind this strategy were 
wrong. This explanation was often backed by the neo-liberals. 
 
2.3.2 – Export led development
From around 1980 the neo-liberals had gotten into the mainstream which facilitated a shift to 
a more liberal policy. The recommendation for developing countries was to open their 
economy, withdraw the state of economic activity and countries would then develop naturally 
based on their endowed comparative advantage. The arguments can be characterised in two 
main groups that are interlinked, namely pro-export arguments and pro-import liberalisation 
arguments. Neo-liberals see them linked because an import restriction on a production factor 
that an exporter uses is like a tax on an exporter. The main arguments usually are:87
 
I. Advantages of increased exports: Some of the main arguments for increased exports is 
that an increase facilitates; i) A increase the country’s production; ii) Increased exports 
will increase the availability of foreign exchange; and iii) Increased entrepreneurship 
due to higher perceived pay-off by producing for the larger international market. 
 
II. Advantages of a more open economy: Increased import liberalisation is according to 
many of the same authors to give some additional attributes; i) A orientation towards the 
international market will facilitate an increased access to technologies; ii) Increased 
openness will give dynamic comparative advantage which indicates a more 
sophisticated production structure as time moves on; iii) Increased division of labour 
which will increase the productivity of the economy as a whole and promote economic 
growth; iv) The increased competition will discipline domestic companies by raising the 
level of competitive pressure and thus making them more effective; v) Import 
liberalisation will give less opportunistic behaviour by disciplining governments; and vi) 
Producers will get access to factors of production at international prices; import 
restrictions would be an implicit tax on exporters. 
 
These are not universally accepted arguments as there are host of counterarguments that goes 
against. For the sake on continuity I will characterise them in the same two main arguments as 
the pro-arguments: 
                                                 
87 See for instance McKinnon (1964), Chenery & Strout (1966), Lucas (1988), Cornwall (1977), Krugman 
(1987), Lal & Rajapatirana (1987), Romer (1990), Esfahani (1991) and Yarborough & Yarborough (1994). 
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 I. Disputed export-led growth thesis: The export-led growth hypothesis is not universally 
accepted and there are a number of theoretical and empirical counterarguments: i) 
Several economic models have postulate that an export-led growth policy will only work 
if the conditions in the economy are adequate (see for instance Buffle, 1992); ii) Many 
of the theories that emphasise an export-led growth seem to fit better with industrial 
goods exports than for primary goods; iii) There is doubt whether it is politically 
plausible that developed countries will allow all developing countries to export their 
way out of poverty; and iv) There is the possibility for growth-led export rather than the 
opposite, something that the neo-liberals acknowledge, and there is the possibility for a 
two-way feedback mechanism between growth and export..88 
 
II. Disputed advantages of import liberalisation: Import liberalisation might be more 
contested than the export-led hypothesis and a number of empirical and theoretical 
counterarguments have been made; i) There is plenty of evidence that indicates that was 
not due exports played an important role in the East Asian growth process, but this was 
not due to any full scale import liberalisation as recommended in the SAP; ii) Increased 
scale economics and technological intensity after import liberalisation is crucially 
dependent on the expansion of production; often industrial firms in developing countries 
have been out-competed by foreign competition (Deranigagula & Fine, 2001). The 
evolutionary approach says that its not given that increased competition by itself 
increases innovation and learning (Evenson & Westphal, 1995); iii) The decreased 
opportunistic argument due to import liberalisation has never been fully understood and 
surprisingly few studies have looked at for instance corruption before and after import 
liberalisation.89 There is doubt whether trade policy is the appropriate tool to fight 
corruption with; iv) It’s unclear how big the advantage is from resources going from 
inefficient to more efficient sectors which is a static one-time benefit from liberalisation. 
Estimates have predicted that these advantages are not more than 1-2 % of GDP and are 
a poor argument for import liberalisation if there are no dynamic comparative 
advantages present; and v) Theoretically, it seems just as plausible to argue for export 
                                                 
88 All countries that after WWII have shown sustained economic growth have had a high growth in exports, but 
not all countries with a high export growth have had sustained economic growth. 
89 An exception is Onis (1991) who attempted to measure corruption after import liberalisation in Turkey. The 
conclusion was that corruption had not declined; rather it had simply taken new forms. 
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subsidies or less import restrictions for exporters and their suppliers as in the case for 
South Korea and Taiwan. 
 
Giles & Williams (2000) took a literature overview by looking at 150 studies which examined 
the export-led hypothesis. The results were mixed and hence not conclusive. In all there 
seems, however, to be more agreement of the potential benefits of increased exports than the 
potential benefits from import liberalisation. The increased popularity of the export-led 
growth argument was based on the high export growth in countries like South Korea and 
Taiwan. This gave the export-led growth argument much of its legitimacy. In the 1980s many 
American scholars believed that South Korea and Taiwan were open economies with little 
state intervention and hence close to the neo-liberal “ideal” economic vision.90
 
Research has since shown that this assertion of South Korea and Taiwan was false and many 
have called it a process of myth making. 91 Bruton (1998) said that the vision of free trade in 
South Korea and Taiwan right from the outset was very much “made in Washington”.92 South 
Korea; as I mentioned previously had both high state intervention and used protectionist 
measures to promote their economies. But nobody disputed the fact that export growth was 
high. Hence, the export-led argument has become more important than some of the arguments 
related to a minimalist state. The consequences at the start of the 1980s, I would claim, were 
dire. The SAP was based on the neo-liberal interpretation of the East Asian miracle at the 
time, which was filled with myths. 
 
The literature on more open economies has often stated that more “open” economies have 
grown faster than relatively “closed” economies. Edwards (1993) and Rodrik & Rodriquez 
(2000) have criticised this literature on the basis on methodological problems. Edwards 
(1993) pointed out that economists tend to put to much information into data that simply isn’t 
there. Data between countries usually give little information on innovation, trade and growth. 
Rodrik & Rodriquez (2000) showed how methodological issues in the most cited studies 
made the conclusion of faster growing open economies more watered down. Another, not to 
                                                 
90 For interpretations of East Asian economies as “free trading” countries see for instance Balassa (1982), Little 
(1982), Lal (1983) and Balassa (1988). 
91 For a criticism of the neo-liberal interpretation of East Asia see for instance Maganizer & Hout (1980), 
Johnsen (1982) and Dore (1986) for Japan; Amsden (1985) and Wade (1990) for Taiwan; and Jones & Sakong 
(1980), Luedde-Neurath (1986) and Amsden (1989) for South Korea. 
92 Presch (1996) mentioned that the support for free trade among American academic economists is as high as 
97%! 
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often mentioned, criticism comes from Deranigagala & Fine (2001) which says that it more 
often is equations and not models that are being tested. When the theory of comparative 
advantage is to be tested a equation showing exports as a result of trade liberalisation might 
reveal that trade liberalisation increases exports. But the theory is an interlinked model of 
different presumptions, if a country that has it’s natural comparative advantage on labour-
intensive goods and capital-intensive exports increases there is a inherent contradiction within 
the model that does not shows itself in the equation. 
 
Bruton (1998) said that case studies at the micro level often are more promising avenues for 
showing the relevance of policies and normally give a far less strategic role for trade policy 
than neo-liberals would claim. Exporters often do have a higher productivity than non-
exporters. One of the main questions is whether this is a process of “learning-by-exporting” or 
a self-selection process of the most efficient domestic producers into exports.93 Most case-
studies do not support the “learning-by-exporting” argument, but rather finds that the most 
efficient firms in general self select themselves into exporting activities.94 The evolutionary 
theory, as I mentioned, does not state that increased competition automatically leads to 
increased innovation. This is also dependent on a host of other factors such as technological 
and learning institutions that support firms. As Rodrik (1994) mentions, whether or not import 
liberalisation leads to increased productivity and production is case dependent rather than 
universal and is most likely driven by other factors than trade policy as well. Rodrik (2000a) 
allows questioned how much trade policy by it self could solve. The myth the trade 
liberalisation is a “cure-for-all” diseases has been debunked. There is more agreement today 
that trade policies alone cannot replace a development strategy. 
 
In East Asia, the trade policy of the first mover countries did not change radically over the 
two periods in question. For the other East Asian countries I mentioned it did. There are large 
differences though. The SGT relied to a far higher degree than the first mover countries on 
export zones, in general relied more on international markets and less on protectionist 
measures to foster or protect their home industries. The former planned economies choose a 
gradual opening up of their economies with the creation of export zones where FDI and 
foreign competition was allowed. There was, however, a promotion of exports with high 
                                                 
93 A problem with this literature is that often does not differentiate between a one-time static adjustment to 
international markets or dynamic learning effects over time. 
94 See for instance Bernard & Jensen (1995), Bernard & Jensen (1999), Aw et al. (1998), Kraay (1999) and 
Söderbom & Teal (2000) 
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earning potential and the trade policies pursued seemed to fit better with what the first 
countries pursued. Not least, China and Vietnam seemed to a higher degree to set their trade 
policies more independent of the neo-liberal paradigm recommendation than the SGT. 
Regarding the trade policies in East Asia in this period there are three main characteristics: 
 
I. Continued active export promotion: The export promotion in the first mover countries 
continued and many of the other East Asian countries, as I mentioned, joined the freight. 
However, there, seems to have been a lesser degree of economic planning in the second 
period as the international institutional framework set higher limitations through trade 
negotiations within the institutions such as the GATT and later WTO. 
 
II. Continued strategic policies: The trade policies in the first mover countries continued to 
take sector specific needs into consideration and there was a linkage between trade and 
other policies. China is an interesting example. IBRD (1996) stated that China was 
experiencing an export-led economic growth. Lo (2004a), however, found that the 
economic growth was negatively correlated with exports and positively correlated with 
imports, which does not fit the neo-liberal interpretation. The most of the economic 
growth, according to Lo (2004a) was driven by a growing demand from the home 
market which facilitated an increase of the technology intensity of the production 
structure driven by increased capital imports, see subsection 2.2.2. According to Lo & 
Chan (1998) the egalitarian income distribution together with the emergence of mass 
consumption and the rapid income growth fuelled much of the high productivity sectors 
in China. Technology and trade policies are thus in some ways combined as they were in 
the Japanese and Korean case. 
 
III. Continued institutional support: Institutional support for exporters in the first mover 
countries was increased due to an overall increase in the institutions that governed the 
economy. In the SGT and China this led to the creation special export zones to support 
export and promote FDI in such areas. 
 
Trade policies in Africa changed dramatically under the SAP. This had a number of effects on 
African countries: 
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I. Import liberalisation: Imports were liberalised, often without the local support which 
often made them vulnerable to policy reversals later on. The SAP was better in import 
liberalisation than in removing the export bias in many African countries. This led to a 
rapid increase in imports, such as in Uganda which liberalised its trade in 1987 and 
imports increased from around 9 % of GDP in 1987 to around 20 % of GDP in 1993. 
However, exports continued at around 5 % of GDP throughout this period (Ssemogerere 
& Fieldings, 1996). The only reason why a large BoP problem was avoided was a mass 
influx of donor aid. Exports have increased since 1993, but the export sector is still 
heavily dependent on foreign exchange to inputs of production and nobody knows what 
will happen when aid money halts. This has led to accusation that the SAP served 
external rather than African actors. Import liberalisation did have a number of less 
favourable effects on African economies; i) Increased volatility due to the increased 
openness; and ii) Domestic African firms were often not able to compete with the 
foreign companies, not least due to lacking institutional support leading to 
deindustrialisation. The liberalising of foreign trade also had two other effects; i) A 
reduction of state income due to decreased tariffs; and ii) The fallacy of composition 
since many African countries increased the supply of the same goods leading to reduced 
total income due to lower prices even though quantity expanded. This is what happened 
in Ghana which increased its exports of cacao from 149 000 tons in 1984 to 224 000 
tons in 1992. But the income went down from 347 million USD in 1984 to 256 million 
USD. Thus a 50 % increase in volumes gave a 35 % reduction in income (Stein, 1999). 
 
II. Passive policies: The SAP did not take sector specific needs into consideration. Import 
liberalisation was to be sector neutral to allow the most efficient firms to manage their 
own. Without the sector specific policies, however, the needs that the sectors had to be 
fostered before meeting international competition or because of specific learning needs 
were not taken into consideration. 
 
III. No real institutional support: Many have criticised the SAP for not focusing on 
institutions. The institutions needed to promote exports were not present in Africa and 
there was no real strategy for how to create these. Even a near free trading economy like 
Hong Kong had active institutional support through Trade Developmental Centres to 
facilitate increase their exports. It’s hard to see African countries increasing their export 
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with such an amount of anti-export bias and the lack of export support institutions in 
addition. 
 
There where thus vast differences of how trade policies were conducted and how they 
promoted growth in the two regions. The differences between the two regions can be summed 
by: 
 
• Africa was far more prone to “academic fashions” than East Asia. Africa went the 
whole line from ISI to attempting to establish open economies through SAP. East 
Asia, to a far higher degree, has been independent of these trends and more choose the 
policies which it believed would suit their own economies at the stage of economic 
development that the country was at. 
 
• In East Asia the trade policy was more strategic as opposed to passive in Africa. East 
Asian government saw trade policies as an integrated part of a wider economic policy 
and attempted to attune the trade policy to sector specific needs to achieve broader 
economic objectives. African trade policy was far more passive, neither during the ISI 
nor during the SAP was sector specific needs taken into consideration, leading to a 
less efficient trade policy. 
 
• The institutional support to be able to support international trade was greater in East 
Asia as compared with Africa creating a framework where transaction costs for 
exporting were reduced by reducing the uncertainty of conducting exports. 
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Chapter 3 – Institutions 
Development economics took institutions back into the debate after many of the failed neo-
liberal reforms during the 1980s.95 But there are differences in what authors perceive as 
institutions and there functioning. There are two main strands within the literature regarding 
institutions (for the differences between the two, see for instance Rutherford, 1996): 
 
I. New institutional theory: Many would regard this as institutional theory based on 
neoclassical economics. Many of the key assumptions are similar such as the rational 
man (homo economicus), markets are regarded as natural and are not considered as 
institutions and institutions are created to minimise transaction costs for market 
exchange. This strand of literature follows North’s (1990) view that sees institutions as 
“agents of constraint” or as “rules of the game”. Institutions are therefore created from a 
bottom-up process reflecting the preferences of individuals where the preferences are 
taken as given. The state in this perspective is created to coordinate certain tasks that 
private actors cannot, for instance macroeconomic stability, protecting private property 
rights, and upholding the rule of law. 
 
II. Old institutional theory: Old institutional theory has a long history which goes back to 
for instance Max Weber and Joseph Schumpeter. The theories are more often based on 
the social man (homo sociologus), markets are regarded as institutions and are not 
natural and institutions are created to affect human behaviour. In this view institutions 
can be regarded as “social codes” since they affect human behaviour but institutions are 
also affected by human behaviour. One example is cultural norms since they affect how 
a person perceives the world and how this individual should act. But culture is not static 
and does change over time through human behaviour, although slowly. Institutions are 
first of all mental representations that are dependent on a concept. The state is an 
institution that is not a physical object but a mental representation. Buildings such a 
government office might represent the state, but are mere symbols of the institution. The 
state itself is merely a mental representation based on the concept of nationalism or 
social coordination. The main channel of influence is the opposite from new institutional 
theory. Institutions in the old institutional theory affect individual motivation 
                                                 
95 There were two other events that facilitated the return of institutions into the mainstream; i) The collapse of 
the USSR and former communist countries following market reforms; and ii) The East Asian financial crisis; see 
Rodrik (2000b). 
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(preferences in the neoclassical theory) where institutions are more or less perceived as 
given.  
 
These are some features of institutions that are not captured by new institutional theory that 
are vital for understanding the growth difference between Africa and East Asia. The most 
important might be the new institutional practice to analyse institutions in isolation rather than 
in their social context. An institution is an institution no matter where it’s practiced and it’s 
assumed they function they same everywhere. But, most will agree with the assertion that the 
democracy in the US functions somewhat differently than the democracy in Zimbabwe even 
though both formally are democracies. That is why I will choose the later approach and define 
institutions as “social codes” rather than “agents of constraint”. One example can illustrate 
the significance. The SAP attempted to introduce private property rights in some African 
countries but these attempts did in general not have the intended effects. From a new 
institutional perspective this would seem strange since private property rights are a best 
practice institution will lead to increased incentives for production and innovation. Thus, 
since such an institution has been able to deliver economic growth elsewhere, it would be 
rational to adopt it. The problem is that institutions cannot be separated from their social 
context. Institutions co-exist with each other and interact. The institutions around property 
right were still more adapted to the “old” form of property rights. When a new institution 
comes in place, often the institutions around, such as values, norms and economic institutions 
are still geared towards the institution that has been replaced. To put it differently, private 
property rights was not socially embedded into to the context in which it was supposed to 
operate. This highlights two features; i) Institutional change does not only require an change 
in one institution, but in a number of related institutions to succeed; and ii) For a institution to 
function optimally it will need the social acceptance, or legitimacy, to function as intended, 
and the establishment of such trust often takes time. 
 
My approach to institutions more as “social codes” gives greater weight to legitimacy as a 
concept. Three institutional explanations will be assessed in a comparative perspective 
between East Asia and Africa which are:96
                                                 
96 I could have added the cultural institutional approach which looks at cultural defined rules as an explanation 
for economic growth. This discipline is old and stems back to the works of Max Weber. Several authors have 
emphasised the role of Confucianism in the economic performance of East Asia; but it’s not possible to trace a 
common cultural background for the African region which is very cultural heterogeneous. In addition, some 
 127
 I. Technology: I will only briefly look at this approach since many of the arguments 
already have been mentioned. To have a framework for analysis, I found that the 
national system of innovation (NSI) might be most relevant to analyse the differences in 
the technological ability.97 Abramovitz (1986) used the term “national absorptive 
capacity” to describe the ability a country had to attain the knowledge and diffuse them 
accordingly to be able to catch-up with the leading countries. The NSI describes the 
capacity of the economy to learn and innovate. There is a distinction between the two, 
learning is attributed to the process development by which companies learn to master 
new technologies and experience learning-by-doing effects. Innovation is the process by 
which completely new process, products or businesses are created. For developing 
countries the “learning” part might be more relevant, especially at a low stage of 
development. Human skills then become imperative. Criscuolo & Narula (2002) takes 
human capital as an indicator of a nation’s absorptive capacity as it’s highly correlated 
with a country’s ability to catch-up technologically. The NSI can be defined according 
to a narrow and broad concept. The narrow concept describes an integrated system of 
economic and institutional agents directly linked to the use of innovation in the national 
economy (Adeoti, 2002).  According to the OECD (1999) the narrow concept of the NSI 
can be divided into five main sets of actors and institutions: i) Private enterprises and the 
research institutes that they finance; ii) Governments that set the policy agenda; iii) 
Bridging institutions which include research councils and research institutions which act 
as the intermediate between governments and the users of knowledge; iv) Universities 
and related institutions that provide key knowledge and skills; and v) Other public and 
private organisations that play a role in the national innovations systems. In East Asia 
there were some differences between countries. In Japan and South Korea the private 
sector financed a higher degree of the research through large companies. In Taiwan, 
however, the public research institutions played a far larger role. The NSI was both well 
financed and well integrated in East Asia. A key concept is the role of human skills 
which affects all elements of the NSI. The level of skills was high in East Asia and 
promoted the learning ability of the individual institutions and the integration of the 
system as a whole. East Asia has shown a remarkable ability to learn, diffuse and build 
                                                                                                                                                        
growth countries in East Asia are not predominantly Confucian with the mainly Buddhist dominated Thailand 
and the Muslim dominated Malaysia and Indonesia as the best examples. 
97 Freeman (1987) defined the NSI as: “networks of institutions in the public and private sector whose activities 
and interactions initiate, import modify and diffuse new technologies”. 
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up attained knowledge and have been able to “learn” to a high degree which has made 
them catch-up with some of the leading countries. Some countries themselves, such as 
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, have partly gone beyond that and start to “innovate” to 
a larger extent themselves, partly spreading the knowledge to other East Asian countries. 
In Africa these institutions were hampered by the lack of human skills in both quantity 
and quality. In addition, many of the institutions were under funded, which got worse 
after the initiation of the SAP, and were weakly integrated with little relevance to the 
needs of African firms. I have already dealt with most of these issues in subsection 3.2.2 
and will not comment on the narrow concept of the NSI further. In the broader context, 
the NSI could include the elements within the narrow concept and in addition all 
institutions affecting learning, research and innovation in society for instance the 
financial systems and the monetary policy. In East Asia the financial systems have been 
credited to be able finance long-term investments in sectors with new technologies that 
might have been perceived to be too risky in a pure market-based system due to the high 
uncertainty. Given the role of conditionality, these loans were more efficiently exploited 
and gave incentives for continued technological upgrading. Also other elements 
contributed to the long-term learning of East Asian economies, such as the 
government’s commitment to economic growth and their consultation with the private 
sector, the trade policy that fostered up certain industries with protection to make them 
more competitive to be able to earn foreign exchange income at a later stage; and 
keeping a macroeconomic stable environment. In Africa the financial system, neither 
during the IS era or the SAP era, functioned as intended and had only a limited ability to 
finance long-term loans which were necessary for investments in new technologies. In 
addition, the government’s economic policy was inconsistent and frequently changing, 
trade policies did not reflect the needs of African economies and to higher degree 
followed the trends in the academic environments of the donors and there was 
macroeconomic instability which lowered the incentives for long-term commitment due 
to the high perceived risk in Africa. All these issues have been touched upon in chapter 
3 and hence will be commented on them further. 
 
II. Government capacity: Looking at the government institutions and the political process 
gives us an overview of the three major elements of the political process, namely agenda 
setting, policy formulation and implementation. One claim that’s repeated by the 
supporters of the IS approach during the IS phase and the supporters of the SAP in the 
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SAP phase was that implementation in Africa was a major problem. Both state 
intervention supporters and sceptics alike have praised the effectiveness of policy 
implementation in East Asia. This has been linked to the notion government capacity 
which I define as the ability to set the policy agenda, formulate and implement policy 
that a government has in relation to other actors. The more resources a government has, 
the greater capacity it will have; and the more independent from civic society it is, the 
greater capacity the government has. I will look at three levels of influence and how 
they affect the government in the two regions; i) The role of external actors such as 
financial institutions and foreign powers; ii) The internal capacity of the government 
measured by the competence of the ruling elite and the quality of the bureaucracy; and 
iii) The role of civic society in influencing government policies. I will look at these 
levels in section 3.1. 
 
III. Social embeddedness: The final approach does not look at the government as such, but 
at the various elements of society in relation to the government. There are two major 
themes I find crucial to explain some of the differences between East Asia and Africa. 
Firstly, the government in East Asia was able to manage conflicts to a far larger extent 
than governments in Africa laying the foundations for social and political stability on 
which economic growth could be based. Secondly, the legitimacy of the East Asian 
states was in general perceived to be higher than for African states making the policies 
that East Asian governments formulated more legitimate and hence more effective in 
implementation. I will look at the differences in social embeddedness in section 3.2. 
 
3.1 State capacity 
The simplest model for policy formulation and implementation is the engineering model of 
economic decisions. In this approach, governments have a social welfare function which it 
attempts to maximise and will choose the policy that maximises this objective. After the 
policy is formulated it will be implemented and there is an optimal expansion of economic 
activity. Governments that do not implement policies that maximises economic growth must 
be uneducated or less informed. Many economists, still today, think that finding the 
appropriate policy that maximises economic growth is a technical problem, just as engineers 
solve a technical problem, hence the name of the model. However appealing, this model is far 
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too simplistic to account for the real life disparities for why certain governments choose 
policies that “obviously” are harmful for economic growth. 
 
The engineering model was popular in the 50s and 60s and led to a great belief in what 
governments could achieve in society. This model did not take into account the whole 
political process. The policy process contains three elements; i) Agenda setting; ii) 
Formulation; and iii) Implementation. A policy that was formulated was not always 
implemented according to intention. Often influences outside the government dictated policy 
outcomes. These real life political processes which take place in everyday life are not 
accounted for in the engineering model. What Chang (2001) called “Golden Age Economics” 
did not have a theory around the political process which made them vulnerable to academic 
criticism.98 The neo-liberal academic attack in the 70s and 80s through for instance Krueger 
(1974); and Bates (1981) brought politics back into the economic profession. Policies were in 
the “public choice” models of the neo-liberals seen as part of a political market were, unlike 
the market for goods and services, the outcomes were not optimal. Policies were used for 
“rent-seeking”, that is to enrich a privileged few to retain power in society. These policies 
were similar to those pursued in feudal Europe during the Middle Ages. For the neo-liberals, 
policies were irrational and should be removed from the economy. The logical conclusion was 
that governments should withdraw from the economy. This approach is intellectual and 
empirically far more appealing than the previous approaches to the political process. But they 
do have a number of flaws themselves, which I will return to later on. 
 
The natural question arises what characterise states that are able to maintain economic growth 
over a given period of time. Why do some governments promote economic growth and others 
not. In the public choice literature the conclusion is that governments get captured by vested 
interests. To promote economic growth a bureaucracy responsible for economic policy should 
be isolated from the political process and therefore the leadership will not have political 
ambitions and will “automatically” pursue the most efficient economic policy. Vartainen 
(1999) researched a number of successful “developmental states” and found that a political 
insulated bureaucracy played a major role in all. Promotion within the bureaucracy was in 
general not based on personal contacts, but on professional merits. Schneider (1999) 
                                                 
98 “Golden Age Economics” got its title from the mainstream ideas in the period 1950 to 1973 which saw a 
phenomenal economic growth called the “Golden Age” and comprised of Keynesianism, welfare economics and 
early developmental economics (import substitution). 
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researched a number of failed “developmental states” and found that the bureaucracies were 
heavily entangled with the political process. Promotion was based on personal relations and 
political views which did not promote professionalism. I don’t think that there is to much 
doubt that a too high degree of political interference in the working of the bureaucracy does 
not promote professionalism and hence economic growth. 
 
From my previous line of argument the conclusion might be that economic policy should be 
isolated from the political process. The problem is that the picture is more complicated than 
that. Evans (1995) mentioned that an institution left to its own without check-or-balances will 
develop itself into a political force and start to pursue their own political ambitions. An ideal 
in the neo-liberal vision, an independent central bank, is a good example. In theory, a central 
bank that is independent from policies and controls the interest rate to meet inflation targets 
will function optimally. In real life, there will always be room for political interference and 
political ambitions.99 No institution will ever be completely isolated from the political 
process. There are strong arguments for why a complete isolation wouldn’t be desirable 
either. When a policy is to be implemented, a consensus often helps the implementation of a 
policy. My point is that political participation might render political formulation more 
complex, but might make policy implementation more effective. O’Donnel (1994) and Stepan 
& Skach (1994) makes the same argument by claiming that policies more seldom get reversed 
in parliamentary system as opposed to strong presidential systems due to the process of 
consensus building. The point I want to make is that isolated bureaucracies might be more 
effective in formulating their policies, but this not make them more effective in implementing 
their policies. Evans (1995) forcefully makes this argument with concept of “embedded 
autonomy”. There is a trade-off between the level of autonomy and the embeddedness and 
striking the right balance is hard in real-life. Returning to the study of Vartainen (1999), he 
found that the successful “developmental states” all had state sectors that cooperated heavily 
with good organised private sectors. The state was flexible to change its policy to meet the 
needs of the private sector, but was not captured by the private sector. Schneider (1999) 
reported that the private sector in the failed “developmental states” were dependent on the 
state sector for licences, personal contacts and subsidies. There seems to be a case of too high 
degree of embeddedness and lack of autonomy. 
 
                                                 
99 Alice Greenspan was in 1992 accused for helping the election of Clinton over Bush in the presidential 
campaign by raising interest rates. 
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To best show the differences in the political processes and state capacity within the two 
regions I will divide this section in three parts. The first part will look at the role of external 
influences on agenda setting and the formulation of policy. The second part will cover the 
internal capacity of the state to formulate and implement policy. The final part covers the 
domestic interests and how these are related to the political process. 
 
3.1.1 External influence 
Policy is not conducted in a vacuum. International trends like academic “fashion”, 
superpower policy and external dependence all affect the policy making within a country. Not 
all of these trends always aim for the most efficient economic outcome. For instance how the 
US boycotted the apartheid regime in South Africa through economic sanctions. The boycott 
was not due to economic or trade goals, but racial policy even though economic instruments 
were used. The difference between East Asia and Africa is vast with regard to external 
influence even though both regions had a high dependence on the external environment.100 
Autonomy becomes a key concept.101
 
East Asia’s influence from external sources is, nevertheless, diverse and it’s difficult to 
pinpoint a set of characteristics that fit all the countries at the same time. I will briefly look at 
three sub-sets of countries to make a more meaningful assessment: 
 
I. Japan and the First Generation Tigers: There are three major points I find important 
with this sub-set of countries. Firstly, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan all were highly 
important countries during the Cold War since they were capitalist countries “next door” 
due to their geographical position. These Asian countries obtained preferential 
agreements with the US which without doubt stimulated their exports. Secondly, this 
sub-set of countries proved very capable in the diplomatic game of trade policy and 
bilateral agreements (see for instance Lall, 2000). They knew the power game and were 
often not willing to upset their trading partners even though they felt the policies forced 
upon them were unreasonable. Japan is a case to the point and how Japan reluctantly has 
liberalised parts of its economy from the 1980s under pressure from the US. Another 
example might be how Japan implemented so-called “Voluntary Export Restraints” 
                                                 
100 When I say external in this section I mean from outside the region. 
101 Mkandawire (1995) defined the state’s autonomy as: “the fiscal capacity of the state or more specifically, the 
revenue base of the state, and on the other hand, the constitution of civil society, the thrust of its political and 
economic demands and its organizational and combative strength”. 
 133
(VER) on its textile export to the US. Lastly, this sub-set of countries was very 
autonomous in the 1950s and 60s to choose the policy they themselves perceived to be 
most beneficial. For other developing countries today this might be more difficult due to 
a changing international framework due to for instance trade agreements under the 
WTO. 
 
II. The Second Generation Tigers and the Philippines: This sub-set of countries were not as 
favourably supported during the Cold War, did not have the same degree of autonomy 
and were not as skilful diplomats as their first mover counterparts. The academic trends 
affected this sub-set of countries far greater than the first  mover countries as they went 
the whole line from IS to outward orientation more based on the market than perhaps the 
first mover countries. What characterises these countries is not only a high dependence 
on external markets, but also a high degree of dependence on regional powers such as 
Japan and to a lesser extent the FGT. Economically, the SGT and the Philippines 
became dependent on the first mover countries for their investment, trade and, not least, 
their technology which created a asymmetry in the regional power structure. Partly to 
offset these influences there have been attempts to increase cooperation through 
ASEAN.102 
 
III. Former communist countries: China (from 1978), Laos and Vietnam (from 1986) 
attempted to transform their economies from a communist planned economy to a more 
market-based approach. The neo-liberal tenants from the IBRD recommended a “Big 
Bang” approach where all market reforms were implemented at the same time. But, our 
sub-set of countries instead followed a more incremental and pragmatic approach which 
drew criticism especially from American researchers which believed that this only led to 
sub-optimal solutions that were worse than any of the two alternatives.103 The high 
economic growth rate in China and Vietnam since the start of the economic reforms, 
despite, rather than because of neo-liberal recommendations has taken many analysts by 
surprise. There are two major characteristics which I believe the former communist 
countries have in common with the first mover economies. Firstly, they have a high 
                                                 
102 ASEAN was founded in 1968 of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand; today there 
are 10 member states; the other 5 being Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam. 
103 When the USSR and Eastern Europe were to liberalise their economy they asked the IBRD for help and 
implemented the “Big Bang” approach. The results were a collapse of the economies of the former USSR and in 
Eastern Europe since the institutional fundaments were not present. The collapse due to “hard-core” neo-liberal 
policies led to the reappearance of institutions within the mainstream. 
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degree of political autonomy and have proved to be able to resist external pressure if the 
policies recommended were not perceived as beneficial for their economies. Secondly, 
they are very capable in the diplomacy game and are able to exploit current power 
relations to promote economic growth due to for instance WTO agreements. In my 
opinion, these countries show more similar characteristics with the first movers, rather 
than the second mover countries. A major difference is the lack of preferential treatment 
due to the geopolitical power structure.104 
 
African countries have also had mixed political developments. Even though some relative 
richer African countries like Kenya, Zambia, Zimbabwe and especially South Africa have had 
a relative higher political autonomy, the majority of countries have had a high degree of 
external influence. Even though there are between country differences, in general there are 
three development trends that I found important for how the external environment affected 
African countries: 
 
I. Cold War influence: During the Cold War period, which ended in 1990, support was 
given to different countries on the basis of their political orientation. Not in the sense of 
democracy of communism, but more on the basis of which of the two superpowers was 
to become the “ally”. There were a lot of problems with this pattern. Firstly, if support 
was given to the government, say for instance from the USSR, it could be virtually 
guaranteed that the US would support an opposition group in the country and possibly 
supply them with arms. This might have contributed to increased social and political 
turmoil which made economic development virtually impossible. Secondly, there was 
often weak or no conditionality to the support with regard to domestic policies 
(Olukoshi, 2002).105 This might have kept autocratic regimes afloat and hindered the 
domestic political development by working against democracies. 
 
II. Diplomatic capabilities: Newly independent African countries often came unprepared 
and with poorly qualified personal to trade negotiations. This has resulted in asymmetric 
trade agreements with other countries. The rhetoric behind multilateral trade 
negotiations is that the ultimate aim should be free trade, but the political reality often 
                                                 
104 Vietnam experienced the opposite end of the Cold War due to the infamous American military intervention in 
the country. 
105 The reason is very simple and relates to the “exit” strategy. If a country could not get support from one side, it 
could go to the other side to gain support. 
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follows a “give-and-take” mentality where some protectionist barriers are lifted in so far 
other countries do the same. Many would stress that African countries do have 
preferential market access on a number of products to the EU through the former Lome 
convention. But there is a great asymmetry caused by the protectionism of Western 
agricultural sectors which is more about the subsidies which repress international prices 
rather than tariffs and non-tariff barriers per se since many African countries have the 
latter as well. 
 
III. Political autonomy: The debt crisis which started in the beginning of the 1980s was, as I 
mentioned in section 2.1.1, a capital supply shock. This also had political repercussions. 
As I mentioned in section 1.3.2, Mkandawire (1995) said that the independence or 
autonomy of an institution is closely tied to its fiscal resources. Cold War finance by 
itself was for many African countries not enough and there was increased donor 
involvement in Africa.106 The IBRD and IMF increased their political influence by 
becoming a main source of finance in the region and pressed a lot of neo-liberal driven 
policies through conditionality, which meant that African states lost some of its political 
autonomy. This was even truer after 1990 when the Cold War finance halted and there 
was no real alternative for obtaining international fiscal resources than to follow the 
SAP. Soludo & Ogbu (2004b) are some of the African academics that believe that the 
increased foreign involvement in the African political process undermines the African 
political institutions and thereby decrease their political autonomy. Many neo-liberal 
academists, however, do not agree with this assessment and stresses that the failure in 
Africa is more due to weak policy implementation rather than the contents of the SAP 
policies. African countries according to this view have shown a “lack of commitment”. 
 
The external environment thus had different influences for the regions. I have focused on 
three factors. Firstly, the Cold War was more favourable for some East Asian countries such 
as Japan and the FGT countries than for Africa were it contributed to political instability. 
Secondly, East Asian countries showed a far higher ability to play the political “game” of 
                                                 
106 I stress the role of the IBRD and the IMF in this section since they have had a greater influence than other 
donors. This does not mean that other donor involvement is irrelevant. Quite the contrary, donors often gave 
support in return for conditionality, for instance French support was given on the basis that the support would be 
used to buy French-made products. This makes one wonder about the real beneficiary from such a policy. My 
main point is that donors often had different objectives and different policy requirement which often contradicted 
one and other. The contradicting policy “recommendations”, the volatile nature of development assistance 
(which saw a decline after the Cold War) and the lack of coordination among donors all contributed to make the 
policy process in Africa even more complicated. 
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trade negotiations compared to African diplomats. Lastly, East Asian countries did exhibit a 
far higher degree of political autonomy than African countries, which of course was linked to 
economic growth since East Asian countries were not as dependent on external sources of 
finance as the African countries. 
 
The lack of political autonomy due to the external involvement is perhaps one of the most 
important factors that differentiate the East Asian and African economies. I can take one 
example from Nigeria cited in Soludo & Ogbu (2004b). In 1987 the Nigerian government 
found that some areas had the potential to become highly productive agricultural areas for 
products like rice, wheat, sorghum and millet needs. To promote the agricultural sector tax 
incentives were given and there were set up a host of trade barriers to stimulate production for 
the home market. The response of the Nigerian farmers was very positive with increased 
investments in the agricultural sector and the production in certain areas had increased 10 
times by 1990, with prices declining rapidly which could indicate increased scale economics. 
The problem was that the trade barriers set up in 1987 stopped the import of about 600 million 
USD worth of agricultural goods, mainly from US farmers. The American government 
attempted to use various methods, including through their influence in the IBRD to pressure 
Nigeria to abandon their trade barriers. In 1990/91 Nigeria was subject to a debt crisis and had 
to resort to IBRD loans. One of the requirements was that some of the trade barriers imposed 
in 1987 were to be lifted. This increased the imports of agricultural goods and most of the 
Nigerian farmers went bankrupt when competing with subsidised American farmers. The 
result was many empty acres of farmland as a symbol of another failed agricultural project. I 
would contend that the policy did not fail due to a “bad” agricultural policy, but rather 
because Nigeria got into a conflict with a major trading partner, the US, which used the IBRD 
as a political tool to promote the interest of US farmers. In commenting this trade dispute 
Ogbu & Soldu (2004b) said: 
 
“This case illustrates two key points. First, it shows that the international system of 
exchange embodies two sets of rules: one for the powerful and the other for the poor 
(especially indebted ones). Where the firms of the powerful countries can compete 
effectively, free trade is advocated. Where they are out-competed, the US, for example, 
invokes the voluntary export restraint mechanism to force its trading partners (e.g. Japan) 
to reduce its exports to the US. Second, the example underscores the overriding dose of 
external influence and the lack of independence of indebted African countries in choosing 
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policies that maximize the welfare of their citizens. When policy-makers realize this 
choking influence of external forces and that they are, in some cases, being asked to 
implement policies that serve external rather than their domestic interests, their attitude to 
the implementation of such policies would be of aloofness or plain sabotage. In the 
literature, there is often talk about the policy-makers’ lack of commitment. But such lack 
of commitment is endogenous to a set of variables, including the lack of ownership and 
conviction about the potential gains of the policies they are being asked to implement. 
Thus, unless policy-makers perceive a policy as being beneficial to their societies, even if 
they sign policy documents (at least to reach agreements with the donor agencies) 
effective implementation is likely to suffer.” 
 
Much of the emphasis on how East Asian countries were able to grow was through meeting 
country-specific needs through their economic policy, see for instance subsection 2.2.3. 
However, the autonomy was not enough as there is no clear-cut agreement what constitutes 
“good” economic policy. In the next two subsections I will emphasise how external actors 
also affected the internal capacity of the state and the internal political process in Africa. To 
use the neo-liberal public choice analogy, there seems in general to be more evidence that the 
African state got captured by foreign vested interests rather than domestic. The example from 
the Nigerian agricultural sector is one of many. The counterargument against this “autonomy” 
argument is that governments are prone to pursue policies that retard economic growth if the 
appropriate binding institutions are not in place. Since the African state capacity is weak, 
foreign forces should bind “African governments to the mast” and make sure they implement 
“good” policies. 107 That’s why the IBRD has worked against alternatives to SAP. The 
alternatives to SAP were more often popular among African governments and people. 108 The 
argument of binding institutions is only valid if, and only if, it’s possible to identify a set of 
neutral policies that all can agree upon promotes economic growth in the long run. Perhaps 
many neo-liberals see their own policy recommendations this way. The empirical evidence on 
which set of policies promotes economic growth, however, is mixed and thus far gives no 
                                                 
107 Jaycok (1993), the former vice-president for the IBRD said:”. . . most of this technical assistance is imposed, 
it is not welcome and there is no demand for it really except on the donor side. . . This is in fact an endemic 
problem in the donor community — expatriate management substituting for domestic management. . . What is 
left in that demoralized ministry is being attracted away by donors and salary supplements.” 
108 Both the Lagos Plan of Action (1981) and the AAF-SAP (African Alternative Framework to the Structrual 
Adjustment Program) were far more attractive for African countries and more strucuralist policy 
recommendations, but the IBRD used its financial and political power to block such attempts. 
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support for a set of universal agreed upon policies that will promote economic growth in the 
long-run. 
 
3.1.2 Internal capacity 
The internal capacity of the state is what I define the competence of the leadership and the 
quality of the bureaucracy. This means that the state internal capacity comprises of these two 
elements. The early debates within development economics about the strength of the state 
looked upon on a “strong” state as one that had a high degree of financial transactions and 
large public ownership. Neo-liberal arguments regarding the “industrial policy” debate 
claimed that the state in East Asia was “weak” on the backdrop of that public investment and 
ownership was low. In Africa, public investment and ownership was higher and this was 
interpreted as evidence for a “strong” state. So the conclusion for the neo-liberals in the 1980s 
was that East Asia grew because the state was “weak”, while Africa did not grow since the 
state was “strong” and crowded out the private sector.109
 
This view has few followers today. The revisionist showed that East Asian governments 
intervened in their economies to a large extent without the usage of public investments or 
ownership, for instance through “administrative guidance”, tax incentives and quantitative 
import restrictions. What also characterised the East Asian governments was that they were 
able to achieve their stated objectives to far higher degree than African governments. In my 
view, East Asian governments were “strong” because they were more effective in controlling 
the political process, formulating policies and implementing the policy that was formulated 
far more effective than in other developing regions. This required both the presence of a 
competent leadership, or technocratic elite, and the presence of competent administrative 
capacity, or bureaucracy. Africa, on the other hand, lost more of their formulating capabilities 
with the increase of foreign influence (see the previous subsection 4.1.1), did not formulate 
sustainable policies and the implementation of the policy was often inefficient. In other 
words, the African state was “weak”.110
                                                 
109 A fundamental difference between the neo-liberal and the revisionists is that the neo-liberals see the state and 
the private sector as natural rivals. So an increased state sector will usually lead to a “crowding out” effect. The 
revisionists see the state and the private sector more as complementary and will argue for a larger degree of 
“crowding in” stemming from public investments. 
110 Root (2001) made the difference between “weak”, “unlimited strong” and “limited strong” states. “Unlimited 
strong” states had no credibility and could use the economy for its own usage. “Limited strong” states had some 
institutions that limited its own power to make credible commitments to the economy. According to Root (2001) 
only “limited strong” states were able to promote growth. 
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 East Asia had a strong state capacity for promoting economic growth. I would like to stress 
three elements with regard to state capacity: 
 
I. Pilot agencies: Agencies such as MITI in Japan and EPB in South Korea comprised of a 
technocratic elite with a high academic qualification. The interesting feature of many of 
these was that they in general were not economists. In Japan and South Korea they were 
mostly lawyers, while in Taiwan they were mostly engineers. What was needed, 
according to Chang (1998), was the ability of highly qualified generalists with high 
learning capacity, rather than a specialist. As I mentioned in section 2.2.3, “government 
learning” was a key concept. The East Asian governments showed a high degree of 
flexibility and there was a high degree of “learning-by-doing”. The policies were often 
incremental and pragmatic, avoiding the extremes of import substitution or an open 
economy, preferring to strike a strategic balance that would fit their economies. As the 
economies changed over time, new situations led to new policies. 
 
II. Bureaucracy: A competent administration is needed for the day-to-day running of the 
state. Well run bureaucracies are important for increasing transparency and for effective 
implementation of policies. In East Asia the bureaucratic capacity is high with well 
qualified personal. In my view, one of the most important aspects of the bureaucracy 
was that promotion was based on academic and professional merit rather than personal 
contacts. This was important for three reasons: i) It promoted professionalism which 
increased the state’s transparency; and ii) More neutral judgement which was more 
geared to promoting objective efficiency rather upholding personal relationships 
compared to other developing regions. 
 
III. Regime type: A popular motion in the literature is that authoritarian regimes are linked 
to the concept of developmental states and that authoritarian regimes are more able than 
democracies in promoting economic growth at a low stage of development. One reason 
for why this link has been popularised is the role of the regimes in South Korea and 
Taiwan which had authoritarian regimes and high economic growth.111 There are 
                                                 
111 There are counter examples as well, such as Japan after 1945 (even though the Japanese authoritarian regime 
did promote economic growth before WWII), but also European examples such as developmental states with 
democracies in Austria, Finland and France. 
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several arguments for why a authoritarian regime could be more effective; i) Increased 
ability in policy formulation since they don’t have voters to think about thereby ensuring 
a long-term oriented policy maximising economic growth in the long-run; and ii) The 
ability to force unpopular but necessary policy through. The arguments against 
democracies, especially at lower stages of development, are that they: i) Give more 
weight to short-term policies due to elections; ii) Less effective in policy formulation 
leading to less cohesion in the economic policy due to consensus building; and iii) More 
state consumption since governments only might stay in office for short periods. What 
seems beyond doubt is that the regimes in East Asia, democracies or not, has been 
stable. This has increased the consistency of policies over longer periods. The evidence 
on regime types and economic growth is mixed. Haggard (2004) said that the economic 
growth is the same for democracies and authoritarian regimes.112 ManIntyre (2003) 
claimed that it not was important whether or not the country was a democracy or not. A 
large number of veto powers could make authoritarian regimes just as indecisive as 
democracies. South Korea (in 1993) and Taiwan (in 1996) went from authoritarian 
regimes to democracies and so far there is no evidence of any growth slowdown after 
the transition. The Philippines also got a democracy in 1986 and has shown greater 
economic growth after the transition than before. I want to make two points from my 
discussion; i) The ability a state has is more dependent on how the state is organised 
through the state structure and the competence of the administrators rather than the 
regime type per se; and ii) The most important characteristic seems to be political and 
social stability and a stable regime which is able to have continuity over several periods. 
East Asia had both, a good organised state sector with an effective decision-making 
body combined with political stability and continuity. 
 
Africa has had a weak state capacity. I would to stress three elements: 
 
I. Low bureaucratic capacity: The educational standard of the administrators is in general 
low for African bureaucracies (Ogbu & Soludo, 2004a). Many trade- and industry 
departments in Africa are without people with a PhD. According to Mkandawire & 
Soludo (2002) the main problem of the bureaucracy is the lack of incentives to attract 
qualified personal and the weak technical competence. The capacity of African 
                                                 
112 Even though economic growth was the same for democracies and authoritarian regime, the nature of 
economic growth was different leading to a higher degree of economic development in democracies. 
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bureaucracy has been declining even further after the initiation of the SAP. Reduced 
state spending and a lowering of the state capacity meant that wages in the public sector 
declined and many experienced and competent administrators quit their job. The 
weakening of the bureaucracy has led to a decline in the African state’s ability to 
implement policies. Ironically, the IBRD (1994) cited a “lack of commitment” due to 
inefficient implementation as the main cause for why the SAP failed. The irony was of 
course that it was the SAP that lowered the African state’s ability to implement the 
policy it was supposed to. One of the main problems of the African bureaucracy is that 
the reason for promotion was more based on personal merits rather professional 
qualification. The consequences are dire since it i) Lowers the transparency of the 
government thereby lowering it’s legitimacy; and ii) Does not distribute resources 
neutrally, preferring upholding personal contacts rather than efficiency.113 
 
II. Regime type: If autocratic regimes alone were enough for economic growth, Africa 
would be a rich region today. As a matter of fact, the only two countries with long 
sustained economic growth in Africa, Botswana and Mauritius, have been democracies. 
The link between the developmental state and democracy in Botswana contradicts the 
findings from East Asia that authoritarian regimes are needed at a low stage of 
development. But, Botswana has undoubtedly been boosted by a stable political and 
social climate together with a stable regime. This can of course not be seen 
independently from economic growth. Economic growth boosted the legitimacy of the 
country’s leadership, so stable long-run policies were both a cause and an effect of 
economic growth. In general, however, what characterised Africa were unstable 
autocratic regimes. The consequences of frequent policy reversals I have already 
mentioned in subsection 2.2.3. A criticism against the neo-liberal policies and the SAP 
has been the authoritarian tendencies inherent within these policies. Africans were in 
general hostile to the neo-liberal driven SAP. Ghana, under Rawlings, was hailed as one 
of the few successful implementers of the SAP. The military regime of Rawlings was 
stable over a longer period and was able to “force” the policies through (Callaghy, 
1989). Ghana does not have a well organised civic society and its creation was hindered 
                                                 
113 The main exception is Botswana which has a bureaucracy unique to Africa (Owusu & Samatar, 1997). There 
are three noteworthy characteristics; i) The academic quality of the leadership is high and the relationships 
within the bureaucracy are characterised by being very professional; ii) Public institutions were well embedded 
in the civic society with well established contacts; and iii) The bureaucracy and the state enjoy a high degree of 
legitimacy from society and have a high degree of autonomy from both external and internal forces. 
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by their rulers. Zambia is one of the few African countries with a well developed civic 
society and they hindered much of the effective implementation of the SAP policies. 
Another example is Kenya were most of the resistance not came from the civic society, 
but from within the state itself (Bienen, 1991). The isolation from pressure groups from 
within is also not sufficient for a optimal economic policy. The Nigerian military regime 
which took power in 1994 did neither take the advice from foreign donors nor the civic 
society as it attempted to maximise its own consumption based on oil revenues and an 
overvalued exchange rate. The regime also reversed many of the liberalisation policies 
that been initiated since 1986. This is an example of the general pattern of policy 
reversals that increases uncertainty for market participants. It also shows that 
governments in Africa, rather than the provider of a certain institutional environment, 
often are the causes for uncertainty. 
 
III. Donor involvement: As I mentioned, the SAP decreased Africa’s state capacity, but the 
state was at the same time burdened with the responsibility for the failings of the neo-
liberal policies. The irony of the SAP policies of the 1980s was that the SAP policies of 
the 1990s saw building state capacity as a policy priority. But the message was 
confusing since the African government were on one side the main culprit of African 
misery and had to withdraw from the economy; at the same time their capacity 
rebuilding process was important so it could promote economic activity by providing 
public goods and institutions. This tension has never really been resolved. As 
Mkandawire (1998b) mentions, the IBRD has discredited the state from having any 
larger role in economic development, but at the same time an overextended state has to 
achieve good governance, create an enabling environment and stabilise the economy. 
The increased donor involvement from the start of the 1980s has decreased the African 
state’s capacity not only by lowering government expenditure, but also by undermining 
African political institutions by attempting to “save African states from themselves”. 
This has reduced the autonomy and the functioning of the African political institutions. 
The democracy waves of the late 1980s have created, at least on paper, a lot of 
democracies in Africa. But these are often undermined by foreign donors since they are 
not perceived as being able to choose their own most beneficial policies. This has led to 
what Mkandawire termed “voiceless democracies”. This situation is aggravating and 
depressing for Africans as they are undermined by foreign powers. Political autonomy is 
a necessary condition for economic growth and the lack of it is keeping Africa at a low 
 143
stage of development. The reason for this necessity is that countries at a lower stage of 
development have specific needs and the solutions towards these often need to be taylor-
made, as an example I can mention the institutional innovations in East Asia with a 
certain element of “local flavour”. So far there is no credible evidence of universal paths 
to develop economies from a low starting point. As Soludo (2002b) put it: “Asia did not 
industrialize by having the BWIs literarily take their economic policy-making hostage”. 
 
There are major differences in the internal capacity of the state in the two regions. In a 
comparative perspective three elements have been mentioned in this subsection: 
 
• The low bureaucratic capacity in Africa and its entanglement with the political process 
is most likely a major hindrance for promoting economic growth. The SAP lowered 
the bureaucratic capacity even further in Africa leading to an even weaker state 
capacity.114 In East Asia the high quality of the bureaucracy and its professionalism 
has definitely been a major cause for the growth in East Asia.115 
 
• The evidence on the regime type is mixed. Both autocratic and democratic regimes 
promoted economic growth in East Asia, while only two democracies did so in Africa. 
It is more likely that the organisation of the state and the effectiveness of the decision 
making body regardless of regime type was far more important in the growth process 
than the regime type per se. East Asian decision making and the effectiveness of 
                                                 
114 One of the versions of the “impossibility thesis” is that Africa cannot follow an industrial policy of the East 
Asian kind since the state capacity is too weak. There is a limitation to this argument, though. There is no doubt 
that the economic policy conducted in East Asia demanded a high state capacity and a competent administration. 
It is however not clear that it is any easier creating a “free” market economy which also demands a high 
administrative capacity. A host of institutions are needed such as secure property rights, contract rules, 
bankruptcy laws, a well functioning bureaucracy, rules for market participation, rules for traded goods, rules for 
market behaviour and a well functioning judicial system to name a few. The US has some of the largest 
regulatory mechanisms in the world to secure a “free” market. I am not claiming that a more free market 
economy is more costly to establish, it’s very difficult to say. A stylised fact, however, is that more countries 
have been able to create more interventionist regimes to catch up with the leading economies than “free” market 
economies that have done the same, so far Hong Kong is the only example coming to mind. 
115 Some, like Berger & Hsiao (1988) and Tai (1989) have linked the high bureaucratic quality to their Confucian 
heritage (see also IBRD, 1993). This has led to another version of the “impossibility hypothesis”; other 
developing countries could not follow the same path as East Asia since the East Asian societies had “favourable 
historical condition” which is not present in other countries. Chang (1998) was of a different opinion and points 
to the fact that neither South Korea nor Taiwan had a competent bureaucracy in 1960. Both were notorious for 
being corrupt around that time. South Korea and Taiwan send their bureaucrats to Pakistan and the Philippines 
until the end of the 1960s. There was, however, a rapid “learning-by-administrating”. In addition, Hong Kong 
and Singapore to a higher degree reflected British rather than Confucian bureaucracies. The message Chang 
(1998) is trying to get across is two-fold. A good bureaucratic heritage such as an Confucian tradition can 
become corrupt very fast. Also, a good quality bureaucracy can be build faster than people in general believe; it 
took South Korea and Taiwan a little more than a decade to build up a competent bureaucracy. 
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policy implementation was far larger than in Africa. One of the main reasons is the 
more stable regimes in East Asia, while frequent shifts in power have come to 
characterise Africa increasing uncertainty for market participants. 
 
• A number of East Asian countries had the so-called “pilot agencies”, but almost all 
countries had some form of technocratic leadership attempting to promote economic 
growth. The leadership normally comprised of a high educational quality and showed 
a high learning capacity. In Africa such technocratic leaderships did not emerge. An 
exception might be Uganda since the start of the 1990s when an technocratic elite in 
”the Minsistry of Finance and Development” and the Central Bank have dominated the 
country’s policy formulating since the beginning of the 1990s and Uganda is one of 
the few African countries that recently has experienced economic growth. The SAP 
was an attempt to stimulate the economy through a growth vision, but unlike the East 
Asian growth vision, it was not embedded in the countries were it was to be 
implemented.116 As UNRISD (1995) put it: …the neoliberal ”political-economist”… 
push for a minimalist state whose role is to produce an ”enabling environment” for 
the functioning of an essentially self-regulating market economy based on free 
competition – and the ”thickering of civil society”. This is a vision of the economy and 
of the role of the state in it which corresponds to no known actual experience in the 
recent history of the world.” 
 
3.1.3 Internal influence 
The policy process was, as I mentioned, brought back into the economic profession by the rise 
of the public choice literature. The likes of Balassa, Krueger and Bates attacked the notion 
that the state was able to promote economic growth. Fearing a capture by vested interests, 
policies should be removed from the economy. Public choice models are very constructive in 
                                                 
116 The IBRD themselves attempted to create a technocratic elite which would promote “local ownership” and 
help with a more efficient implementation of the policy. Economists with the “right”, that is to say neo-liberal, 
background were handpicked by the IBRD to function as an autonomous institution which would pursue the 
“right” economic policy. These attempts were in general not successful; at least three reasons can be mentioned; 
i) The principal of handpicking personal on the background of their political orientation is a breach of the 
“Weberian professionalism” leading to less transparency; ii) These institutions were not autonomous but 
dependent on the IBRD which limited their functioning; and iii) They were too far away from the African 
political process and were not embedded into those societies they were meant to operate. Often they were 
perceived as being too close to the foreigners. When African governments under the SAP had to slim the state 
expenses, these foreign created institutions were the first to go despite having the trust of the IBRD. 
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understanding how apparent “irrational” government policies are pursued. Also, they show 
some of the potential dangers with state intervention. 
 
Despite the apparent advantages of these models they do have their weaknesses. Policies are 
analysed on the basis of individual self maximization which excludes other motivations for 
policies. I want to stress three problems with these models: 
 
I. The concept of “rents” is very simplistic and does not differentiate between so-called 
productive and non-productive rents. Also, it does not recognise that the inherent goal of 
capitalism in itself is the creation of surpluses and hence rents. 
 
II. Analyses are ad-hoc as the persistence of policies is easier to understand as opposed to 
the evolution of policies. For instance, if the government chooses to place a factory in 
my home town it must be because I bribed someone in the government. It’s easier to see 
that when the factory is present and I am employed in it I will attempt to keep the 
factory there. Bates & Devarajan (2000) themselves admitted the ad-hoc weaknesses 
within the models. 
 
III. Outcomes are very deterministic since the result always will be that the government will 
maximize itself at the expense of society. 
 
According to the neo-liberal criticisms following the East Asian financial crisis, East Asia 
was a case of “crony capitalism” based on personal contacts and corruption. For many 
scholars this was more a case of trying to press the economic crisis situation in the public 
choice framework. The adequacy of such an assertion is questionable. It is not so much that 
anyone doubts that there were some forms of corruption present and selective support was 
given, but it does not explain how East Asian economies could grow sustained these last 
couple of decades with “crony capitalism”, while other developing countries could not. If a 
scientific framework like the “public choice” models is used to explain everything, at the end 
of the day it explains very little. 
 
East Asia for me fits better in other frameworks like for instance the “embedded autonomy” 
concept. There are three factors I like to highlights from the East Asian internal influence: 
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I. Private sector consultation: I have mentioned this argument already in subsection 2.2.3 
and 3.1.2. The East Asian governments were able to respond to the needs of their 
producers through consultation mechanisms. As Mkandawire (1995) mentioned, the 
governments are very sensitive to the policy demands of their main source of finance. 
The manufacturing sector both provided the government with finance, it also provided 
the government with increased legitimacy since they were able to fuel the economic 
growth, see subsection 2.2.2. The building of a consensus around the economic policy 
might have been vital for the latter implementation for two reasons; i) It increased the 
accountability of all parties since they all were responsible for the results of the policy; 
and ii) Increased legitimacy of the economic policy not only because the state became 
more accountable, but also since the private sector in part affected the policy process. 
 
II. Consensus around economic growth: The high mobilisation around economic growth 
which I mentioned in subsection 2.2.3 and I will come back to in subsection 3.2.2 has 
also been of vital significance. This national mobilisation might have contributed to a 
feeling of a common cause. If one starts by explaining all “rents” as corrupt and 
maintaining the status quo as in the “public choice” models it is difficult to explain why 
anyone was lobbying for a non-existing information technology sector at the start of the 
1980s. The agreement around common goals made both the state and the private sector 
give something to achieve something later on. This is might be adequately summarised 
by the concept of “mutual hostage taking”. 
 
III. Shifting balance: The balance between the private sector and the state is delicate and one 
party can easy start to dominate the other. In some East Asian countries the balance 
shifted over time. The most illustrative example might be South Korea. In the 1960s, the 
state was very powerful, but promoted large conglomerates which emerged as a private 
sector counterweight. At the start of the 1980s the Chaebols had grown very powerful 
and the balance of power shifted in their favour. From the 1980s, and especially since 
1990, there has been a lot of liberalisation in South Korea driven on a internal desire for 
liberalisation often stemming from the Chaebols. The balance of power shifted again at 
the end of the 1990s when public opinion went against the Chaebols. Following the East 
Asian financial crisis the IMF attempted to break part of their dominant role in the South 
Korean economy. Another example can be Thailand were it’s claimed that the private 
owned banking sector has a too large political power relative to the state. 
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 African states have been criticised by the neo-liberals for their “irrational” policies. The 
standard explanation fronted is that this was the result of a post-colonial state which was left 
without “check-and-balances”. The public choice literature mentions at least six points for 
why the state lowered growth in Africa:117
 
I. Excessive and counterproductive intervention in domestic economies which hurt the 
private sector and market forces. 
 
II. Excessive bureaucratisation which led to a excessive state sector. 
 
III. The state was captured by a clientist network and a urban coalition which lobbied 
against the rural (productive) sector and “rational” macroeconomic policies. 
 
IV. Power populism that was laid up to a vocal urban elite. 
 
V. Monopolisation of all layers of economic activities which resulted in rent-generating of 
different niches and branches. 
 
VI. Excessive centralisation which did not encourage local (private) initiative. 
 
This created a strong anti-state attitude and the African state became one of the most 
demonised institutions on the continent.118 There are a host of empirical problems connected 
to this interpretation though. I can briefly mention three of them: 
 
I. Lack of urban coalitions: There is little evidence of urban coalitions in most African 
countries (Mosley et al., 1991). Interests in urban areas are normally badly organised 
and inherently contradictory. Most decision in African countries is taken in small circles 
                                                 
117 See for instance Bates (1981), Jackson & Roseberg (1982), Callaghy (1987), Ergas (1987), Rothchild & 
Chazan (1988), IBRD (1989), Medard (1991) and Barkan (1992). 
118 As Olukoshi (2004) noticed, there was almost a personal competition among the public choice authors for the 
most fitting characterisation of the African state: ”Depending on the particular angle from which they entered 
into the debate, the state was variously described by different scholars as ”neo-patrimonial”, ”unsteady”, 
”omnipresent but hardly omnipotent”, ”a bare leviethan”, ”soft”, ”sultanist”, ”prebendal”, ”hemned on”, 
”over-extended”, ”kleptocratic”, ”predatory”, ”parasitic”, ”crony”, ”inverted” and ”humpty-dumpty”. 
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of power, sometimes even a single person (Healey & Robinson, 1992; and Grindle & 
Thomas, 1991). 
 
II. Doomsday perspective: Neo-liberals often characterise the African state prior to the 
1980s and SAP has been as a total failure. This does not match the evidence. The region 
as a whole experienced economic growth during the 1960s, but experienced negative 
growth since the SAP started in Africa. Some countries, such as Kenya and Nigeria, 
recorded growth rates as high as 8-9 % in GDP per capita during the 1960s. The growth 
rate for SAP countries was a maximum of 3-4 % in GDP per capita (see for instance 
Mkandawire, 1995; Gibbon & Olukoshi, 1996; and Havnevik & van Arkadie, 1996). I 
am not saying that the African state was functioning extremely well before the 1980s or 
that other factors than the SAP affected the growth performance in this period. But, the 
characterisation of African states as complete failures prior to the 1980s is little nuanced 
and gives a wrong picture of the record of African states. 
 
III. Authoritarian tendencies: As I mentioned previously, the neo-liberals see it as the state’s 
job to “force” unpopular, but necessary policy through. More radical political 
economists have claimed that a democracy and SAP cannot mutually exist since there 
are authoritarian tendencies within the neo-liberal policies. This is because the 
conditionality attached to the SAP is undemocratic and authority is needed to “force 
through the SAP”.119  The problem in Africa was that there was little evidence of urban 
coalitions or vested interests through civic societies which were blocking the 
implementation of the SAP. Instead, the resistance towards the SAP was widespread and 
even came from those groups that were supposed to benefit from these policies.120 
 
A point that I have emphasised throughout the discussion of the political process is how 
foreign powers increased their influence in the African political process. This also affected the 
internal policy process. I would like to stress three factors of how it affected internal policies: 
 
                                                 
119 See for instance Bangura (1986), Mustapha (1992), Campbell (1989), Olukoshi (1991) and Mkandawire 
(1996). 
120 Ironically, Herbst (1990), a neo-liberalist, welcomed the democratic transitions at the end of the 1980s since 
democracies would punish unpopular leaders and there “neo-patrinomial” relationships. In other words, the 
urban minority was going to be punished by the rural majority. The irony is that some of the social instability 
was caused by a popular resistance against the SAP and many governments were elected on the basis of an 
strong anti-SAP rhetoric. The problem was often that, once in power, the financial situation did not allow them 
to have any other choice but to implement the “policy recommendations” of the SAP. 
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I. IBRD a political player: The IBRD attempted to block alternatives to the SAP policies 
by for instance blocking the formation of civic society groupings. Authors like Nelson 
(1989) and Bates & Krueger (1993) attempted to find out who the winners and losers 
from policies would be so they could wrong foot any opposition.121 Pro-SAP groups 
were promoted and anti-SAP groups were attempted blocked (Beckman, 1992). One of 
the biggest problems with the neo-liberals and the IBRD is that they see their own 
policies as neutral and value free based on science. But, there is not sufficient evidence 
to support the notion that those countries which follow neo-liberal policy 
recommendations will develop from a low stage of development or that those countries 
following neo-liberal policies will grow faster than other countries. As a matter of fact, 
there is no real example of how a country has become industrialised on the basis of the 
policy recommendations inherent in the SAP. Other policies than the neo-liberal 
recommendations are than either irrational or based on the rent argument. The IBRD 
only supported the outcomes of democracies if they were they were in line with their 
one “market friendly view”, see for instance Collier (1996).122 This led to what 
Mkandawire called “voiceless democracies” where democracies were unable to pursue 
their own economic policy. The whole concept of “local ownership”, which was 
attempted at the beginning of the 1990s, merely received lip service. The initiatives 
supported were solely those that supported the liberalisation policies. In the worst cases 
IBRD personal wrote documents themselves in their office and went around to different 
local leaders asking them to claim authorship (see for instance UNDP, 1993; Botchwey 
et al., 1998; and Bangura, 1999). 
 
II. Big resistance: As Olukoshi (2002) mentioned, people from the poor and middle class 
often lost out through the SAP policies due to: i) Increased economic stresses on 
workers and poor through devaluations which increased inflationary pressures; ii) Wage 
                                                 
121 One of the main reasons why such a policy failed was that models often operated with groups like “informal 
vs. formal”, ”tradables vs. non-tradables”, “market vs. state”, “agriculture vs. manufacturing”. The problem is 
that reality often does not fit into such nicely fitted categories and there are lot of grey zones. Since it’s not given 
where certain groups belong to, it therefore becomes unclear which groups looses out and which gains from 
reforms (Bangura & Gibbon, 1992) 
122 A fitting analogy would be Ford’s famous quote: “You can choose any car you want as long as it’s black”. 
African academic environments are usually not neo-liberal, but have more structuralism sympathies. If Africans 
were to decide their own policy to a larger extent the possibility is high that this would increase the state 
intervention and the institutional building process. Both the African academic tradition (with a strong link to 
pan-africanism) and the East Asian tradition (especially the Japanese) have closer links to structuralists 
paradigms than the neo-liberal. Thus, the “Washington consensus” does not apply to these regions. Given the 
different academic orientation the perceived causes and solutions to the different crisis are naturally different. 
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freezing to avoid hyperinflation leading to decreasing real wages; iii) Public sector 
downsizing leading to increased unemployment; iv) Cost retrieval with the introduction 
of school and user fees for health services excluding a lot of the poor from these basic 
services; and v) High inflationary pressure as a result of price regulation and a quick 
deregulation adding to the inflationary pressures from devaluations. Thus there was a 
wide-spread opposition to the SAP policies coming from the grass-root level. This could 
have policy implementation very difficult. 
 
III. Implementation difficulties: The formation of the policies was not the main difficulty 
during the SAP. But, the implementation was weak. Actors in Africa are not active in 
the political formulation process since the political institutions are not well developed 
and a lot of the decision making takes place in small circles.123 However, the 
implementation of policies is often affected by the actors that bare the consequences of 
such policies. When a policy is to be implemented by local officials people offer for 
instance bribes or other beneficiaries to be exempt from the policies or get a more lax 
implementation. Because of this, the effective implementation of a policy on the ground 
can often be very different from the formulated policy. It also allows for large regional 
differences reducing the cohesiveness of the policy in question. This being the case, 
given the highly unpopular nature of the SAP policies, it is no surprise that the effective 
implementation is as poor was as poor as it was. My point is that a real consensus 
around political issues would make the effective implementation far greater given that 
the political institutions have the legitimacy and are being perceived as autonomous. 
 
Public choice models were positive in the sense that the political process was brought back 
into the economic profession. But the paradox is that the conclusion was that politics should 
be removed from the economic process. The evidence to support their models, though, is far 
from conclusive. This goes for both East Asia and Africa. Conditionality as a policy tool was 
                                                 
123 In Kenya from 1963 to 1978, the so-called Kenyatta regime, the economic policy was achieved by a 
consensus with the main economic actors and laid close to their needs. Kenya did experience economic growth 
until 1973, but did experience increased macroeconomic shocks since. From 1978 to 2002, the so-called Moi 
regime put more of the economic policy formulation process up to the president which meant that the policy got 
more centrally formulated. The SAP was officially adopted during the 80s, but it was not until the early 1990s 
that it was truly adopted. Policies conducted during the 1980s were not taken local considerations and central 
economic actors were not consulted. My point is that increased consulting increases the dangers of selectivity, 
but a too centrally formulated policy as under the Moi regime in Kenya during the 1980s increases the dangers of 
poor implementation. This is a case of the difficult balance of “embedded autonomy” that Evans (1995) 
mentions. 
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implemented so that the African states would implement the economic policies according to 
the neo-liberal vision. One finding that is very important is the role of feedback mechanisms 
in the East Asian growth experience to make i) Policies more adequate and avoid some of the 
information problems governments have; and ii) Increase the legitimacy of the policy by 
allowing it to be subject to some form of consensus thereby increasing the effectiveness  of 
implementation. The BWIs, however, had a larger focus on “forcing” unpopular, but 
“necessary” policy through in Africa. The lack of real consensus building and the high 
insistence of the workings of neo-liberal policies in an environment that has other academic 
sympathies are two of the main reasons for why the SAP had such a difficult time being 
implemented as it proponents intended. 
 
3.2 Social Embeddedness 
Often ignored in economic literature is the fact that the state has a multitude of tasks that are 
non-economic in nature. If a random person in the street was asked the question: “What’s the 
role of the state?” the answer would most likely not be only to promote markets. Economic 
growth and increased welfare would most likely be a key requirement, but the state’s role runs 
deeper than that. The legitimacy of the state is for a large part depended on economic growth 
which most likely increases the welfare of the people. But economic growth alone is not the 
only factor determining the legitimacy of the state. Rather people will look at the whole set of 
tasks that people perceive the state should be dealing with. This means that the legitimacy of 
the state will be judged by an assertion of the fulfilment of different tasks, where economic 
growth is one of the most important. My point is adequately summarised by Olukoshi (2004): 
 
”…in addition to its trial and error nature, policy is an essential political affair... It is 
therefore important for effective policy making to recognize that policy is not solely a 
product of economic considerations but also of a host of other considerations, 
including national unity and stability, conflict management, and cultural values. This 
being the case, the efficacy of policy cannot be assessed solely on the basis of 
economic criteria, and certainly not on the kinds of narrow market-based criteria that 
are central to the structural adjustment agenda of the IMF and the World Bank”. 
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To assess how these more non-economic tasks affect the economy I wish to focus on two 
elements which are very relevant for economic growth. Firstly I will look at the role of the 
state as a conflict manager. Secondly I will assess the question of legitimacy. 
 
3.2.1 Conflict management 
Conflicts have had adverse effects for social and political stability in Africa. These conflicts 
seemed to have occurred with a lower frequency in East Asia compared to other developing 
regions. The natural question becomes whether this was more or less independent from the 
economic situation and thereby enhancing East Asian growth prospects from the outset. Or 
did the economic growth in East Asia create the political and social stability needed to 
continue the economic growth spurring a virtuous cycle. I believe that both of these questions 
can be answered with a partial “yes”. Economic growth can also create conflicts and how the 
government deals with for instance income inequality and the shifting importance of different 
sectors which affects political relations. Thus the management of conflicts becomes important 
for the continuation of the social and political stability that economic growth is dependent 
upon. In addition, there needs to be social and political stability for the economy to take off. 
 
Economic activity is about the allocation of resources which in practice means that certain 
sectors normally change their relative and sometimes their absolute importance compared to 
other sectors. Such shifting structure over time creates new power relationships. According to 
standard economic theory, the whole society benefits from long-term economic growth. But 
there is less agreement what happens in the short-term and how these changes should be dealt 
with. Neo-liberal in theory operates with highly efficient markets which imply flexible prices 
and a high resource mobility which means that short-term effects will be short-lived and 
hence these don’t warrant attention. The argument, on theoretical level, is that income 
inequality is not an issue since it doesn’t affect efficiency. 
 
In practice the neo-liberals acknowledge that in certain developing countries inequality has 
adverse effects for economic growth by affecting social and political stability. One suggestion 
is to composite “the losers” since “the winners” win more from economic growth than the 
losers lose and thus income redistribution could smooth structural transition by compositing 
“losers”. 
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The revisionists do not promote the notion of highly efficient markets and allows rigidities. If 
the losses from market competition are too high for the market agents suffering these losses, 
they might not accept the market outcome and take “political action” (Chang, 1994a). Rodrik 
(2000a) claims that healthy societies have a range of institutions which makes such “social 
coordination errors” less likely, for instance “the rule of law”, high quality judiciary, 
representative political institutions, free elections, independent trade unions, institutional 
representation of minorities and social safety nets. These institutions operate to make the 
potential “pay-off” for “winners” of social conflicts less and guarantees that “losers” do not 
get excluded. This will increase the incentive for cooperation. Chang (1994a) mentioned that 
the possibly most effective way to handle and prevent future conflicts is to facilitate 
redistribution from “winners” (often high-income groups) to “losers” (often workers). In 
practice, it’s hard to see that any other institution than the state can fulfil this role. According 
to Chang (1994b) there are five ways to solve social conflicts with regard to resource 
allocation: 
 
I. Let the market decide: For some neo-liberals, for instance Barr (1987), this is seen as the 
most just outcome since it rewards those actors that are most efficient.124 
 
II. Give selective support to vulnerable groups: Given selective support to those who do 
not benefit from the market outcome. For instance given employees who get fired from 
a big plant unemployment benefits. This is a way of directly addressing the adverse 
effects of market outcomes. The problem with this method that it might be seen as 
discriminating at some stage since certain groups get increased protection over others 
 
III. Give selective support to vulnerable outcomes: Has the same effect as the previous by 
elevating the adverse effects, for instance unemployment benefits, but has at the same 
time a more neutral outlook by not targeting groups per se, but rather adverse outcomes. 
 
                                                 
124 Personally, I find the reasoning somewhat odd. Firstly, the morale that more efficient players are “better” or 
more “eglideible” gives the impression of an Bentham ideal, who’s moral reasoning are somewhat controversial. 
Secondly, and for me most important, the argument is partly contradicting itself. Today’s institutional context, 
resource distribution or power sharing are historical products of previous state intervention at some point and 
thus “distorted” from the outset. 
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IV. Change the political agenda: The boundary what is political and what is economical is 
elusive and shifting over time. Thus governments have the option not to intervene in 
adverse economic outcomes by stating that it’s not a political problem. 
 
V. Use force: Hardly recommendable, but an historical used tool, is to press the new 
outcomes using force. Amadeo & Baduri (1991) said that such a method might work in 
the short-run, but would have more adverse effects in the long-run. 
 
I believe that the social stability in East Asia was not given as such. If one were to turn to East 
Asia in the year 1950, the outlook for economic growth would appear to be bleak. Japan was 
still under American occupation which lasted until 1953. Korea was split following the 
Korean War which was still ongoing in 1950. China had been taken over by Mao and the 
communist party in 1949 which was followed by “economic” reforms such as the persecution 
of capitalists and landowners. Taiwan was taken over by the KMT party, which in the West 
was seen as unreliable. The build-up before the economic take-off is very important to 
understand the growth miracles, as I mentioned in section 2.2.3. Chang (1998) mentioned that 
the East Asian governments showed a high ability to redistribute wealth and increase the 
national cohesion of the countries. This goes for both the build-up prior to take-off and in 
dealing with redistribution after economic growth had taken off. I want to elaborate on a 
number of aspects regarding these policies: 
 
I. Land reforms: In Japan, South Korea and Taiwan there were a number of land reforms 
prior to take-off. In the Japanese case, these reforms were long overdue according to 
some and the American occupation was able to press these through. The reforms 
restructured ownership by setting limitations on the amount of land each farmer could 
own and introduced rules for cultivation. This increased the amount of land each single 
farmer had by strengthening their private ownership. This might have boosted 
agricultural productivity since the increased returns were more related to the farmers 
own efforts, hence there were increased incentives to increase production. The increases 
in agricultural productivity were important for the economic take-off of the countries by 
freeing up labour which could move to the cities and this increased urbanisation boosted 
industry and thereby income. An interesting point made by Kay (2001) is that the 
landowners, the supposed “losers” of these reforms were compensated by the state and 
they virtually disappeared after the land reforms. Many, as a matter of fact, became 
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investors and thereby capitalists in the new industrial economy. The Philippines 
attempted similar land reforms, but did not succeed to the same degree as the countries 
thus far discussed. The increasing land pressure in Malaysia and Thailand, on the other 
hand, was solved by opening up tropical areas for cultivation, thereby reducing social 
tensions. 
 
II. Social safety net: An interesting aspect of the land reforms was the increased 
protectionism against foreign products; the same went for small traders such as local 
shop owners in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. Chang (1996) mentioned that this was 
an important aspect of the overall economic policy since the increased agricultural 
prices increased agricultural production and the small shops and more “traditional” 
economic activity was being protected which meant that the “losers” from the modern 
transformation could be compensated. In developing countries welfare states and social 
safety nets might be poorly developed and the “losers”, if not compensated, might take 
political action to stop some of the modern economic growth. By allowing a “safety 
valve” for those falling outside the “new society” and a gradual opening up (and also 
perhaps a modernisation of for instance the agricultural sector after growth has taken 
off) the potential for social conflicts were dampened. 
 
III. Luxury consumption: In Japan, South Korea and Taiwan there were also limitations on 
so-called luxury consumption. This facilitated at least three effects; i) It decreased 
consumption and hence increased savings; ii) Import substitution since the domestic 
producers started to produce some of the luxury goods that were not being imported any 
more. This one of the reasons why some scholars prefer to see these countries more as 
complementary in their usage of export promotion and import substitution; iii) Most 
important for our argument is that these measures also had a political dimension since 
the governments wanted to avoid an unintended “demonstration effect” during the Cold 
War days (Chang, 1997). An increase in luxury consumption could increase the class 
struggle and increase communist sympathy. An interesting point regarding the opening 
up of China from 1978 was that Deng Xioaping wanted to create a “demonstration 
effect” by letting some Chinese getting rich first so other would which to follow and 
increase the capital accumulation. 
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IV. Housing projects: This goes first of all for the city states of Hong Kong and Singapore 
which have their own unique problems due to the status of city states. Land rents are 
high in these states and to elevate some of the pressure in an attempt to keep land rents 
low the Hong Kong and Singaporean government subsidised housing projects.125 This 
reduced the potential for social conflicts due to housing schemes which had been 
building up after 1945. 
 
V. Labour conflicts: Both Singapore and South Korea have had infamous clashes with 
regard to labour conflicts; see for instance Ogle (1991) for South Korea. These pressures 
have undoubtedly been repressed by partly harsh means, but the labours did get a lot of 
their demands through, such as for instance work compensation for working accidents 
and a right for payments of labour firstly ahead of other interests if a company was 
deemed to be bankrupt. Probably it would have been unsustainable not to meet many of 
the demands of the demonstrators since, as I mentioned, violence most likely is not a 
long-term mean of solving conflicts. 
 
VI. Ethnic redistribution: An interesting case study is the New Economic Policy (NEP) 
conducted by Malaysia (see Snodgrass, 1995). Malaysia after independence was ethnical 
heterogeneous, has large ethnically divided income differences and a primary goods 
production structure. In 1969 there were racial riots after the minority population of 
Chinese (30 % of the population) and Indians (8 % of the population) threaten to take 
political power from the more numerous, but impoverished Malay population (62 % of 
the population). The NEP was an attempt to conduct an ethnical redistribution based on 
economic growth to reduce the possibilities of ethnical conflicts by decreasing the level 
of poverty and increasing the employment of the Malay population. The measures 
included a modernisation of the rural areas, a rapid but balanced population increase in 
urban areas, the establishment of a Malay commercial and industrial sector, ethnic 
quotas on higher education, quotas on ownership and increasing the numbers of public 
companies.126 This was intended to decrease the relative importance of the wealthiest 
                                                 
125 Hong Kong pursued a more laissez-faire strategy than the other Asian countries. The subsidising of housing 
projects was perhaps the biggest exceptions to this policy. 
126 A promotion of the rural areas with many farmers was also a pro-Malay policy since most of the Malay 
population were living in rural areas and dependent on agriculture. 
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Chinese and increase the relative share of the Malay population.127 The policy managed 
to induce a state-led economic growth with important, mainly labour-intensive export 
zones, which managed to decrease some of the ethnical disparities, thereby dampening 
some of the potential for future ethnic conflicts. 
 
Africa has had more episodes of civil war than any other region in the world since 1960. The 
lack of economic growth has partly been a cause of the social tensions and economic 
conflicts, but is also an effect of the lack of political stability. This is a vicious circle were 
poverty feeds violence, violence leads to social and political instability, which makes 
economic growth virtually impossible thereby increasing the problems. The lack of economic 
growth can thus be a potential topic for an endless discussion of what comes first; the chicken 
or the egg? African governments did not exhibit the ability to decrease social conflicts; as a 
matter of fact they were often the reason for conflicts. In addition to economic growth, there 
are a number of factors that have affected the government’s ability to solve political and 
social conflicts; 
 
I. Colonial foundations: In Africa “favoured” ethnic groups often got the colonial state as 
a “reward” for their support during the colonial era. These favoured ethnic groups often 
collaborated more than others with the colonial powers and were also often the groups 
that were wealthier than other ethnic groups. This fuelled ethnically divided income 
differences which were exacerbated by the usage of a “divide-and-rule” policy from the 
colonial powers that attempted to put the different ethnic groups up against each other. 
After independence the colonial institutions were often taken over by these “favoured” 
groups were the colonial policies often were continued by native groups. The policy of 
mutual alienation by the colonial powers left the state with little legitimacy and laid the 
foundations for partly ethnically motivated conflicts. Often these conflicts were between 
the so-called “favoured” groups and non-favoured groups such as in Angola, Burundi, 
Chad, Djibouti, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda and Zaire (Jinadu & Ake 
(2004)). 
 
                                                 
127 The reforms can be deemed to have been successful on the basis that it managed to redistribute the national 
wealth. In 1970 the Malay population only had 2 % of the national wealth, the Chinese and Indians had 43 % and 
foreigners had 65 %. In 1990 the distribution of wealth had increased for both the Malay as well as the 
Chinese/Indian population to 20 % and 46 % respectively, while the relative share of the wealth for foreigners 
had decreased to 25 %. The economic growth also meant that not only the slices, but also the size of the cake 
increased and the overall poverty level went from 49 % of the population in 1970 to around 15 % in 1990. 
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II. Ethnic redistribution: When non-favoured groups got control of the state institutions 
there often was a rhetoric favouring an ethnic redistribution of wealth. Under import 
substitution the income differences were attempted to be fought by increasing the state 
sector and paying favourable wages to close some of the disparities in income. In 
general these attempts did not succeed. I believe that several factors contributed to this 
failing: i) There was a willingness to achieve income redistribution before economic 
growth. So the size of the cake did not expand, even if the slices were redistributed, in 
stark contrast to Malaysia; ii) There was a tendency to favour the ethnic group that had 
control of the government, thereby creating a situation were state control was a means of 
securing that one’s own group got a share of the cake and therefore controlling the state 
often became the cause of the conflict, making it difficult for the state to attempt to 
resolve income differences. In Nigeria different industrialisation efforts were attempted 
at various times and the geographic concentration of the efforts normally reflected 
which ethnic group was in power. This led to a number of industrial clusters in various 
locations and a fragmented industrial structure in the country; and iii) Related to the 
previous argument, minority groups did not have efficient institutional protection 
leading them to be excluded from the political process which created increased 
discontent which could have fuelled increased instability. The lack of institutional 
protection for minority groups might be a major reason for why attempts of democracy, 
especially with a simple majority vote, often has failed in Africa, there was no 
protection for the “tyranny of the majority”. 
 
III. Structural Adjustment Programs: The SAP was highly unpopular in Africa as it often 
was seen as an increased political influence from non-African foreign powers. As I 
mentioned in section 3.1.3, the IBRD/IMF themselves got entangled in the local 
political process favouring groups that supported their policies and worked against those 
that opposed it, thereby undermining the political institutions of the various countries 
and creating “voiceless democracies”. The SAP might have increased ethnic tensions in 
Africa even further through several channels; i) Capital restrictions for certain ethnical 
groups that did not support the SAP policies; ii) Reducing the public spending thereby 
increasing the speed of the divergent income process; iii) The privatisation of public 
companies seems to have favoured the already relative “richer” segments, increasing the 
income differences; and iv) The intuition fees for primary education excluded the 
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poorest from education which led to a process where the poorest had less abilities to 
increase their incomes through the formal economy. 
 
IV. Sudden changes in ownership: A sudden change in the ownership structure of a country 
as negative long-term implications for economic growth since it raises uncertainty and 
thereby the perceived transaction costs. There have been a lot of episodes in Africa were 
governments have intervened directly to change the ownership structure, thereby raising 
the perceived risks by investing in Africa. In Uganda, Idi Amin attempted to change the 
relative income distribution by throwing out the relative richer ethnically Indian 
population and confiscating their properties. In Zimbabwe Robert Mugabe also 
attempted a “redistribution” policy in 1995 by confiscating the land of white farmers 
and giving them to political supporters. Since 1994 there has been a lot of pressure on 
the South African government to tackle some of the income differences in the country 
and some land reforms are underway to reduce the relative importance of white farmers. 
Such reforms might have been easier to implement after what happened in nabouring 
Zimbabwe out of fear that the same drastic measures might be taken in South Africa. 
 
V. Geographic concentration: Ethnic conflicts often get more intense when ethnic groups 
have identified geographical power bases. Zimbabwe, for instance, has ethnic groups 
which clearly had their geographical bases as compared with for instance Botswana. In 
Botswana the ethnical groups were evenly spread out without having the same clear 
geographic connections as ethnic groups in other African countries. In Singapore the 
government was very aware of this and set quotas on the maximum number of each 
ethnic group that was allowed to live in certain blocks or part of the city thereby 
spreading the ethnic groups more evenly. 
 
A host of scholars have criticised the East Asian governments for being protectionist by 
having inefficient sectors such as agriculture. This criticism is understandable, if countries 
were to open up for agricultural goods they could be imported cheaper and the producers that 
would remain would have to produce more efficiently. The NEP in Malaysia has also been 
criticised for being racist and not favouring the most efficient solutions through for instance 
ethnical quotas on education. Even though these arguments are valid, they seem not always to 
take the bigger picture into consideration. In regional negotiations Japan has often been asked 
to liberalise its agricultural sector. A Japanese diplomat was once quoted saying: “In Japan, 
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rice is 10 % economics and 90 % politics”. My point is that the East Asian governments did 
not attempt to optimise the most efficient economic solution, but the most efficient social 
solution. Social stability can be fragile and is at the same time a necessary condition for 
economic growth to take place. Chang (1998) makes the point by saying that the social 
stability that the East Asian governments “bought” was expensive, but lay the necessary 
foundations that economic growth could be build upon. In the Malaysian case, the non-
favoured ethnic group, the Malay population, saw their situation created by the colonial 
powers which favoured the Chinese population. In such a view the colonial powers used state 
intervention to favour some groups over others to create more favourable distributions of 
wealth. Once the political power was taken over by the Malay population, they believed it was 
their right to correct these “distortions” created by previous interventions of the former 
colonial powers. The point is that present institutional and political structures are historical 
products and have therefore been influenced by various factors which render the view that the 
markets give the most “natural” outcome less legitimacy since the present outcome is a 
product of intervention of the past. I am not saying that the policies in East Asia are the most 
efficient nor do I necessarily recommend the same policies for present developing countries. 
But, my argument is that these policies did manage to maintain the social and political 
stability in East Asia which fuelled economic growth. Also, increases in income made the 
societies more stable and increased the powers of the state to promote social stability as the 
growth process went on. 
 
The African situation is a major contrast to the East Asian case. There is no doubt that much 
of the political and social upheavals in Africa are linked to the lack of economic growth and 
the weak increases in standards of living. But also, a lot of the problems were left over from 
the colonial regime such as high income inequalities and ethnical fragmented populations. 
The state itself was a colonial creation and control over the state was often a source of conflict 
by it self. This made the state’s ability to maintain political and social stability very difficult. 
Collier (1998b) believes that ethnical fragmentation does not give the same problems if 
countries are democracies. The problem is that it doesn’t solve the problem the “tyranny of 
the majority”. The state needs greater capacity and legitimacy to be able to handle conflicts 
and democracy with build mechanisms that limits it power such as guaranteed minority rights 
has the potential to work in Africa. The increased foreign presence, however, has put further 
strains on many African people and undermined the already weak political institutions in 
Africa making matters worse. The most troublesome development has been the emergence of 
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“voiceless democracies” where foreign powers decided which economic policy Africans 
should pursue. Redistribution policies that have been pursued have often not succeeded. To be 
able to handle conflicts more autonomy is needed. There are, however, increasing regional 
attempts to handle social conflicts through for instance the African Union. 
 
3.2.2 Legitimacy 
I define legitimacy as the social acceptance of the users of the institutions towards the 
institution in question. This definition has an important implication; legitimacy is a process 
that goes down-up. Institutions can be created through a top-down process through for 
instance the governments, but its legitimacy can only be granted by the end-users of these 
institutional arrangements. Without legitimacy there will be no real solution to the problem of 
who supervises the supervisors (Stiglitz, 1999). Capitalism as an economic system emphasises 
the role of the market as a central allocation tool. As Rodrik (2000a) put it: “Social insurance 
legitimise the market economy because it renders it compatible with social stability and social 
cohesion”. The justification for income redistribution is according to this view based on the 
need for legitimacy for the market economy. This highlights another important feature; the 
market system is a means to higher living standards, not a goal by itself. Sindzingre (2004) 
criticised the neo-liberals for their distinction between formal and informal institutions since it 
gives the impression that informal institutions are something vaguer and less binding than 
formal institutions. This is according to Sindzingre not true for many developing countries 
where so-called informal institutions are more widespread, more binding and enjoy a higher 
degree of legitimacy than formal institutions. The reason for the failure of the SAP, according 
to Sindzingre, was therefore the lack of focus on informal institutions and a too high focus on 
building formal institutions. Sindzingre (2005) emphasised a number of attributes that affects 
the legitimacy of institutions: 
 
I. Relations to pre-existing institutions: An institution needs to have a certain degree of 
embedeness with pre-existing institutions to achieve legitimacy. Institutions do not exist 
in vacuums, but in relation to each other, if the distance between a new and old 
institution becomes too big, the new institutions might not achieve the necessary 
legitimacy to function optimally. Market reforms in many developing countries to create 
Western style economic institutions have often failed which might partly be explained 
by the differences in institutions such as cultural values. 
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 II. Accountability: An institution that is accountable for its result has a tendency to increase 
its legitimacy by being responsible for the results it produces. That is why democratic 
elected governments in general are perceived as more legitimate than autocratic regimes. 
 
III. Source of the institutional innovation: Institutional innovations created through a down-
up process tend to have a greater legitimacy than institutional innovations that are 
created through a top-down process. The reason might be that the legitimacy itself is a 
down-up process and that’s why implementation without a consensus or grass root 
initiatives can be less effective. Also, national sources of legitimacy also tend to have a 
higher degree of legitimacy than foreign. 
 
I will use these attributes as a framework for understanding legitimacy in the two regions. In 
East Asia governments were able to achieve a relative high degree of legitimacy. The 
economic policies and institutional innovations were therefore more effective implemented 
than in the case of Africa. The East Asian governments managed the different attributes of 
legitimacy in an adequate fashion: 
 
I. Cultural identity: Englebert (2000) emphasised that the state itself often was an 
endogenous product of the East Asian societies and therefore by definition was a 
product of the pre-existing institutions which increased its legitimacy. In Japan, the 
American occupation forces allowed the country to keep the emperor as a symbol of 
national unity. This increased the continuity and legitimised the national values which 
were severely dampened after the military loss of World War II which needed to be 
rebuilt. Another example of how institutions were put close to pre-existing institutions 
were China and Vietnam which choose to open up gradually and the institutional 
innovations were in accordance or close to pre-existing institutions. This is what Rodrik 
(2000a) called institutional innovations with a “local flavour”, which I elaborated on in 
sub-section 2.2.3. I believe this is a very important part of the economic growth in East 
Asia and why the policies and institutional innovation were as effective as they were. 
Another attribute that has been emphasised, see for instance Tenold (2002), is the 
national unity or national mobilisation around economic growth in a number of East 
Asian countries, which I also mentioned in sub-section 2.2.3. According to Vartainen 
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(1999) a common external threat often helped this sense of national unity as for instance 
the North Korean threat for South Korea or the Chinese threat for Taiwan. 
 
II. Accountability: The presence of “deliberation councils” in a number of East Asian 
countries led to a feedback mechanism were the different institutions were bounded by a 
mutual hostage taking were the different elements were responsible for the results they 
produced thereby creating a system were the various actors were accountable for their 
results, as I have mentioned previously. The fact that the private sector not only was 
consulted, but also had a part in policy formulation led to a process were policies and 
institutional innovations in part came through a down-up process which increased the 
legitimacy and the effectiveness of these policies. An interesting feature with a number 
of high growth countries in East Asia is the gradual emergence of democracy. 
According to the modernisation theory, democracy is a natural development that follows 
economic development. Other scholars disagree and contend that democracy is partly 
independent of economic development and can therefore occur at any stage of economic 
development. Nevertheless, there seems to be a two-way feedback mechanism. Firstly, 
an increase in living standards can legitimise autocratic rule since the ruling party is able 
to increase the material wealth of its population. Secondly, an increasing standard of 
living beyond a certain material well-being can increase the demands for political 
participation partly due to higher education and shifting preferences with a higher 
standard of living. These tendencies oppose each other. The modernisation theory 
claims that the former dominates at a early stage of economic development and the latter 
dominates at a latter stage after the living standards has passed some kind of “critical 
mass”. In South Korea and Taiwan democracies have developed over time following 
economic development. In Japan, however, democracy preceded the post-WWII 
economic development (but not the pre-WWII economic development). In China the 
ruling party is afraid of losing legitimacy and has allowed capitalist into the ruling party 
so the policies formed are not too far away from the needs to increase the legitimacy by 
having a down-up element into the policy formulation. More importantly, capitalists 
create a lot of the wealth that the Chinese economic growth is dependent upon and 
economic growth is the new source of legitimacy for the ruling communist party after it 
de facto abandoning communism (though never officially denouncing it). 
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III. Legitimate source: Foreigners do not have a high legitimacy in many East Asian 
countries, for instance Japan and South Korea. The low degree of FDI in their 
development partly reflected this. The state as a source for institutional innovation was 
often regarded as a legitimate partner and as I mentioned, many policies and institutional 
innovations were also consulted and thereby the private sector also was a major source 
behind the economic policies. South Korea has liberalised its economy far more during 
the 80s and 90s than Japan and this reflects to a higher degree shifting preferences 
within South Korea rather than external pressure. In Japan, the economy has somewhat 
reluctantly been liberalised partly on the backdrop of foreign pressure, but these 
institutional innovations do not always have the same legitimacy as compared with 
national solutions. The US attempts to pressure China on human rights through trade 
negotiations.128 For me it seems unlikely that such a policy will be effective unless these 
correspond to some form of national movements that can increase the pressure on the 
Chinese authorities from within. 
 
The African state has not had the same degree of legitimacy as their East Asian counterparts. 
According to Sindzingre (2004) the whole concept of “state” in Africa was not comparable 
with the concept “state” in East Asia. The very foundation, nature and its existing within the 
societies they are supposed to govern cannot be compared. Therefore, the different elements 
that can give states legitimacy varied in contrast to East Asia: 
 
I. Artificial states: I would like to make three points; i) The state lacked legitimacy in 
Africa since it often was not based on local African institutions or local power structure. 
Also the policies and institutional innovations did often not have a “local flavour” to 
make them adapt to the African context, see subsection 2.2.3. States in Africa were to a 
higher degree than other regions an exogenous product of the societies they were meant 
to govern (Englebert, 2000). The state as an institution was in itself an imported 
concept. An exception to this general rule was Botswana. The British were not 
interested in this colony and allowed the local Tswana kings to rule, thereby upholding 
the local institutions of government. In 1966 at independence Botswana was one of the 
10 poorest countries in the world inheriting virtually nothing in form of human capital 
and infrastructure, but they did inherent democracy (Owusu & Samatar, 1997). The first 
                                                 
128 Even though the so-called war on terror with Guantanomo Bay and various prison scandals have reduced the 
legitimacy of such a policy somewhat in the near future. 
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prime minister was a prince of one of the local Tswana kings and thereby continuity and 
legitimacy was upheld. The Botswana success story is at odds with the modernisation 
theory that predicts that democracies develop after and not before economic 
development takes place. The general picture for African countries, though, is of people 
that did not associate themselves with the new states that they inherited in 1960 and 
hence the term “artificial states”. Often the policies and institutional innovations, in 
contrast to East Asia were conducted in closed circles with little grass root input which 
rendered policies and institutional innovations less legitimate and made them harder to 
implement; ii) Attempts to create a national unity have been thwarted by the presence of 
other forms of autonomy which were being perceived as more legitimate which goes for 
individual ethnical groups and pan-africanism. As Mkandawire (2004) points out, the 
search for identity is always ongoing and many have over time started to identify 
themselves with the “artificial states” they inherited. Mkandawire was opposed to the 
word “artificial states” since all states are social contracts and by definition artificial. 
Some policies attempted by the African governments were attempted to create some 
forms of national unity, many of these attempts did not succeed.129 As Landes (1999) 
points out, nothing is as unstable as dual autonomy. African people associate themselves 
first of all with their ethnic group, then Africa (through pan-Africanism) and lastly with 
the state they live in. Its not that they do not associate themselves with their countries, 
but they seem themselves as African first, and then as Nigerian or Ghanaian; iii) The 
fear of loss of autonomy has hindered regional cooperation’s which has severely 
dampened the development of potential constructive economic relationships among 
African countries. Regional cooperation through supra-national bodies requires a certain 
amount of loss of sovereignty, but the newly independent countries following 
independence were at the time not willing to give away their hard won freedom. This 
dampened regional cooperation and has led to little regional economic integration 
despite attempts to contrary through various schemes. 
 
II. Lack of accountability: The lack of accountability for the results that policies have 
produced in Africa refers to two levels, namely the state level and the international level 
through international financial institutions. Both have not been able to boost growth in 
                                                 
129 Another “artificial” state that broke away from European control, the USA, is a case to the point of how 
national unity is created as an concept used to legitimise the control of the government. In class rooms in the US 
the national anthem is often song so that children from their upbringing associate themselves with the American 
nationalism. 
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Africa and have often blamed each other for this failure. On the first level, the state, I 
already have mentioned in section 3.1.3 that most policies were not consulted with the 
people or the private sector leading to little potential feedback. The presence of 
autocratic regimes and frequent coups also did not help to create a sustainable 
environment for accountability to promote legitimate economic policies which would 
boost economic development. The democracies that developed in the end of the 80s and 
the beginning of the 90s have at times been seen as unsustainable since they have been 
undermined by external donor pressure. On the second level, the international financial 
institutions, the lack of “local ownership” where governments realistically can affect the 
policy formulation has created an environment of weak legitimacy where economic 
policies are weakly implemented both at the state and the grass root level. The results of 
the SAP were blamed on “lack of commitment”. But the lack of real accountability for 
the results that the SAP has produced has decreased the legitimacy of the IBRD/IMF. 
My point is that the little “real” consultation and the blocking of African alternatives 
have created an environment where policies are more forced upon Africans rather than 
the results of real policy consensuses making them less legitimate and hence subject to 
policy reversals and lack of effective implementation. 
 
III. Lack of legitimate source: African states were not seen as legitimate during the IS era 
and had difficulties in implementing their policies and institutional innovations as a 
result. Often the question was: “Who does the state belong to?” As I mentioned, control 
over the state was often a goal for different ethnic groups and thus the state was not seen 
as legitimate if “the others” had control over it. Perhaps one of the few plusses from the 
increased donor involvement has been the increased focus by Africans on the state as a 
source of identity. The increased involvement of the IBRD and the IMF has prompted 
popular anti-BWI sympathy. Policies or institutional innovations on the initiative from 
foreign sources, especially the BWIs, are in general not perceived as being legitimate at 
least three reasons; i) The lack of accountability for policy outcomes; ii) Lack of 
consulting and consensus building in the policy formulation process; iii) Contradictions 
with what policy recommendations developing countries are prescribed and what 
developed countries themselves pursued historically;130 and iv) Contradictions what the 
                                                 
130 As I mentioned in subsection 2.2.2, today’s rich countries all used selective industrial support and 
protectionist trade polices at an earlier stage of development. The message thus become; “Do as I say; not the 
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developing countries are prescribed and which policies the developed countries 
themselves pursue today.131 
 
The differences between in legitimacy argument I have fronted between the two regions is 
summarised by: 
 
• East Asian countries identified themselves with the states they were living in as 
compared to Africans were the state formation process was a legacy from colonial 
times. 
 
• The government and the private sector were both accountable for the results of the 
economic policy in East Asia. In Africa, the state was not accountable under the ISI 
period, while the BWIs rendered themselves not to blame for the SAP from the 1980s 
despite being the main formulators of these policies. 
 
• Institutional change in East Asia normally needed an element of internal pressure for it 
to do be successful. In Africa attempts of grass root levels initiatives were often 
thwarted either by the government of the IBRD (see subsection 2.1.3). Thus down-top 
institutional innovations were normally blocked, while the foreign sources of 
institutional change did not have much legitimacy rendering many of their reform 
attempts unsuccessful. 
                                                                                                                                                        
way I did it.” Chang (2002) summarises this argument in his book, which his adequately called, “Kicking away 
the ladder”. 
131 Often, infant industry protection and protectionist trade policies are still used by developed countries today. 
These are very often hidden. For instance how the US has been able to foster many high technological 
companies through government procurement of the military as a strategic sector, hence defending its policy by 
buying their goods from American producers. Another example could be some of the environmental and health 
standards of food products coming from the developing countries. 
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Conclusion 
East Asia has had the fastest economic growth of all regions since 1960, while Africa has had 
the worst economic growth record of all regions in the same period. I have attempted to shed 
light on two questions during this thesis. 
 
I. Which factors can explain the divergence in terms of economic performance between 
East Asia and Africa? 
 
II. How can differences in the role of the government with regard to economic policies and 
institutions explain the growth divergence between East Asia and Africa? 
 
There were three major sets of causes I have discussed; i) Structural; ii) Policies; and iii) 
Institutions. Given my focus on the role of the government it was natural to put the main 
weight on the policies and institutional causes. 
 
Structural causes 
The set of causes, which I termed structural causes, are to some degree independent of the 
government’s actions. But at the same time they may enhance or limit the ability of the 
government to promote economic growth. The first of the structural causes I emphasised was 
geography and demography. There were three main causes which the literature mentioned 
which I found important: 
 
I. Africa has a far higher degree of its land mass in the tropics relative to East Asia and is 
hence far more prone to these effects. This includes a heavy disease burden which 
increases individual and social costs and might reduce life expectancy. 
 
II. East Asia has a far higher population density and access to waterways than Africa. The 
higher population density in East Asia might have increased the potential for economics-
of-scale and scope and might have led to a more advanced division of labour which 
would increased the productivity historically relative to Africa. The higher access to 
waterways in East Asia decreased transportation costs and might thus potentially have 
increase trade which might facilitate increased division of labour and availability of 
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technology. Africa has been more hindered by natural large transportation costs due to 
the low degree of the region that borders sea or ocean-going rivers in the interior. 
 
III. The growth of the working population in East Asia was higher than the general 
population growth from 1965 to 1990 leading to decreased costs due to less cost on 
education and pensions (declining dependency ratio) and at the same time boosting 
output by an increased availability of labour. This has been termed a “demographic 
bonus” for the part of East Asia. In Africa, however, the total population growth was 
higher than the growth rate in the working population from 1965 to 1990 leading to an 
increasing dependence ratio which due to the lack of economic growth led to great fiscal 
burdens. To follow the analogy of the previous term, I would label this a “demographic 
drag” for the part of Africa. 
 
I have looked at other structural causes as well and found three of them in particular relevant: 
 
I. Colonial legacy: The Japanese colonial legacy in northeast Asia might have led to 
a more favourable colonial legacy as compared with the European legacy in both 
Southeast Asia and Africa. This goes not only for the economic structure which 
was more focused on industry than other colonial legacies, but also the 
institutional legacy which left a far more exploitive state structure in Africa. 
 
II. Ethnic fragmentation: This might have had some adverse effects for Africa such 
as; i) A reduced incentive to produce public goods; ii) Increased social and 
political instability; and iii) Increased transaction costs for conducting business. 
 
III. Primary goods dependence: Africa has a far higher dependence on primary goods 
than East Asia; the latter has been able to exports vast amounts of industrial goods. 
This might have been important for at least three reasons; i) Primary goods seem 
to have more volatile prices and a long-term decline in prices; ii) Trade in 
manufacturing goods has expanded far greater the last 50 years than trade in 
primary goods; and iii) There seem to be higher learning externalities connected to 
the production of industrial goods rather than primary commodities. 
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All the structural aspects I mentioned have affected the effectiveness of policies and 
institutions. Some aspects are also more directly linked to the political process. I have 
mentioned two important aspects of how these structural aspects affect policies and 
institutions: 
 
I. Geography and demography have made policies less effective in promoting economic 
growth in Africa than in East Asia. Different authors draw this line of reasoning to 
different levels. While Bloom & Sachs (1998) claim that almost 2/3 of Africa’s weak 
growth performance is explained by geography and demography; Collier (1998) 
believes that the main causes for Africa’s economic performance lay in policies and 
institutions. 
 
II. The historical legacy of colonialism influenced the ethnic composition of the new states 
and which ethnic groups would be left with the political and/or economic power after 
independence. In Africa there seems to have been a correlation between whether a 
majority group has been in political power and pro-growth policies and minority groups 
were allowed to keep their economic wealth as long as they were no political threat. In 
East Asia this link is less clear. Governments were able to promote economic growth 
also in states where ethnic minorities where in power, such as in Taiwan. 
 
III. The presence of a large primary goods sector and ethnic fragmentation is though be 
correlated with increased potential for ethnic conflicts. Africa could be more prone to 
political and social instability. Given the many episodes of political and social unrest in 
the region some of the potential conflicts became real. East Asia, though not spared 
completely for turmoil was less prone to such unrest and had far fewer episodes of 
political and social unrest. 
 
IV. The political life in Africa is far more dominated by ethnic issues than ethnically 
heterogeneous countries in East Asia. Given this history of political organisation, ethnic 
issues thus become a far more troublesome issue in Africa, which might have increased 
some of the adverse effects of ethnical fragmentation. 
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Economic policy causes 
There was a major shift in the economic paradigm from the 1950s until today. The first 
paradigm within developing economics, import substitution, dominated from the 1950s until 
around the mid 1970s. In general this approach did not deliver the desired results neither in 
Africa nor in those East Asian countries that adopted it. In general, import substitution 
economies in both regions were prone to macroeconomic difficulties which stemmed from 
inflationary pressures and balance-of-payment problems. A sub-set of five East Asian 
countries, Japan and the Tiger economies, instead actively promoted exports and were the 
fastest growing developing countries in the period until 1980. This gave the impression of an 
alternative strategy for development. 
 
The second paradigm took over the mainstream in the mid 1970s, the neo-liberals, and 
emphasised macroeconomic stability, free markets and open economies with a strong 
scepticism against state intervention. The fast growing East Asian economies were interpreted 
as virtual free markets and open economies and it was though that this strategy would 
function in Africa as well. Other East Asian economies such as China, Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Thailand, and later on, Vietnam also started to liberalise their economies and actively promote 
their exports. They were all able to achieve considerable economic growth following the 
policy shift. The increased donor involvement from the IBRD and IMF through the 
stabilisation and SAP were attempts to impose neo-liberal policies on African countries. 
These attempts were in general very disappointing. The blame, however, was according to the 
IBRD and IMF not on the policies itself, but on the African governments that were supposed 
to implement them citing a “lack of commitment”. 
 
A host of scholars have criticised the neo-liberal approach. I have concentrated on only one of 
these academic groups and termed those who argue in favour of developmental states away 
from the neo-liberal paradigm for “revisionists”. It was especially the characterisation of the 
East Asian economies as virtual free market and open economies that draw a lot of 
scepticism. Scholars like Johnson (1982), Amsden (1989) and Wade (1990) were able to show 
that the East Asian countries did use a high degree of state intervention and protectionism, 
which reluctantly has been accepted by the neo-liberals. The neo-liberals questioned the 
effects of industrial and trade policies and the debate of its working is still ongoing and 
unlikely to die any time soon. The revisionists have criticised the SAP since the neo-liberal 
policies did not take the historical or institutional preconditions in Africa into consideration. 
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The debate of the adequacy of neo-liberal policies in the African context is still ongoing, just 
as in East Asia. 
 
To cover the various aspects of the economic policy, I have concentrated at three forms of 
policies which have been mentioned in the literature; i) Macroeconomic policies; ii) Industrial 
policies; and iii) Trade policies. 
 
Macroeconomic policies were far more capable in East Asia relative to Africa. East Asian 
governments managed to keep a low and table inflation, debt levels at reasonable rates and 
kept the exchange rates “realistic” or undervalued. African government had a far more 
difficult time keeping the macroeconomic balance which was reflected by more volatile 
inflation, increasing debt levels and overvalued exchange rates. There is no doubt that one of 
the key failings of the ISI was the weak priorities given to macroeconomic stability. The 
macroeconomic stability that emerged in East Asia and the macroeconomic instability in 
Africa explains a considerable part of the growth differences between the two regions. 
 
The industrial policy debate is vast and at times confusing since different authors emphasise 
different concept. My approach was to divide the debate into three main parts; i) Financial 
systems; ii) Learning and technology; and iii) Coordinating economic policies. 
 
The first of the three industrial policy issues was financial systems and under import 
substitution a policy of repressed interest rates, called financial repression, was pursued in 
both regions. Financial restraint seemed to function better in East Asia than in Africa due to: 
 
I. The higher economic growth in East Asia which facilitated increased liquidity to the 
system. 
 
II. Increased rural presence of financial institutions in East Asia which helped the access to 
credit for many of the poor and increased their ability to save. 
 
III. Africa financed a higher degree of public investment and often without conditionality 
attached to preferential loans, while East Asia more often financed private investments 
with a high degree of conditionality which facilitated more effective investments. 
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IV. The policies geared to the financial sector were to a higher degree coordinated with 
other economic policies in East Asia than in Africa. 
 
In the period after 1980 many East Asian countries liberalised their financial systems. Africa 
also attempted to liberalise their financial systems through the SAP. The liberalisation process 
was however far more successful in East Asian relative to Africa: I would claim that there are 
at least four reasons for this outcome: 
 
I. Liberalisation in East Asia was more custom-made to the needs of the individual 
economy while the reforms of the SAP were more universal “one-shoe-fits-all” 
solutions which to a lesser degree took country specific needs in Africa into account. 
 
II. There was economic growth present in East Asia which facilitated increased liquidity to 
the financial sector, while this was not the case in Africa. 
 
III. There was a far greater macroeconomic stability in East Asia relative to Africa which 
made the financial liberalisation more successful. 
 
IV. East Asian governments were better than their counterparts in Africa in building the 
institutions that would facilitate a transition to more open financial systems. 
 
There is a large ongoing debate regarding the nature of the financial systems reforms under 
the SAP and why they failed in Africa. Also the nature of the recent East Asian financial 
crisis is hotly disputed with some blaming faulty industrial policies while others claim that it 
was faulty liberalisation policies. A consensus that is emerging from the debate, however, is 
the need for strong institutions to allow the smooth functioning of financial systems. 
 
The second of the three industrial policy issues was learning and technology. There seem to 
be three areas of consensus regarding the learning and technology arguments. 
 
I. The first area of consensus is the vital role of human skills. East Asia started with a far 
larger base of human skills than Africa and was also able to build on this early 
advantage far better than Africa. The focus of studies was more adapted to the needs of 
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the manufacturing sector and the quality of education was far higher in East Asia 
relative to Africa. 
 
II. The second area of consensus is that learning takes place at the firm level. Firms were 
far more capable to learn and innovate in East Asia than in Africa. Some would attribute 
to the increased availability of human skills and finance alone. Others will also 
emphasise the role of the state, which was far more effective in East Asia giving more 
relevant and direct support for the learning process of firms than in Africa. The role of 
direct industrial support, however, is debated and is often at the heart of the industrial 
policy debate. This debate is unlikely to die any time soon with evidence pointing in 
multiple directions. What both critics and sceptics of selective industrial support seem to 
agree on is that this support was far more effective in East Asia since there were a 
number of conditionality attached to this support such as export and production targets 
which meant that resources were more efficiently exploited and this gave incentives for 
technological upgrading. Also, there seems to be an agreement that the lack of effective 
conditionality or competitive pressure was much of the reason for why such selective 
industrial support failed in promoting an efficient utilisation of resources and facilitate a 
process of learning and technological upgrading in Africa. 
 
III. The last area of consensus is that most technology is generated internationally. East Asia 
have had a stronger institutional framework to learn and diffuse technology through for 
instance reverse engineering and this might partly the higher success of this strategy for 
countries like Japan and South Korea. Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) played a more 
vital role for other East Asian countries, but to varying degrees. FDI in Africa, 
especially in manufacturing has been very scarce. The availability of technology has 
been higher for East Asia than for Africa. But it seems that lack of learning and 
technological upgrading in Africa to a large extent was a function of the weak national 
absorptive capacity rather than the availability of the technology per se. Also, the 
economic growth process and the upgrading of industrial and human skills in East Asia 
made more technologies available and thus the availability of technology was partly a 
function of economic growth. 
 
The last of the three areas of industrial policy I covered was the coordination of economic 
policy. Normally, this goes for the complementary investment argument, but I extended the 
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argument to cover two vital elements of economic growth; i) Take-off; and ii) The 
continuation of economic growth. East Asia was able to achieve both. I emphasised three 
elements what made the East Asian take-offs qualitative different from those countries that 
managed to achieve them in Africa: 
 
I. The agricultural fundament: In East Asia there was a large increase in the productivity 
of the agricultural sector which laid the necessary fundament for a sustained economic 
modernisation process; in Africa this did in general not occur and I believe this can be 
attributed to a combination of poor policies and geographic hardships. 
 
II. The growth vision: East Asian countries managed to create challenging but realistic 
growth visions for their economies and were able to mobilise and coordinate 
investments and other resources to achieve these growth visions. In Africa growth 
visions were either unrealistic, non-consistent and/or frequently changing due to the 
frequent changes in leadership which all contributed to the lack of “real” growth 
visions might be vital to achieve economic growth from low stages of development. 
 
III. Institutional innovations: In East Asia the institutional innovations that were needed 
for the economic take-off were often given a “local flavour” so they would not be too 
far away from the local environment thereby achieving more legitimacy and the 
institutions were more adapted to the local needs which enhanced the workings of the 
institutions in question. African institutional innovations often lacked a certain degree 
of local embeddeness which made these institutional innovations less legitimate and 
less adapted to the African context. At least equally important were the rapid shifts in 
institutions which often followed shifts in the political leadership which often led to 
those institutional innovations became a source of uncertainty rather than its decrease. 
 
Maintaining growth might be more difficult than the initial take-off which might be shown by 
the fact that many developing countries have had short growth spurts without being able to 
maintain this growth over longer periods. I believe that four elements account for much of 
why East Asia has been able to maintain a high growth rate over a longer sustained period: 
 
I. The role of coordinating institutions to secure a more cohesive economic policy. 
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II. Governmental learning with feedback mechanisms with the private sector which 
helped forming a pragmatic policy in a process of “learning-by-doing” by policy 
makers 
 
III. Structural changes were dealt with by compensating so-called “declining industries” 
so they could restructure or lend them liquidity in times of short-term distress 
 
IV. The role of binding institutions such as property rights and the rule-of-law which 
shows that government had a credible commitment to economic growth by reducing 
its own power thereby potentially increasing entrepreneurial activity. 
 
I believe that the continuation of the lack of economic growth in Africa for a large part was 
explained by. 
 
I. The lack of coordination in the state sector with a fragmented decision structure and 
unclear responsibility across departments. 
 
II. African states have been plagued by frequent changes in power and policy reversals 
which have left a legacy of a “stop-and-go” policy which increased the transaction 
costs of economic activity by increasing uncertainty. 
 
III. The lack or the underdevelopment of binding institutions such as property rights or the 
rule-of-law has left the government as a non-reliable partner since they were not 
perceived to be committed to economic growth. 
 
The last of the three economic policy causes which have been looked at are trade policies. 
Until the 1970s import substitution industrialisation (ISI) meant that; i) Imports were to be 
substituted with domestic production; ii) Overvalued exchange rates would facilitate 
increased imports; and iii) Increasing trade barriers were set up to prevent balance-of-payment 
problems. In Africa the ISI strategy was not sustainable due to: 
 
I. Increased macroeconomic difficulties due to an increasing BoP deficit and increasing 
inflationary pressure. 
 
 177
II. High levels of protectionism and economic planning led to a highly inefficient 
industrial sector. 
 
III. Small home markets reduced the potential for home-market led development even 
further in Africa and implementation problems due to a weak state capacity increased 
some of the adverse effects.  
 
Some of these effects were shared by the implementers of the IS strategy and planned 
economies in East Asia. But, Japan and the FGT were able to grow faster than other 
developing countries. Other fast growing East Asian countries started to copy the trade policy 
of the first movers countries from the 1970s and onwards. The trade policy had three major 
characteristics which remained more or less the same until today: 
 
I. There was an active promotion of exports, especially in industrialised goods. There 
was a focus on fostering international competitive industries with high earning 
potentials. 
 
II. Trade policies were often strategic in the sense that they supported sector specific 
needs and protected sectors that were not ready for international competition. Often 
trade policies were seen as a small part of a larger economic policy 
 
III. There was a high degree of institutional support for exporters, for instance through the 
Trade Promotion Centres. 
 
From the 1980s and onward the East Asian trade policies followed along similar lines as 
before, but the African trade policy changed dramatically. There were attempts to follow a 
more export-led development, but there were large qualitative differences with East Asia: 
 
I. There was a substantial import liberalisation following the SAP, but the anti-export 
bias remained in many countries. This led to increased import competition, without the 
same possibilities for export increases. 
 
II. Trade policies were adopted universally across all sectors bypassing sector specific 
needs giving less attention to the technological upgrading of the export sector. 
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 III. The institutional support to support an export-promotion strategy were lacking in 
Africa. 
 
The broad differences between the trade policies in the two regions can be summarised as: 
 
• Africa, to a far larger extent than East Asia, was prone to “academic fashions” going 
the whole line from ISI to an open economy strategy. East Asia’s trade policies were 
more independent from such fashions and to a higher degree the policies that were 
deemed most beneficial for their economies were pursued. 
 
• East Asian governments to far larger extent were able to take sector specific needs into 
account when forming their industrial policies since trade policies only was a smaller 
part of a larger coherent economic policy. The SAP did not take sector specific needs 
into account since neutral market incentives would make the most efficient firms 
prosper, but many of the African companies were instead out-competed as imports 
increased faster than exports. 
 
• The institutional support framework in East Asia, even in the liberal trade regime of 
Hong Kong, was far stronger than in Africa. There was no apparent strategy for 
upgrading the institutional framework for supporting exports in Africa within the SAP, 
making the export-promotion strategy a more daunting challenge. 
 
Institutions 
I have chosen to define institutions according the old institutional theory closer to the term 
“social codes”, rather than the new institutional theory “agents of restraint”. A reason for my 
choice is that institutions have synergy effects and need to be analysed in their social context 
to be able to make a meaningful assessment. Thereby a term like legitimacy becomes vital in 
the understanding of institutional change. I have emphasised three institutional explanations; 
i) Technological; ii) State capacity; and iii) Social embeddedness. 
 
Firms in East Asia have shown a far higher ability to master new technologies with the state, 
universities and public research institutions all playing important supporting roles in a well 
integrated NSI network relative to Africa. In Africa, in addition to having a weak and 
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fragmented NSI network at the outset of the period, have experienced declining funding of 
these institutions during the SAP era reducing their ability to learn and master new 
technologies. Also human skills play a crucial role in the functioning of the various elements 
of the NSI and there integration. The higher human skills in East Asia gave them a major 
advantage over Africa. In addition, other policies that supported the wider functioning of the 
NSI framework, such as competition rules and the financial system were far more supportive 
of firms in East Asia than in Africa. 
 
The second institutional explanation regards the state capacity where it looks at state’s ability 
to set the agenda, formulate and implement economic policy. The effects of other sources of 
influences and the ability to resist pressures thus become significant. I covered three levels. 
The first was at the international level. It is clear that East Asia has been far more autonomous 
than Africa in choosing their own policies. In addition some countries got US support during 
the Cold War through preferential market access and were very skilful diplomats in 
international trade negotiations. Africa seems to have lost more of its autonomy, especially 
after the 1982 debt crisis and the end of the Cold War in 1990 which increased the foreign 
financial dependence. The second level covered the internal capacity of the state. East Asia 
had; i) Pilot agencies consisting of highly skilled technocratic economic planners; ii) A 
competent and efficient bureaucracy; and iii) Efficient decision making bodies with stable and 
continues policies. Africa, on the hand, had; i) A low bureaucratic capacity; ii) An inefficient 
decision making-body with unstable and frequently changing policies; and iii) Increased 
donor involvement in the national policy-decision weakening the internal political institutions 
and which also led to decreasing funds for the bureaucracy. The final level was the influence 
of domestic political forces on the state’s policies. The “public choice model” predicts a 
capture of the state by vested interests. In East Asia, though, this seems not to have happened. 
Instead, the state has been able to consult the private sector in the policy formulation process 
without being captured by it. This is closer to Evans’ (1995) concept of “embedded 
autonomy”. In Africa as well, there seems to be little evidence that urban coalitions have 
captured the state. As a matter of fact, there seems to be more evidence that the state has been 
captured by vested foreign, rather than domestic interests in most African countries. The 
BWIs have increasingly become entangled in the domestic political process since the 
initiation of the SAP blocking alternatives to the neo-liberal policies. 
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The third institutional explanation looks at the state’s social embeddedness in society which 
comprises of more than their mere economic role. Regarding conflict management East Asian 
governments have been able to maintain social stability which is partly interlinked with 
economic growth. There were a host of means, for instance protectionist measures to protect 
farmers. Many have criticised such practice since it was economic inefficient. But, they often 
tend to forget the bigger picture that these reforms did not look for the optimal economic 
solutions, but the most optimal social solution. Economic growth is crucially dependent on 
social stability and non-economic factors such as social stability are imperative. Africa has 
had more conflicts than any other region in the world and the lack of economic growth 
certainly plays a large role. The state often did not have the capacity to deal with these 
conflicts and was very often the source of conflict itself. This brings me over to the second 
aspect of social embeddedness, namely legitimacy. The East Asian governments were 
perceived as being far more legitimate than their African counterparts due to a higher 
accountability and the ability to better align institutional change close to the pre-existing 
institutions. In addition, the increased foreign involvement is even less legitimate in the eyes 
of many Africans and this has contributed in making foreign policy “recommendations” very 
hard to implement. Institutional change, just like policies, need to come from a reliable 
source. The BWIs don’t have much legitimacy in Africa, especially through their lack of 
accountability for the results of their own policies, and have become less and less legitimate 
as a source for institutional and policy change over time. 
 
Putting the threads together 
There is no doubt that the evidence is abundant enough to support the claim that Africa had 
more difficulties from the outset in achieving economic growth than East Asia due to a 
number of causes such geography, demography and the burden of history. Government 
polices may therefore have had less effect in affecting economic growth in Africa than in East 
Asia due to these causes. But, there is a limit to such an explanations and growth episodes in 
Africa show that geography is not destiny. 
 
Economic policies have varied in both regions throughout the period. The debate has mainly 
been between the neo-liberal policy recommendations and the structural schools of thought I 
have covered in this thesis, which I termed the revisionist. The evidence, which policy 
promotes economic growth, is mixed. The neo-liberals seem to have their strongest arguments 
with; i) The differences in macroeconomic stability; ii) Economic growth in East Asia driven 
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by private investment, while Africa had a high degree of public investment; and iii) The high 
export growth in East Asia and the lack of such in Africa. Some of the counterarguments from 
the revisionist have most validity in explaining: i) The learning and technology upgrading 
process in both regions; ii) Strategic industrial and trade policy in East Asia; and iii) The role 
of the bureaucracy and pilot agencies in East Asia and their lacking quality in Africa. The role 
of the financial systems is still disputed and it’s not evident which “camp” has the “best” 
evidence. All in all it’s difficult for one school to claim superiority over the other since the 
evidence is mixed. I still believe the revisionists have somewhat huger validity in arguing for 
country specific rather than the more universal neo-liberal solutions. Developing countries 
seem to have different needs than developed countries, something that also has been 
acknowledged by the WTO when arguing for preferential trade agreements for the least 
developing countries. But, at the same time, since the policy recommendations are country-
specific the policy recommendations become somewhat less clear which might historically 
have weakened the revisionist position politically due to less clear messages than the neo-
liberals. In all the role of policies in the East Asia growth process was, nevertheless, far more 
efficient, consistent, stable and transparent than in the African case. The SAP in Africa has 
contributed rather than to resolve this situation. A large mistake in the formulation of the SAP 
was that all state intervention was seen as undesirable, leading to a weakening of the state and 
its ability to formulate policies and build institutions which would support economic activity. 
 
Institutional explanations gave a far clearer message than the economic policy I reviewed. 
The institutional explanations I have covered have shown a far more favourable institutional 
climate for East Asia than for Africa. As Haggard (2004) mentioned, one should be cautious 
when analysing institutions. The biggest error could be to assume that when economic growth 
takes place, the institutions are automatically “good”. Also, it makes one wonder what is a 
neutrally “good” institution. All three institutional explanations emphasised the decreasing 
institutional support since the initiation of the SAP in Africa. It also emphasised that the 
technological support, the state capacity and the social embeddeness of the state all were 
greater in East Asia prior to the SAP as well, explaining a large part of the growth difference. 
Technological institutions lost funding during the SAP and have weakened the African 
economies ability to be able to catch-up technologically. Another large mistake in the SAP era 
was the undermining of African political institutions, given foreigners more political 
influence in Africa. Political autonomy is a necessary, but in it self insufficient condition for 
economic growth. The conditioanlities and the creations of binding rules for African 
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governments would have been valid in so far the neo-liberal economic policy 
recommendations were far superior to other recommendations. The evidence, as I reviewed 
above, is far from conclusive, but more country-specific policies seemed to have played a 
large role in East Asia. Autonomy is needed to pursue such country-specific policies. The lack 
of accountability also has made the BWIs policy “recommendations” less legitimate, thereby 
lowering the implementation of their policies. 
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Appendix #1 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Angola   Kenya*   Saint Helena 
Benin    Congo    Sao Tome 
Botswana*   Congo, DR (Zaire)*  Senegal 
Burkina Faso   Lesotho   Central African Republic 
Burundi   Liberia   Seychelles   
Comoros    Madagascar   Sierra Leone  
Djibouti    Malawi   Somalia 
Cote D’Ivoire   Mali    Sudan*  
Equatorial Guinea  Mauritania   South Africa*   
Eritrea    Mauritius   Swaziland 
Ethiopia*   Mayotte   Tanzania*  
Gabon    Mozambique   Chad 
Gambia   Namibia   Togo 
Ghana    Niger    Uganda 
Guinea   Nigeria*   Vest Sahara 
Guinea Bissau   Reunion   Zambia  
Cameroon   Rwanda   Zimbabwe 
Cape Verde       
 
East Asia 
Philippines*   China*   Singapore 
Hong Kong, China  Laos    South Korea* 
Indonesia*   Malaysia   Taiwan, China 
Japan*    Myanmar (Burma)  Thailand* 
Cambodia   North Korea   Vietnam* 
 
The countries that are marked are the common reference countries in tables in so far there is 
data available. In tables aggregate figures plus figures for the seven most populous African 
countries plus Botswana and the seven most populous countries in East Asia based on the 
population statistics by Maddison (2001) for the year 2000. In that way the figures are most 
relevant since they affect such high proportions of the populations of the regions. Botswana is 
the only exception to the rule since I will touch upon the Botswana example numerous times 
during my discussions. The seven most populous countries in East Asia amount for 93.8 % of 
the regions total population in 1950 and this figure was stable during this period and 
amounted 93.2 % in the year 2000. The share of the eight African countries was 52.9 % of the 
region’s total population in 1950 and this figure was also relatively stable and amounted to 
54.1 % in 2000. 
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Appendix #2 – HDI index 
 
Table HDI Index 
 Rank 2003 HDI index 
value 2003 
Expected 
life 
expectancy 
at birth 
2003 
Share of 
adults with 
reading 
and writing 
abilities 
2003 
School 
attendance 
at primary, 
secondary 
and tertiary 
level 2003 
GDP per 
capita 
(PPP) 2003 
Japan 11 0,943 82,0 - 84 27.967
Hong Kong 22 0,916 81,6 93,5 74 27.179
Singapore 25 0,907 78,7 92,5 87 24.481
South 
Korea 
28 0,901 77,0 97,9 93 17.971
Seychelles 51 0,821 72,7 91,9 85 10.232
Malaysia 61 0,796 73,2 88,7 71 9.512
Mauritius  65 0,791 72,2 84,3 71 11.287
Thailand 73 0,778 70,0 92,6 73 7.595
Philippines 84 0,758 70,4 92,6 73 7.595
Kina 85 0,755 71,6 90,9 69 5.003
Cape 
Verde  
105 0,721 70,4 75,7 73 5.214
Vietnam 108 0,704 70,5 90,3 77 4.230
Indonesia 110 0,697 66,8 87,9 66 3.361
South 
Africa 
120 0,658 48,4 82,4 78 10.346
Equatorial 
Guinea  
121 0,655 43,3 84,2 65 19.780
Gabon  123 0,635 54,5 71,0 74 6.397
Namibia  125 0,627 48,3 85,0 71 6.180
Sao Tome 126 0,604 63,0 83,1 62 1.231
Myanmar 129 0,578 60,2 89,7 48 n.a.
Cambodia 130 0,571 56,2 73,6 59 2.078
Botswana  131 0,565 36,3 78,9 70 8.714
Comoros  132 0,547 63,2 56,2 47 1.714
Laos 133 0,545 54,7 68,7 61 1.759
Ghana  138 0,520 56,8 54,1 46 2.238
Sudan 141 0,512 56,4 59,0 38 1.910
Congo  142 0,512 52,0 82,8 47 965
Togo 143 0,512 54,3 53,0 66 1.696
Uganda 144 0,508 47,3 68,9 74 1.457
Zimbabwe 145 0,505 36,9 90,0 55 2.443
Madagasca
r  
146 0,499 55,4 70,6 51 809
Swaziland 147 0,498 32,5 79,2 60 4.726
Cameroon  148 0,497 36,3 81,4 66 2.561
Lesotho  149 0,497 36,3 81,4 66 2.561
Djibouti  150 0,495 52,8 65,5 24 2.086
Mauritania  152 0,477 52,7 51,2 45 1.766
Kenya  154 0,474 47,2 73,6 52 1.037
Gambia  155 0,470 55,7 37,8 48 1.859
Guinea  156 0,466 53,7 41,0 41 2.097
Senegal 157 0,458 55,7 39,3 40 1,648
Nigeria  158 0,453 43,4 66,8 64 1.050
Rwanda 159 0,450 43,9 64,0 55 1.268
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Angola  160 0,445 40,8 66,8 30 2.344
Eritrea  161 0,444 53,8 56,7 35 849
Benin  162 0,431 54,0 33,6 55 1.115
Cote 
D’Ivoire  
163 0,420 45,9 48,1 42 1.476
Tanzania 164 0,418 46,0 69,4 41 621
Malawi  165 0,404 39,7 64,1 72 605
Zambia 166 0,394 37,5 67,9 48 877
Congo, DR 
(Zaire)  
167 0,385 43,1 65,3 28 697
Mozambiq
ue  
168 0,379 41,9 46,5 43 1.117
Burundi  169 0,378 43,6 58,9 35 648
Ethiopia  170 0,367 47,6 41,5 36 711
Central 
African 
Republic 
171 0,355 39,3 48,6 31 1.089
Guinea 
Bissau  
172 0,348 44,7 39,6 37 711
Chad  173 0,341 43,6 25,5 38 1.210
Mali  174 0,333 47,9 19,0 32 994
Burkina 
Faso  
175 0,317 47,5 12,8 24 1.174
Sierra 
Leone 
176 0,298 40,8 29,6 45 548
Niger  177 0,281 44,4 14,4 21 835
N.a. stands for not available) 
Source: Human Development Report 2005 s. 219-222 
 
 206
Appendix #3 – Ethnic Fragmentation (EF) index 
 
Table EF index 
 EF index value Ranking Region 
Congo DR 0,885 1 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Uganda 0,883 2 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Kenya 0,877 3 Sub-Saharan Africa 
South Africa 0,873 5 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Cameroon 0,852 6 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Mali  0,844 7 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Philippines 0,838 8 East Asia 
Nigeria  0,827 9 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Tanzania  0,827 9 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Cote D’Ivoire 0,826 11 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Mauritius 0,814 13 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Zambia 0,813 14 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Chad 0,810 15 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Guinea-Bissau 0,806 16 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Senegal  0,778 20 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Madagascar  0,776 21 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Angola 0,771 22 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Gabon 0,765 24 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Gambia 0,764 25 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Central African Republic 0,757 26 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Ethiopia (pre may 1993) 0,756 27 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Indonesia 0,754 28 East Asia 
Liberia 0,745 30 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Ghana 0,742 31 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Guinea 0,741 32 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Burkina Faso 0,734 35 Sub-Saharan Africa 
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Mozambique 0,727 36 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Ethiopia (post 1993) 0,717 38 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Sudan 0,715 39 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Eritrea 0,699 43 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Malaysia 0,694 44 East Asia 
Malawi 0,691 45 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Togo 0,689 46 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Congo Brazzaville 0,685 48 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Niger 0,671 53 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Namibia 0,663 59 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Mauritania 0,660 61 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Benin 0,660 61 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Djibouti 0,585 78 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Cape Verde 0,551 89 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Thailand 0,535 95 East Asia 
Zimbabwe 0,522 100 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Myanmar 0,520 101 East Asia 
Singapore 0,479 116 East Asia 
Sao Tome and Principe 0,420 129 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Botswana 0,418 130 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Equatorial Guinea 0,395 137 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Vest Sahara 0,343 144 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Vietnam 0,262 163 East Asia 
Burundi 0,258 164 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Somalia 0,256 165 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Lesotho 0,253 172 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Komorene 0,241 173 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Cambodia 0,238 175 East Asia 
Swaziland 0,186 185 Sub-Saharan Africa 
China 0,125 202 East Asia 
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Seychellene 0,115 205 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Macao 0,096 211 East Asia 
Japan 0,079 216 East Asia 
Taiwan 0,039 228 East Asia 
Hong Kong 0,039 228 East Asia 
Mayotte 0,020 231 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Korea, North 0,004 239 East Asia 
Korea, South 0,002 240 East Asia 
Source: Yeoh (2001) 
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Appendix #4 – Increase in world trade 
 
Diagram 2: Average annual growth rate in merchandise exports 
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It’s worth nothing at least three points from the diagram. Firstly, there has been an high 
growth rate in world trade in the whole period from 1950 to 2004, in excess of 7 % annually; 
and growth rate was the highest in the period from 1950 to 1973 when it exceeded 8 % 
annually. Secondly, in all periods the growth in industrial goods has been higher than for 
primary goods in all periods and driven most of the increase in world trade. Industrial export 
growth was especially high in the period from 1950 to 1973 when it laid close to a annual 
growth rate of 10 %. Finally, there are large variations between periods with regard to the 
growth rate of minerals and fossils as well as agricultural goods. This has made the reliance 
on such goods for the majority of ones export income has lead to difficulties for those 
countries with such dependence. The annual growth in minerals and fossils declined from 7 % 
in the period 1950 to 1973 to less than 1 % in the period 1973 to 1990. Such a major decrease 
of course is related to the oil price shocks, but oil alone cannot explain the whole drop in 
yearly growth rates. 
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Appendix #5 – Enrolment in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Figure A5.1: Gross enrolment ratios in Africa 1960 – 1995 
 
 
 
 
Figure A5.2: Public Expenditure on Education as a percentage of GDP, 1970 to 1996 
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Figure A5.3.1: Government Expenditure on Primary Education per student in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (constant 1990 US$) 
 
 
Figure A5.3.2: Government Expenditure on Secondary Education per student in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (cost in constant 1990 US$) 
 
 
Figure A5.3.3: Government Expenditure on Tertiary Education per student in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (constant 1990US$) 
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